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Abstract 
Innovation is vital to companies’ competitive advantages and is an important 
driver of economic growth. However, innovation is costly, since the innovation 
process is long, idiosyncratic, and uncertain, often involving a very high failure 
probability and great positive externalities .We thus launch the investigation from 
the following three aspects to explore how to create a better environment for 
producing innovation: Financing of innovation; dual-class share structure of 
innovation; and regulation and policy (e.g. SOX Act.)'s impact on innovation. 
First of all, we study the effect of firms’ real estate collateral on innovation. In 
the presence of financing frictions, firms can use real estate assets as collateral to 
finance innovation. Through this collateral channel, positive shocks to the value of 
real estate collateral enhance firms’ financing capacity and lead to more 
innovation. Empirically, a one standard deviation increase in a firm’s real estate 
valuation is associated with an 8% increase in the quantity, quality, generality, and 
originality of its patents applied in the same year, and such positive effect is 
persistent over subsequent five years. The positive effect is more pronounced for 
firms that are financially constrained, dependent on debt finance, or belonging to 
hard-to-innovate industries. Our results suggest that corporate real estate collateral 
serves an important role in mitigating financial constraints, which leads to more 
innovation outputs. 
Second, we try to explore how the dual-class share structure would affect the 
in production of innovation. Despite the risk of power abuse by corporate insiders 
 
 
with excessive control rights, technology companies are increasingly adopting 
dual-class share structures. In this paper, we show that such structures are 
negatively associated with corporate innovation measures. For dual-class firms, 
patents are increasing in Tobin’s Q, high-tech or hard-to-innovate industries, 
external takeover market threats or product market competition. Our findings are 
robust to reverse causality. To ensure that these findings are not the result of 
reverse causality, we examine a subsample of firms that switch from single-class  
Third, we investigate whether innovation by publicly listed U.S. companies 
deteriorated significantly after the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
Using data on patent filings as proxies for firms’ innovative activities, we find 
firms’ innovation as measured by patents and innovation efficiency dampened 
significantly after the enactment of the Act. The degree of impact is related to firm 
specific characteristics such as firm value (Tobin’s Q) or corporate governance 
(G-Index) as well as firms’ operating conditions (i.e., high-tech industries, delisted 
or not). We find evidence that SOX’s impact on firms is more pronounced for 
growth firms, firms with low governance scores, firms operating in high-tech 
industries or firms that continued to stay listed. Overall, the results suggests that 
the SOX has an unintended consequence of stifling corporate innovation. 
 
 
Keywords: Innovation; patents; Financing capacity; Real estate collateral; 
Financing constraints; dual-class; market conditions; corporate governance; 
Innovation; Sarbanes-Oxley; R&D expenditures 
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Part I Corporate Real Estate Collateral and Innovation 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Innovation is vital to companies’ competitive advantages (Porter, 1992) and is 
an important driver of economic growth (Solow, 1957; Baumol, 2001). However, 
innovation is costly, since the innovation process is long, idiosyncratic, and 
uncertain, often involving a very high failure probability (Holmstrom, 1989) and 
great positive externalities (Arrow, 1962). As a result, under-investment in 
innovation is prevalent. Hall and Lerner (2010) attribute such under-investment to 
a severe “funding gap”. 
A large literature suggests that a firm’s debt financing capacity, i.e., ability to 
access debt financing at low cost and respond to changes in investment 
opportunities in a timely manner (Denis, 2011), affects its investment policy. 
Corporations rely heavily on bank loans and corporate debts as their sources of 
external ﬁnancing, the use of collateral is important as it helps alleviate agency 
costs in the presence of moral hazard, adverse selection, or contracting frictions 
due to asymmetric information (Chan and Thakor, 1987; Mayer, 1990; Holmstrom 
and Tirole, 1997; Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame, and Miller, 2011). For example, 
Benmelech, Garmaise, and Moskowitz (2005) show that the liquidation values of 
collateralized assets are first-order determinants of loan contract terms. Firms with 
greater collateral value are able to raise external funds at lower cost (e.g. Berger, 
Frame and Ioannidou, 2011; Lin, Ma, Malatesta, and Xuan, 2011). Thus, a large 
decline in the value of collateralized assets reduces a ﬁrm’s credit-worthiness, 
which negatively impacts its debt financing capacity and ability to invest (e.g., 
Bernanke and Gertler, 1989, 1990), while a positive shock to collateralized assets 
enhances a firm’s debt financing capacity, which allows it to borrow and invest 
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more (Barro, 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Hart and Moore, 1994; Tirole, 2005; 
Jimenez, Salas and Saurina, 2006; Benmelech and Bergman, 2009). 
Notwithstanding the extensive evidence on the link between debt financing 
capacity and investment (see Hubbard (1998) and Stein (2003) for comprehensive 
reviews), to the best of our knowledge no prior study directly tests the role of debt 
financing capacity on investment in innovation. In this paper we address this gap 
in the literature by building on recent studies on the role of collateral in mitigating 
financing constraints. This literature establishes that a firm’s real assets collateral 
can be used to reduce financing costs, enhance financing capacity, and mitigate 
financing constraints. We hypothesize that, to the extent that firms’ innovation 
decisions are affected by their financing capacity, the improvement in firms’ 
financing capacity due to increases in the collateralized real estate value should 
enhance their innovation output. 
An empirical challenge in making causal inferences between debt financing 
capacity and innovation lies in identifying an exogenous shock to these variables. 
For instance, a firm’s innovation policy might have feedback effects on the firm’s 
financing capacity. Unobservable firm heterogeneity correlated with both 
financing capacity and innovation policies could also bias empirical results. To 
empirically test our hypothesis, we exploit changes in the real estate prices at the 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) or state level as exogenous shocks to the 
collateral value of a firm’s real estate assets. Prior work shows that the value of 
the real estate that a firm owns will affect its financing capacity through the 
collateral channel, particularly for financing-constrained firms (e.g., Gan, 2007; 
Benmelech and Bergman, 2009; Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar, 2012). Thus, if 
financing capacity affects a firm’s investment in innovation, we would expect an 
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exogenous positive (negative) shock to the value of collateralized real estate to 
result in increased (decreased) corporate innovation productivity. A key advantage 
of this identification strategy is that it not only captures variation in exogenous 
shocks to debt financing capacity, but also solves the omitted variables concern by 
allowing for multiple shocks to different firms at different times and locations. 
Turning to innovation, we follow prior literature (e.g., Lerner, Sorensen and 
Stromberg, 2011) and use the number of patent applications in a given year that 
are eventually granted as the innovation measure. Patents are valuable innovation 
outputs that are actively traded in intellectual property markets. The number of 
patent applications eventually granted is thus a direct measure of the quantity and 
quality of a firm’s innovation activity (Griliches, 1990). In additional analyses, we 
also use the number of patent citations, patent generality, and patent originality as 
alternative measures of innovation productivity.  
Using a comprehensive sample of U.S. firms from COMPUSTAT Data over 
the 1993 to 2006 period, we find that a change in corporate real estate collateral 
value is significantly positively associated with innovation productivity. In 
particular, a one-standard-deviation increase in the logarithm of the value of 
collateralized real estate assets in year t is associated with an 8.2% increase in the 
number of patent applications, or 0.33 new patent applications, in the same year 
for a given firm. The positive effect of a change in the value of real estate assets 
on innovation is even stronger in year t+1, and then decreases gradually but 
remains significant through yeart+5. We observe similarly strong and significant 
positive effects of real estate collateral on our alternative measures of innovation 
productivity, namely, the number of patent citations as well as patent generality 
and originality.  
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The analysis above may subject to endogeneity concerns. First, real estate 
prices could be correlated with local innovation performance. For example, Firms 
that are more productive in innovation may demand for more local labor and local 
products, thus they could push up real estate prices in the local market, which 
would be captured by the increase in their own real estate assets value. We 
address this concern using two-stage instrumental variable (IV) regressions. 
Following Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005), Mian and Sufi (2011), and 
Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012), we use the interaction of local housing 
supply elasticity and long-term real interest rate as an instrument. These two 
variables are not related to corporate innovation productivity but are highly 
associated with the real state price. The IV regressions report robust positive 
relationship between the change in real estate value and innovation productivity, 
suggesting that our findings are not driven by reverse causality problems. 
Second, a firm with more innovation may decide to own more real estate 
assets, leading to an increase in the value of its real estate assets. We make two 
attempts address the second concern: (1) we control for observable determinants 
of firms’ real estate ownership decision in our baseline regressions. The results 
remain unchanged; (2) we run subsample regressions examining the sensitivity of 
innovation on real estate prices for the non-land-purchasers that never own real 
estate, the future purchases before they do so, and the purchases after they do so, 
separately. We find that the sensitivity is large, positive, and significant only after 
firms acquire real estate.  However, the sensitivity is statistically insignificant for 
the purchasers before they acquire real estate and the non-land-purchasers that 
never own real estate. Thus our findings are not driven by omitted firm 
characteristics affecting the real estate ownership decision and innovation.  
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After demonstrating that the collateral value of real estate has a positive effect 
on innovation outputs, we then partition our sample in several ways to examine 
the possible mechanisms explaining the positive effect. First, we test whether 
companies’ financial constraints affect the sensitivity of their innovation outputs 
respond to changes in the value of real estate collateral. In the presence of 
financial constraints, constrained firms can use their real estate assets as collateral 
to finance their investment in innovation when they otherwise would be unable to 
do so. We hence expect such positive effects of real estate collateral to be stronger 
for constrained firms with costly and limited debt financing sources. Our findings 
are consistent with this prediction. Utilizing measures like the KZ index, debt 
rating and paper rating as proxies for financial constraints (Kaplan and Zingales, 
1997; Whited and Wu, 2006; Denis and Sibilkov, 2010; Farre-Mensa and 
Ljungqvist, 2013), we find that the positive effect concentrates in the subsample 
of financially constrained firms and is insignificant for firms not subjecting to 
financial constraints. Our findings thus demonstrate that companies with costly 
and limited financial resources benefit the most from the appreciation of real 
estate collateral value to improve their innovation.  
 Second, we test how debt financing dependence impacts the positive effect of 
real estate collateral on innovation. As the collateral value of real estate assets 
appreciates, financially constrained firm can borrow external debt as a fraction the 
collateral value of their real estate assets. The literature (e.g., in Hart and Moore 
1994; Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar, 2012) shows that an increase in collateral 
value indeed leads to more issues of debt secured on the appreciated value of land 
holdings, which provides financing for investment in innovation. We thus expect 
that the positive effect of real estate collateral on innovation would be stronger for 
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debt dependent firms which have relatively greater need for debt financing 
compared to firms that only reply on equity financing. Empirically, we find that 
an increase in the value of real estate collateral leads to significantly more 
innovation for firms with existing debt outstanding, as a proxy for debt financing 
dependence, and no impact for firms without debt. Again, our findings provide 
evidence that companies that have greater needs for debt financing take advantage 
of the appreciation of real estate collateral value to improve their innovation.  
 Lastly, if an increase in the collateral value of real estate assets improves 
firms’ innovation, because it helps to mitigate financial constraint and enhance 
debt financing capacity through alleviating agency costs and contracting frictions 
associated with the innovation process which is long, uncertain, often involving a 
very high failure probability. We expect that the positive effect of real estate 
collateral should be especially pronounced in hard to innovation industries where 
the innovation process is highly long, uncertain, involving high failure risk, and 
demanding large resources. We split the full sample into two subsamples 
according to whether or not firms belong to difficult to innovation industries, 
following the work of Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) and Tian and Wang 
(2011) based on patent technology class. We find that the positive effect of real 
estate collateral only exists in the subsample of difficult to innovation industries 
and is insignificant for easy to innovation industries. These results hence suggest 
that the positive effect of real estate collateral for innovation is greater in 
industries in which innovation is more difficult to achieve, consistent with our 
prediction.  
Our research contributes to the literature on the relationship between 
innovation and financing. Cornaggia, Mao, Tian, and Wolfe (2013) show that 
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banks provide an important source of external financing for corporate innovation, 
particularly for firms that are financially constrained. Hsu, Tian and Xu (2013) 
instead show that the development of financial markets, especially equity markets, 
is important in encouraging innovation. Similarly, Atanassov, Nanda, and Seru 
(2007) find that publicly traded firms tend to rely on arm's length equity financing 
rather than relationship-based bank financing to invest in innovation. While the 
question of whether equity or debt financing is more relevant in stimulating 
innovation is outside the scope of the current paper, we shed light on the debate by 
showing empirically that the increase in debt financing capacity associated with 
an increase in the value of firms’ real estate collateral leads to greater innovation.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss 
our sample, the variables used in the analysis, and summary statistics. In Section 3 
we present the empirical results of baseline regressions and robustness tests, and 
in Section 4 we conclude. 
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Chapter 2 Sample Selection, Variable Measurement, and Summary Statistics  
1.2.1 Sample Selection 
Our sample construction and empirical approach follow Chaney, Sraer, and 
Thesmar (2012), who identify variations in local real estate prices, either at the 
state of the MSA level, as exogenous shocks to firms’ financing capacity through 
the collateral channel. To obtain the market value of firms’ real estate holdings, 
we start with the sample of firms on COMPUSTAT in 1993 with non-missing 
total assets. We require that the firms exist in 1993 as this was the last year for 
which data on accumulated depreciation on buildings are available in 
COMPUSTAT. We next require that sample firms have sufficient information 
available to calculate the market value of real estate assets. We then omit firms 
not headquartered in the U.S., as well as firms not present for at least three 
consecutive years in the sample. We further exclude firms belonging to the 
finance, insurance, real estate, construction, or mining industries, and firms 
involved in major acquisitions. These filters result in a sample of 26,083 U.S. 
firm-year observations over the period 1993 to 2006. 
For each sample firm we collect annual information on innovation activity 
from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Patent Citation Data 
File. This dataset contains detailed information on more than three million patents 
granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) from 1976 to 
2006. It provides information such as patent assignee names, number of patents, 
number of citations received by each patent, patent application year as well as 
grant year, and patent technology class. One advantage of the NBER database is 
that it is unlikely to be affected by survivorship bias. As long as a patent 
application is eventually granted by the USPTO, it is attributed to the applying 
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firm at the time of application even if the firm later gets acquired or goes bankrupt. 
Moreover, because patent citations are attributed to a patent and not the applying 
firm, the patent granted to a firm that later gets acquired or goes bankrupt can still 
receive citations long after the firm disappears. 
We merge the NBER patent data with the real estate data from COMPUSTAT 
using a bridge file provided by the NBER database in which GVKEY is the 
common identifier. Following the innovation literature, we set the number of 
patents and citations to zero for firms that have no patent information available in 
the NBER database.  
 
1.2.2 Variable Measurement 
1.2.2.1 Real Estate Value 
 To measure the market value of a firm’s real estate collateral, we first follow 
Nelson, Potter, and Wilde (2000) to define a firm’s real estate assets as the sum of 
the three major categories of property, plant, and equipment (PPE): PPE land and 
improvement at cost (FATP in COMPUSTAT), PPE buildings at cost (FATB in 
COMPUSTAT), and PPE construction-in-progress at cost (FATC in 
COMPUSTAT). Then, because these assets are valued at historical cost rather 
than marked-to-market, we follow Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012) to recover 
their market value by calculating the average age of the assets and estimating their 
current market value using market prices.  
The detailed steps to recover the market value of a firm’s real estate assets are 
as follows. First, we take the ratio of the accumulated depreciation of buildings 
(DPACB in COMPUSTAT) to the historic cost of buildings (FATB in 
COMPUSTAT) and multiply by the assumed mean depreciable life of 40 years 
13 
 
(Nelson, Potter, and Wilde, 2000).
1
 This calculation approximates the age or the 
acquisition year of the firm’s real estate assets.  
Second, to adjust real estate prices, we retrieve the MSA- or state-level real 
estate price index from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight 
(OFHEO) for the period starting in 1975, when OFHEO real estate price index 
data are available, and the consumer price index (CPI) for the period prior to 1975. 
Because we have the mapping table between zip codes and MSA codes 
maintained by the U.S. Department of Labor’s Office of Workers’ Compensation 
Programs (OWCP) as well as the zip codes for each firm from COMPUSTAT, we 
use the zip code as an identifier to match the MSA code and the MSA-level real 
estate price index with accounting data for each firm from COMPUSTAT. Finally, 
we estimate the market value of a firm’s real estate assets for each year in the 
sample period (1993 to 2004) by multiplying the book value of the assets at 
acquisition (FATP+FATB+FATC) by the real estate price index for the given year.  
Note that following Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012), we do not incorporate 
the value of any real estate acquisitions or dispositions following 1993. This 
procedure helps to mitigate the possible endogeneity concern between real estate 
holdings and investment opportunities, since any future variations in the value of 
real estate assets are driven only by variations in real estate prices instead of 
endogenous changes in real estate holdings. In addition, as illustrated in Chaney et 
al. (2012), firms are not likely to sell real estate assets to realize the capital gains 
when confronted with an increase in their real estate value, thus alleviating some 
of our concerns stemming from measurement error on the real estate value. 
                                                          
1
The accumulated depreciation on buildings (DPACB) is not reported in COMPUSTAT after 1993. 
This is why we restrict our sample to firms active in 1993 when measuring the market value of real 
estate assets. 
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In Appendix B, we illustrate the above approach using the case of General 
Motors (GM). In 1993, GM has accumulated depreciation of buildings of 6889.7 
million U.S. dollars and historic cost of buildings of 13577 million U.S. dollars, 
and thus the ratio between these two items is 0.5075. To calculate the average age 
of GM’s real estate assets as of 1993, we multiply 0.5075 by the assumed mean 
depreciable life of 40 years. This gives an average age of 20 years, which implies 
an average acquisition year of 1973. We next multiply the historical cost of GM’s 
real estate assets by the cumulative price increase in the MSA-level real estate 
price index from 1973 to 1993 to obtain the market value of GM’s real estate 
assets in 1993 (18278 million U.S. dollars). Finally, we adjust the market value of 
real estate assets by lagged PPE to obtain our final measure, RE Value, which is 
126% in 1993. To estimate the market value of GM’s real estate assets in 
subsequent years, we simply multiply the RE Value in 1993 by the cumulative 
price increase from 1993 to the year of interest.  
We note that it is crucial in our analysis to control for the potential 
endogeneity concerns in our identification strategy: (1) the real estate prices may 
be correlated with innovation productivity; (2) the decision to own or lease real 
estate may be correlated with firms’ innovation productivity. We address these 
concerns in Section 3.2 of our empirical analysis. 
1.2.2.2 Innovation Productivity 
Following recent innovation literature such as Seru (2012) for publicly traded 
firms and Lerner, Sorensen, and Stromberg (2011) for privately held firms, we 
capture a firm’s innovation productivity using its patent activity, which indicates 
how effectively the firm transforms innovation inputs into outputs. More 
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specifically, based on the information available in the NBER database, we 
construct four measures of a firm’s patent activity.  
Our first measure is the number of patent applications filed in a given year that 
are eventually granted. The number of patent applications can be thought of as 
capturing the quantity of innovation output. We use the patent’s application year 
instead of grant year because Griliches, Pakes, and Hall (1988) argue that a 
patent’s application year better matches the time of innovation than the patent’s 
grant year. However, because patents appear in the NBER database only after they 
are granted, and it takes about two years on average for a successful patent 
application to be granted by the USPTO, many patent applications filed toward 
the end of our sample period (i.e., during 2005 and 2006) were still under review 
and had not been granted by 2006. We therefore limit patent application data to 
the 1993 to 2004 period to account for the truncation bias in patent application 
counts arising from the application-grant lag. 
Our second measure of patent activity is motivated by the fact that, despite 
their straightforward interpretation and easy implementation, patent counts do not 
distinguish ground-breaking inventions from incremental technological 
discoveries. To further assess a firm’s innovation productivity, we follow Hall, 
Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001, 2005) and examine the number of patent citations 
that a patent received. The number of patent citations can be thought of as 
capturing the quality of innovation output. To more precisely capture the impact 
of patents we exclude self-citations when computing the number of citations, but 
our results continue to hold when we include self-citations. Notice, however, that 
while a patent can receive citations over a long period of time (up to about 50 
years), in the NBER database we observe at best the citations received up to 2006. 
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Following Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001, 2005), we correct for this additional 
source of truncation bias in the NBER data by dividing the observed citation 
counts by the fraction of predicted lifetime citations observed over the lag interval. 
More specifically, we scale up the citation counts using the variable “hjtwt” 
provided by the NBER patent database, which relies on the shape of the citation-
lag distribution. 
Although a larger number of patent citations is typically interpreted as 
associated with greater impact, the distribution of citations is also important. 
Therefore, again following Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005), we consider two 
more measures of patent activity: patent originality and patent generality. 
Following existing literature, patents that cite a wider array of technology classes 
of patents are viewed as having greater originality. We define a patent’s 
originality score as one minus the Herfindahl index of the three-digit technology 
class distribution of all the patents that it cites. A patent with higher originality 
score draws upon a more diverse array of existing knowledge. Similarly, patents 
that are cited by a wider array of technology classes of patents are viewed as 
having greater generality. We then define a patent’s generality score as one minus 
the Herfindahl index of the three-digit technology class distribution of all the 
patents that cite it. A patent with higher generality score is being drawn upon by a 
more diverse array of subsequent patents. We then aggregate individual patents’ 
originality and generality scores to the firm-year level and compute the generality 
and originality scores for each firm-year. For firms that file no patents in a given 
year, their patent generality and originality scores are treated as missing for that 
firm-year.  
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We acknowledge that using patent activity to measure firm innovation is not 
without certain limitations. Patent activity is only one way in which a firm 
protects returns resulting from innovation. Many inventions are protected as trade 
secrets, such as the formula for Coca-Cola, and different industries have different 
innovation cycles and patenting propensities. Nonetheless, patents remain the 
most direct measure of the extent and quality of firms’ innovation (Griliches, 
1990), and the use of patent activity to measure of innovation productivity is 
widely accepted in the literature (Lerner, Sorensen, and Stromberg, 2011). We 
believe that adequate controls for heterogeneity in firm financials, firm industries, 
and location of real estate assets should lead to reasonable inferences applicable 
across firms in different industries.  
 
1.2.2.3 Control Variables 
We control for an array of firm characteristics previously shown to be 
significant determinants of innovation productivity. Hall and Ziedonis (2001) 
argue that the number of patent applications and the number of patent citations are 
positively related to firm size. We therefore control for firm size, as given by the 
natural logarithm of total assets (Total Assets); the results are robust to 
alternatively using the natural logarithm of net sales. Next, we control for R&D 
expenses scaled by lagged PPE (R&D Expense), as Atanassov (2012) shows that 
R&D expenditures play an essential role in a firm’s innovation. We additionally 
control for the following variables: firm age, given by the natural logarithm of one 
plus the number of years between when firm i is listed and the year t (Firm Age); 
profitability, given by return on assets (ROA); growth opportunities, given by 
Tobin’s Q (Tobin’s Q); cash flow, given by the ratio of cash flow to lagged PPE 
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(Cash); liabilities, given by the leverage ratio (Leverage); investments in fixed 
assets, given by capital expenditures scaled by lagged PPE (CAPX); and product 
market competition, given by the Herfindahl index of the 3-digit SIC industry of 
the firm based on sales (Herfindahl Index) (e.g., Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, 
Griffith, and Howitt, 2005; Chemmanur and Tian, 2011; Atanassov, 2012; Chang, 
Fu, Low, and Zhang, 2013; He and Tian, 2013; Tian and Wang, 2013; Van 
Reenen and Zingales, 2013). 
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1.2.3 Summary Statistics 
Columns (1) to (6) of Table 1 provide summary statistics for the variables 
used in the analysis based on the full sample. Looking at the innovation 
productivity measures, each year an average firm in our sample files 
approximately 4 patents, receives 36 citations for its patents, and has patent 
generality and originality scores of 1.0 and 2.0, respectively. The distributions of 
the four innovation productivity measures are highly skewed to the right, with the 
75th percentiles of the distribution at zero.
2
 We therefore winsorize these variables 
at the 99th percentile and use the natural logarithms of the number of patent 
applications, the number of patent citations, patent generality, and patent 
originality as our main innovation measures. To avoid losing firm-year 
observations due to zero values, we add one to the actual values when calculating 
natural logarithms. 
An average firm has a real estate value of about 0.8. The distribution of this 
value is right-skewed as well, and thus we winsorize the real estate value at the 
95th percentile and use the natural logarithm of one plus the real estate value as 
our main measure of the value of real estate assets in our analysis. 
Turning to the control variables, an average firm has total assets of $672 
million, ROA of 1%, Tobin’s Q of 2.1, cash flow of 2%, leverage of 24%, R&D 
expense of 64%, capital expenditures of 37%, and Herfindahl Index of 0.15, and is 
17.7 years old since its founding date. All of these control variables are 
winsorized at the 95th percentile. 
                                                          
2
 Firm-year observations with zero patents represent roughly 72.4% of our sample, which is 
comparable to the 84% reported in Atanassov, Nanda, and Seru (2007) and the 73% reported in 
Tian and Wang (2013) based on the universe of Compustat firms between 1974 and 2000 and VC-
backed IPO firms between 1985 and 2006, respectively.   
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Columns (7) and (8) of Table 1 report mean values of the variables for high 
and low real estate value firms, respectively, where we divide the sample into high 
and low real estate value firms according to the median real estate value each year. 
Relative to low real estate value firms, firms in the high real estate value 
subsample have significantly higher innovation productivity measures, suggesting 
significantly greater investment in innovation. When we compare firm 
characteristics between the two subsamples, we find that firms with a higher real 
estate value are older and larger, they have higher profitability, fewer growth 
opportunities, higher leverage, more cash holdings, smaller R&D investments, and 
smaller fixed asset investments, and they operate in less competitive industries 
than their low real estate value counterparts.  
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Chapter 3 Empirical Results 
1.3.1 Baseline Analysis 
We first examine the effects of a firm’s real estate collateral on innovation in a 
simple OLS multivariate regression framework. Specifically, we estimate the 
following model: 
Ln(1+𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡) = α+ 
βLn(1+𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡)+γ𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡
𝑙+δ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡+θFE+𝜀𝑖,𝑡,(1) 
where i indexes firms, t indexes years, and l indexes the MSA or state of the 
firm’s headquarter. The dependent variable, 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡, isone ofour innovation 
productivity measures (i.e., the number of patent applications, number of patent 
citations, patent generality score, and patent originality 
score).Ln(1+𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡),the natural logarithm of one plus the market value of 
real estate assets based on the MSA-or state-level price index, is our key 
explanatory variable. 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡
𝑙  controls for the real estate price index at the MSA 
or state level. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡  comprises the set of control variables. In all 
specifications, wecontrol for two-digit SIC industry, year, and the MSA of 
location fixed effects (FE) to mitigate the concern that unobservable variables 
omitted from Eq. (1) that affect the value of a firm’s collateral value might be 
correlated with innovation productivity. All of the standard errors of the estimated 
coefficients in Eq. (1) are clustered at the firm and year levels. 
Table 2, Columns (1) to (4) report OLS panel estimation results examining the 
effect of a shock to a firm’s real estate collateral value on innovation productivity 
as captured by the number of patent applications filed in a given year. In Columns 
(1) and (2), we measure the RE Value using the MSA-level real estate price index; 
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we find that the value of a firm’s real estate collateral is positively and 
significantly associated with patent numbers. In particular, in Column (1) the 
coefficient on Ln(1+RE Value) is 0.314and it is  statistically significant at the 1% 
level (t-statistic = 20).This result implies that an increase in real estate value leads 
to an increase in the number of patent applications (that is, an increase in the 
quantity of innovation) in the same year. In Column (2) the positive impact of real 
estate value on number of patents remains statistically significant at the 1% level 
when we include a number of control variables. In Columns (3) and (4), we 
measure RE Value using the state-level real estate price index instead of the MSA-
level index, we find the positive and significant impact of real estate value on 
patents continues to hold. Note that the positive effect of real estate value on 
patents is economically large: when the RE Value increases from its mean value 
(0.80, measured using the MSA-level real estate price index) by one standard 
deviation (1.28), the average firm files 0.091×[(1+4.02)/(1+0.80)]×1.28=0.33 new 
patent applications in the same year, which amounts to an8.2% increase from the 
mean value of patent number (4.02). 
Table 2, Columns (5) and (6) report results for the effect of a shock to a firm’s 
real estate value on innovation productivity as captured by the number of patent 
citations in a given year. In Column (5) the coefficient on Ln(1+RE Value) is 
again positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that an increase in real 
estate value leads to an increase in number of patent citations (that is, an increase 
in the quality of innovation)in the same year. In Column (6) we find that the 
positive impact of real estate value on patent citations remains statistically 
significant at the 1% level when we include a number of control variables. The 
positive effect of real estate collateral on patent citations is also economically 
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large: when the RE Value increases from its mean by one standard deviation, the 
number of citations increases by 0.121×[(1+36.17)/(1+0.80)]×1.28=3.20 in the 
same year for an average firm, which amounts to an 8.8% increase from the 
average patent citations (36.17). 
In Table 3, we report OLS estimation results on the effect of a shock to a 
firm’s real estate value on alternative measures of innovation productivity such as 
patent generality in Columns (1) and (2) and patent originality in Columns (3) and 
(4), respectively. Again, we find that real estate collateral value has a significant 
positive effect on patent generality and originality in the same year, with statistical 
significance at the 1% level. Economically, based on the estimated coefficients on 
Ln(1+RE Value) of 0.046for patent generality score in Column (2) and 0.070 for 
patent originality score in Column (4), a one standard deviation increase in RE 
Value from its mean will improve the patent generality and originality by 
0.046×[(1+1)/(1+0.80)]×1.28/1=6.5% and 0.070×[(1+2)/(1+0.80)]×1.28/2=7.5% 
relative to their means, respectively, for an average firm. In summary, the findings 
in Table 3 further confirm our findings that an increase in the value of a firm’s 
real estate collateral helps to improve its innovation productivity, with the positive 
effects both statistically significant and economically large. 
The estimated coefficients on other control variables in Tables 2 and 3 are 
generally consistent with expectations. For example, larger firms and older firms 
have greater innovation productivity each year. Firms also have higher innovation 
productivity when they spend more on the R&D or reduce investment on physical 
assets (CAPX). In addition, firms with lower leverage and firms with more growth 
opportunities or cash are associated with greater innovation productivity, which is 
generally consistent with previous results. 
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1.3.2 Endogeneity Tests 
Our evidence so far shows a robust positive effect of the value of a firm’s real 
estate collateral on its innovation productivity. In this section, we then attempt to 
address the potential endogenous concerns and establish causality from real estate 
collateral to innovation productivity. Specifically, we seek to address two 
potential endogeneity concerns with this experiment: (1) real estate prices could 
be correlated with innovation productivity; (2) the decision to own or lease real 
estate might be correlated with firms’ innovation productivity. 
 
1.3.2.1 Concerns Associated With Real Estate Price  
We use the instrumental variable (IV) approach to address the first 
endogeneity concern that real estate prices could be correlated with innovation 
productivity, following Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012). For example, firms 
that are more productive in innovation may demand more for local labors and 
products, which could push up local real estate prices. This is a standard reverse 
causality argument. In addition, the variations of real estate prices may proxy for 
real estate demand shocks, if the innovation activity of land-holding firms is more 
sensitive to demand shocks, this would bias our estimation of β in Eq. (1) as well. 
In the first-stage of the IV regression, we predict the MSA-level real estate 
prices (RE Price) using the interaction of local housing elasticity provided by Saiz 
(2010), interacted with the nationwide real interest rate as in Himmelberg, Mayer, 
and Weisbach (2005). More specifically, we estimate the following first-stage 
regression to predict the RE Price of MSA l in fiscal year t: 
𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡
𝑙  = β×𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑙×𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛿
𝑙+ 𝜇𝑡
𝑙 ,                                  
(2) 
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where 𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑙  denotes the elasticity of land supply for MSA l measuring the 
constraints of local land supply, 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡  denotes the nationwide 30 years 
real home mortgage rate adjusted by inflation for year t at which banks refinance 
home loans, 𝛾𝑡  denotes the year fixed effects, and 𝛿
𝑙  denotes the MSA fixed 
effects.  
The intuition is that the interest rate affects real estate prices differently for 
locations with different land supply elasticities. Demand for real estate increases 
as the mortgage rate decreases. For a location with a very high elasticity of land 
supply, an increase in demand will be likely to translate into increased quantity 
through new construction rather than higher real estate prices. In contrast, for a 
location with inelastic land supply, an increase in demand associated with a 
decrease in interest rate will be likely to translate into higher housing prices. Thus, 
the change in interest rate should have a larger impact on the real estate price and 
hence the market value of real estate collateral for locations with a lower land 
supplies elasticity.  
Column (1) of Table 4 reports the estimation results of first-stage regression. 
As expected, the interaction of housing supply elasticity and interest rate has a 
positive and statistically significant impact on RE Price at 1% significance level. 
This result indicates that the positive effect of decreasing mortgage rate on RE 
Price is stronger in those MSAs with a lower elasticity of land supply.  
Columns (2) to (5), Table 4 report the estimation results of the second-stage 
regressions of IV approach, where we calculate the RE Value using the predicted 
RE Price from the first stage, and we re-run our panel regressions in Eq. (1) for 
each of our measures of innovation productivity using the instrumented RE Value.  
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Column (2) of Table 4 reports the results when the dependent variable is the 
number of successful patent applications. The IV coefficient estimate on Ln(1+RE 
Value) is 0.068 when we include all of the control variables in the regression. The 
coefficient estimate here is slightly smaller than that based on OLS in Column (4) 
of Table 2, but is still statistically significant at the 1% level and economically 
large. Specifically, based on the IV estimation, a one standard deviation increase 
in RE Value will improve the patent numbers by 6.1% relative to its mean in the 
same year (0.068×[(1+4.02)/(1+0.80)]×1.28/4.02).  
Similarly, Columns (3) to (5) of Table 4show that the IV coefficient estimates 
on Ln(1+RE Value) remain positive, economically sizable, and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, when we instead use patent citations, patent generality, 
and patent originality as our alternative measures of innovation productivity. In 
each case, a one standard deviation increase in RE Value increases an average 
firm’s patent citations, patent generality score, and patent originality score by 
about 6% relative to their respective means in the same year for an average firm. 
The findings suggest that the positive effect of real estate collateral on innovation 
is unlikely driven by endogenous concerns related to real estate price and is 
consistent with the hypothesis that a positive shock to the value of real estate 
collateral improves firms’ financing capacity and thus casually increases 
investment in innovation. 
 
1.3.2.2 Concerns Associated With Real Estate Ownership  
We then address the second endogeneity concern that firms’ decision to own 
or lease real estate might be correlated with firms’ innovation productivity. For 
firms those are more likely to own real estate, if their innovation is also more 
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sensitive to fluctuations in real estate prices, our OLS estimation above may 
overestimate the effect of real estate collateral on innovation.  
As a first attempt in addressing this ownership concern and establishing 
causality, we control for firms’ observable characteristics affecting real estate 
ownership holdings decision interacted with real estate price in our multivariate 
regression specification of Eq. (1). If those controls which make firm more likely 
to own real estate also make firm more sensitive to fluctuations in real estate 
prices, controlling for the interaction between those controls and the 
contemporaneous real estate prices allows us to separately identify the collateral 
channel we are interested in. 
In Column (1) of Table 5, we use the initial characteristics including firm age, 
firm size, ROA, as well as two-digit SIC industry dummies and MSA dummies to 
predict RE Ownership, a dummy indicating whether the firm reports any real 
estate holdings on its balance sheet in each year, in our first-stage regression. 
These controls are shown to play an important role in affecting ownership 
decision, consistent with the literature (Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar, 2012).3 We 
then calculate the interaction between the predicted RE Ownership and RE Price, 
and include this interaction term as an additional control variable in the second-
stage panel regression of Eq. (1). Columns (2) to (5), Table 5 show that, after 
controlling for the endogenous decision of RE Ownership, the positive effect of 
real estate collateral on innovation remains statistically significant. The economic 
magnitudes are reasonably large, similar to those previously reported in Tables 2 
and 3.  
                                                          
3
 As shown in Table 4 of Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar (2012), older, larger, and more profitable 
firms are more likely to own real estate assets. 
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We recognize that there may be other unobservable determinants of a firm’s 
real estate holding decision that impact our conclusions. Therefore, as a second 
attempt in addressing the endogenous ownership concern and establishing casual 
relationship, we additionally test whether the innovation productivity of firms 
holding real estate assets is more sensitive to changes in real estate prices than that 
of firms without any real estate assets, following Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar 
(2012). Econometrically, we regress the innovation productivity measures on the 
MSA-level real estate prices for three different groups separately: non real estate 
purchasers, purchasers before the purchase of real estate, and purchasers after the 
purchase of real estate. If our previous findings are driven by the unobserved 
characteristics that affect both the land-purchasing decision and innovation 
productivity, the sensitivity of innovation to real estate price for purchasers before 
the purchase should be significantly larger than that for firms that do not own real 
estate assets, while the sensitivity for purchasers before the purchase should be 
similar to that for purchasers after the purchase.  
As shown in Table 7, there is no significant relationship between RE Price and 
innovation productivity measures such as patents and patent citations for firms 
without real estate or for firms before the purchase of real estate. Instead, an 
increase in RE Price leads to significantly more innovation outputs only for firms 
with real estate assets after such assets have been purchased. We thus conclude the 
positive effect of real estate assets on innovation is unlikely driven by endogenous 
real estate ownership choice and is consistent with the hypothesis that a positive 
shock to the value of real estate assets casually increases investment in innovation 
through the collateral channel. 
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1.3.3 Innovation over Subsequent Years 
Previously, we have examined the contemporaneous effect of real estate 
collateral on innovation. However, firm’s investment in innovation is typically 
considered to be long-term investment which adds to the firm’s stock to 
knowledge, and its benefits are likely to be persistent for several years in the 
future (e.g., Lerner, Sorensen and Stromberg, 2011). In this section, we thus 
analyze whether a shock to the value of real estate collateral in one year pertains 
to long-run effect on innovation and whether it would affect innovation over 
subsequent years. 
Specifically, we estimate the inter-temporal effects of variation in real estate 
collateral value in year t on subsequent innovation measured over years t+1 to t+5, 
respectively, and report the results in Table 8. We also control for the same set of 
control variables as in Tables 2 and 3 as well as the two-digit SIC industry, year, 
and the MSA of location fixed effects. However, we do not report the regression 
coefficient estimates for the control variables and dummies in Table 8 of this 
section due to space constraint. 
Table 8 shows that the positive effect of a change in real estate collateral value 
in year t on innovation productivity is strongest in year t+1. The positive effect 
then slowly decreases over time but remains positive, large, and significant over 
yearst+2 to t+5. The economic magnitude of the positive effect continues to be 
economically sizable over the subsequent five years, and the coefficients on all of 
the inter-temporal regressions remain statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
findings here suggest that a change in the value of a firm’s real estate assets has a 
persistent but slowly decaying positive effect on innovation productivity. Our 
findings thus are largely consistent with Hall, Griliches, and Hausman (1986), 
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which studies the lag between R&D activities and patent applications and find that 
they move virtually simultaneously. 
 
1.3.4 Economic Mechanisms  
As previously described, we have found that an exogenous increase in the 
value of a firm’s real estate collateral would casually increase its innovation 
productivity both contemporaneously and in the subsequent five years, which does 
not appear to be driven by endogenous concerns associated with real estate price 
and ownership. In this section, we further explore the possible underlying 
economic mechanisms through which the corporate real estate collateral affects 
companies’ innovation productivity. Specifically, we partition our whole sample 
into subsamples according to financial constraint, debt financing dependence, and 
difficulty of innovation to examine whether our results vary across firms and 
whether these factors are possible underlying mechanisms through which real 
estate collateral affects innovation. The subsample regressions follow the baseline 
model specification of Eq. (1) which include all the control variables in Tables 2 
and 3 as well as the two-digit SIC industry, year, and the MSA of location fixed 
effects, and we report the results in Tables 8 to 10.   
 
1.3.4.1 Financial constraint 
We have documented that an increase in the value of a firm’s real estate assets 
can increase its innovation productivity. Recall that we posit that an increase in 
real estate value creates more innovation through the collateral channel. In the 
presence of financial constraints, constrained firms can use their real estate assets 
as collateral to finance their investment in innovation when they otherwise would 
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be unable to do so. We hence expect such positive effects of real estate collateral 
to be stronger for constrained firms with costly and limited debt financing sources, 
as the appreciation of the collateral value of real estate assets improves firms’ 
financing capacity. To further explore this financial constraint channel, in this 
section we empirically examine whether the positive effects of real estate 
collateral on innovation are stronger for constrained firms than for unconstrained 
firms.  
We thus partition the full sample into two equally sized subsamples according 
to the KZ index measure of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) as a proxy for the extent 
of financial constraint. In each year, firms with a KZ index above the sample 
median are considered as financially constrained and vice versa. We then re-run 
our previous multivariate panel regressions separately for the two subsamples and 
report the results in Table 8. Consistent with our predictions, for the subsample of 
constrained firms, the regression coefficients on Ln(1+RE Value) are positive, 
economically large and statistically significant at the 1% level for all four 
measures of innovation productivity. Indeed, the economic magnitudes are about 
two times greater than those for the full sample reported in Tables 2 and 3. In 
sharp contrast, the coefficients estimates are insignificant for the subsample of 
unconstrained firms. Therefore, these findings confirm our hypothesis and show 
that the financially constrained firms with costly and limited financial resources 
benefit the most from the appreciation of real estate collateral value to improve 
their innovation.  
As a robustness check, we use alternative measures such as corporate debt 
rating or paper rating as proxies for the extent of financial constraints, as 
suggested by the recent literature on financial constraint and investment (e.g., 
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Denis and Sibilkov, 2010; Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist, 2013).
4
 We report the 
estimation results in Table IA3 of the Internet Appendix. We find that the findings 
in Table 9 are robust, and the positive effect of real estate collateral on innovation 
productivity continues to concentrate in the subsample of firms under financial 
constraints.   
 
1.3.4.2 Debt Financing Dependence  
The dependence on external debt finance provides another possible channel 
affecting the effect of real estate collateral on innovation. As the collateral value 
of real estate assets appreciates, financially constrained firm can borrow external 
debt as a fraction the collateral value of their real estate assets. We expect that 
constrained firms that need more debt finance will react differently compared to 
firms that primarily finance their innovation through equity.  Actually, the 
literature (e.g., in Hart and Moore 1994; Chaney, Sraer, and Thesmar, 2012) 
shows that an increase in collateral value indeed leads to more issues of debt 
secured on the appreciated value of land holdings, which provides financing for 
investment in innovation. We thus expect that the positive effect of real estate 
collateral on innovation would be stronger for debt dependent firms which have 
relatively greater need for debt financing.  
We check this prediction by splitting the full sample into two subsamples 
according to whether a firm has debt outstanding as a simple proxy for debt 
financing dependence. In each year, firms with debt are considered as debt 
dependent, and the rest of firms without any debt outstanding are considered non 
dependent. We then re-run our previous multivariate panel regressions separately 
                                                          
4
Firms are classified as financially constrained based on debt rating (paper rating) if they have debt 
outstanding that year but their long-term (short-term) credit ratings are not available or below the 
investment grade.  
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for the two subsamples and report the results in Table 9. The findings again are 
consistent with our predictions. The regression coefficients on Ln(1+RE Value) 
are positive, economically large and statistically significant at the 1% level for the 
subsample of dependent firms but are insignificant for the subsample of firms 
without debt (i.e., non debt dependent firms). Again, these results lend further 
support to the view that a positive shock to the collateral value of a firm’s real 
estate assets increases innovation productivity because it improves firms’ debt 
financing capacity. Specifically, debt dependent companies that have greater 
needs for debt financing take advantage of the appreciation of real estate collateral 
value to improve their innovation.  
 
1.3.4.3 Difficulty in Innovation  
As discussed previously, an increase in the collateral value of real estate assets 
improves firms’ innovation, because it helps to mitigate financial constraint and 
enhance debt financing capacity through alleviating agency costs and contracting 
frictions associated with the innovation process which is long, uncertain, often 
involving a very high failure probability. We thus expect that the positive effect of 
real estate collateral should be especially pronounced in hard to innovation 
industries where the innovation process is highly long, uncertain, involving high 
failure risk, and demanding large resources. If an increase in real estate collateral 
value indeed improves the financing capacity, then we expect to observe a larger 
impact of real estate collateral on innovation in these hard to innovation industries.  
We split the full sample according to whether or not it is more difficult to 
innovate in the industry they belong to. Following the work of Hall, Jaffe, and 
Trajtenberg (2005) and Tian and Wang (2011), the full sample is classified into 
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two subsamples based on patent technology class. Hard to innovation industries 
include pharmaceutical, medical instrumentation, chemicals, computers, 
communications, and electrical industries; and easy to innovation industries 
include software programming, internet applications, and other low-tech industries. 
In drug and electronics industries, innovation process is typically long, uncertain, 
failure risk is high, and resources demanded are large. On the other hand, it is 
relatively easy to create in software and low-tech industries. We then re-run our 
previous multivariate panel regressions separately for the two subsamples and 
report the results in Table 10. The findings again are consistent with our 
predictions. The regression coefficients on Ln(1+RE Value) are positive, 
economically large and statistically significant at the 1% level for the subsample 
of hard to innovation industries but are insignificant for the subsample of easy to 
innovation industries. These results suggest that the positive effect of real estate 
collateral for firm innovation is greater in industries in which innovation is more 
difficult to achieve, consistent with our prediction.  
 
1.3.5 Additional Robustness Tests 
To further ensure the robustness of our main results, we employ alternative 
model specifications, alternative subsamples and sub-periods, and alternative 
variable definitions. We report results of these additional robustness tests in 
Tables IA1 and IA2 of the Internet Appendix. All of the regressions include the 
same control variables and fixed effects as in Table 2 and Table 3. 
In Panel A of Table IA1, we use alternative definitions for the innovation 
measures. We find that the effect of a change in real estate value on innovation is 
still positive and significant at the 1% level when using the four innovation 
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productivity measures directly without the log-transformation, when using the 
natural logarithm of one plus the average citation number, generality score, and 
originality score per patent as the innovation measures, and when using a patent 
dummy and a citation dummy (equal to one when there is non-zero number of 
patent applications or non-zero number of citations for each firm-year, and 
otherwise zero) as the innovation measures. 
In Panel B of Table IA1, we use alternative definitions of real estate collateral 
value. We find that the results are still positive and significant at the 1% level 
when using the real estate collateral value directly without the log-transformation, 
when using the market value of real estate assets based on the MSA-level real 
estate price index without normalization by lagged PPE, when using the logarithm 
of one plus the market value of real estate assets based on the MSA-level real 
estate price index without normalization by lagged PPE, when using the logarithm 
of one plus the market value of real estate assets based on the MSA-level real 
estate price index normalized by lagged total assets, and when using real estate 
ownership interacted with the MSA-level real estate price index, where real estate 
ownership is a dummy equal to one if a firm owns non-zero real estate assets, and 
zero otherwise. 
In Panel C of Table IA1, we re-estimate the baseline analysis for different 
subsamples. We find that the results are similarly positive and significant when 
we exclude firms with zero patents and citations, and when we exclude firms 
located in the Silicon Valley Area (i.e., remove the firm-year observations within 
the San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara MSA). 
In Panel D of Table IA1, we rerun the baseline analysis using different sub-
periods. We continue to find positive and significant results when we limit 
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attention to the 1993 to 1997 period (the pre-Information Technology bubble 
period),to the 1998 to 2000 period(the IT bubble period), and to the 2001 to 2004 
period (after the IT bubble period and within the housing bubble period). 
Table IA2 reports the cross-sectional relationship between firms’ real estate 
value and Innovation outputs. The measures of innovation include each firm’s 
annual average number of patents filed from 1993 to 2004 that are ultimately 
awarded and each firm’s annual average citations, generality, and originality of all 
successful patent applications filed from 1993 to 2004. The independent variables 
include the firm-level sample average of the logarithm of one plus the market 
value of real estate assets based on the MSA-level real estate price index 
normalized by lagged PPE (RE Value) and other controls. We find that the 
coefficients on the sample average real estate value are positive and significant in 
all columns. The magnitudes of the coefficient estimates are similar to those 
reported in Tables 2 to 3. The estimates of other controls are also consistent with 
the previous panel regression results reported in Tables 2 to 3. 
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Chapter 4 Conclusion 
 In this paper, we investigate whether a change in the value of a firm’s real 
estate collateral impacts its investment productivity. We find that, for the average 
firm, a one standard deviation increase in the value of the firm’s real estate leads 
to about 8% increase in the number of patent applications in the same year, or 
0.33 new patents. This positive effect holds for alternative measures of innovation 
such as the number of patent citations, patent generality, and patent originality. 
Further, this effect is strongest in the year following the shock to real estate value, 
but persists for at least five years following the shock to real estate value. These 
results are robust to controls for endogeneity, and concentrate among firms that 
are financially constrained, dependent on debt finance, and belonging to hard to 
innovation industries. 
 Overall, the findings in this paper suggest that in a developed capital 
market such as the U.S., firms face constraints to innovation. We document that a 
positive shock to the value of collateralized real estate assets can serve an 
important role in mitigating firms’ financial constraints and thereby help increase 
innovation. These results improve our understanding of the link between debt  
financing capacity and investment in innovation.   
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Part II Dual-Class Shares and Corporate Innovation 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Although the controversial nature of dual-class share structures has led several 
stock exchanges (e.g., Hong Kong and Singapore) to ban them completely, the 
debate is ongoing as to whether such share structures should be allowed in the 
future. Not only have dual-class shares been welcomed in the IPOs of young, hot 
technology firms like Facebook, LinkedIn, Groupon, and Alibaba, they are also 
used by mature firms like Ford Motors and Berkshire Hathaway. In the face of 
their increasing popularity, institutional investors are scrutinizing the downside of 
dual-class shares. CalPERS, for example, has decided to boycott all IPOs 
involving dual-class shares, arguing that dual-class stock misaligns the incentives 
of a company’s shareholders and management, destroying shareholder value and 
unfairly benefiting the founders or executives who control the votes.
5
Supporters 
of dual-class shares, on the other hand, claim that a dual-class structure enables 
corporations to focus more on long-term than on short-term projects and thus 
supports innovation. 
The academic community has produced ample empirical evidence of the 
negative effect of dual-class shares on shareholder wealth in public firms. This is 
consistent with the notion that, in some circumstances, controlling shareholders 
are willing to sacrifice public market share value to perpetuate their private 
benefits of control. Jarrell and Poulsen (1988), for example, show that dual-class 
shares exacerbate agency problems by protecting firms from hostile takeovers and 
giving managers greater power to guarantee job security and perquisites. Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick (2003), in constructing their original governance index, propose 
                                                          
5
 “Sorry CalPERS, dual-Class shares are a founder’s best friend,” Forbes, May 14, 2013.  
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that the adoption of dual-class shares is indicative of poor corporate governance. 
Likewise, a practitioner study by the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC Institute, 2012) finds that, on average, firms with dual-class 
shares underperform firms with a one-share, one-vote standard over time. For 
newly listed IPO firms, Smart and Zutter (2003) also demonstrate that IPOs with 
dual-class shares exhibit poorer performance and trade at lower prices than IPO 
firms with single-class shares. 
Yet, if dual-class shares are associated with inefficiency and lead to wealth 
destruction, why do we observe a proliferation of such shares in the market, 
especially in high-tech IPOs? Recognizing that innovation may be the most vital 
factor for building competitive advantages in technology companies, especially 
young firms, we employ several corporate innovation measures to explore 
whether the adoption of dual-class shares stifles corporate innovation. Besides 
being associated with inefficiency, dual-class shares are also often linked to severe 
agency problems (Jensen, 1986). For example, Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2009) 
show that dual-class shares protect managers or insiders by reducing the amount 
of outside shareholder monitoring. Our first hypothesis therefore posits that, 
consistent with the agency literature, dual-class shares tend to smother innovation.  
We also expect that their adverse effects on innovation will be more pronounced 
for firms that are particularly vulnerable to agency problems, such as mature firms, 
firms with large free cash flow, and firms with low takeover threats.  
Product market characteristics matter for innovation and governance. We 
further hypothesize that dual-class shares will have smaller adverse effects on 
corporate innovation for firms operating in highly competitive product or 
innovation markets that face a greater cost of losing their innovation edge. In such 
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a context, product and innovation market competition serve as effective 
alternative governance mechanisms that align managers’ incentives with those of 
shareholders. Several recent studies show that product market competition helps 
to constrain managers and promotes value creation (Giroud and Mueller, 2010). 
Innovation is quintessential for high-tech firms (Porter, 1992). In these firms we 
predict that competitive pressures tend to offset the generally perverse 
entrenchment effects of dual-class shares. 
To test these hypotheses, we use data widely accepted in the finance literature, 
a detailed NBER data set of over three million patents granted to U.S. public listed 
companies by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) between 
1976 and 2006. From this data set, we extract every patent granted each year for 
every firm, together with the citations for all of each firm’s patents. We also use 
two alternative measures of innovation: patent originality and patent generality.
6
 
We find that dual-class shares are negatively associated with innovation 
measures such as patent counts, citations, generality and originality. In a 
univariate test, for a public firm, having dual-class shares reduces patent counts by 
0.69 per year (about 9%) and this difference is statistically significant. The 
negative effect of dual-class shares on innovation is marginally more pronounced 
for old firms than for young firms. We also show that the effect of dual-class 
shares is more pronounced for less financially constrained firms as measured by 
the KZ index (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). This is consistent with a free cash flow 
agency effect. In addition, the negative impact of dual-class shares on innovation 
is highly significant for firms with low Tobin’s Q ratios.  
                                                          
6
 Patent originality and generality are defined by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) as follows.  
Originality captures the extent that a patent cites previous patents that belong to a broad set of 
technologies. Generality captures the extent that a patent is cited by subsequent patents that belong 
to a wide range of technologies. These two variables are provided by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 
(2005) and are available in the NBER patent database. 
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As regards to the importance of product or innovation market competition, we 
find that adopting dual-class shares has little effect on firms operating in industries 
in which innovation is difficult (hereafter, hard-to-innovate industries). In this 
case, the negative effect is driven mainly by firms operating in industries in which 
innovation is relatively easy. Hence, following Hall et al. (2005), we distinguish 
between firms by the degree of innovation difficulty in their product markets. 
Firms in  hard-to-innovate industries require more time and resources to invest in 
innovation than those in easy-to-innovate industries, so the cost of innovation 
differs between the two (Tian and Wang, 2014). We also find that the negative 
effect of dual-class shares on innovation is less pronounced for firms operating in 
more competitive product markets as measured by the Herfindahl index. 
Nevertheless, despite a significant and negative association between dual-class 
shares and corporate innovation, our findings could be driven by reverse causality; 
that is, firms with little innovation may be more likely to adopt dual-class share 
structures. We address this endogeneity concern by analyzing a subsample of 
firms that change from single-class shares to dual-class shares and demonstrate 
that such a shift precedes a significant decline in corporate innovation. 
Our research contributes to the literature by providing new evidence on the 
role of dual-class shares in corporate innovation. Although prior literature links 
such share structures to the impairment of shareholder wealth and adverse 
corporate governance, the proliferation of dual-class shares adopted by young 
high-tech IPOs in the market warrants a systematic investigation. The evidence 
presented here suggests that dual-class shares stifle corporate innovation on 
average, especially in firms that are more vulnerable to agency problems. Dual-
class structures do not, however, reduce innovation in firms operating in high-tech 
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sectors or firms operating in competitive product or innovation markets. Nor do 
they reduce innovation in firms that are subjected to high takeover threats. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our 
data and empirical methods. Section 3 presents the main results and Section 4 
reports the results of several robustness tests. Section 5 concludes with a brief 
summary and discussion.  
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Chapter 2 Data and Variables 
2.2.1 Patent Data and Firm Characteristics 
We obtain and construct our sample from the COMPUSTAT database for all 
US listed firms from 1970 to 2006, since the NBER patent data ends at the same 
year.
7
We require that the firms must have data in COMPUSTAT. We exclude 
firms that are involved in major acquisitions, as well as firms that are domiciled 
outside U.S. We also require firms to have financial data available on 
COMPUSTAT for at least three consecutive years. Finally, we exclude firms in 
the financial industries and trusts. These filters result in a final sample of 103,476 
U.S. firm-year observations over the period 1970 to 2006. 
In our analysis we control for an array of firm characteristics previously 
shown to be significant determinants of innovation productivity. Hall and 
Ziedonis (2001), for example, argue that the number of patent applications and the 
number of patent citations are positively related to firm size. We therefore control 
for firm size, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. We control also for 
research and development expenses divided by total firm assets. R&D expenses 
play an essential role in financing firm innovation (Atanassov, 2013).We 
additionally control for the following variables: firm age, measured by years 
elapsed since the firm was first listed (Firm Age); profitability, measured by 
return on assets (ROA); growth opportunities, measured by Tobin’s Q (Tobin’s Q); 
the ratio of cash flow (Cash Flow) to total firm assets; the debt-to-assets ratio 
(Leverage); the rate of investment in fixed assets, measured by capital 
expenditures (CAPX) divided by total firm assets; the ratio of property, plant and 
                                                          
7
NBER data comprise detail information on almost 3 million U.S. patents granted between January 
1963 and December 1999, all citations made to these patents between 1975 and 1999 (over 16 
million), and a reasonably broad match of patents to COMPUSTAT (the data set of all firms traded 
in the U.S. stock market). 
44 
 
equipment (PPE) divided by firm assets; and product market competition, 
measured by the Herfindahl index of the 3-digit SIC industry code based on sales 
(Herfindahl Index). The construction of this measure follows Aghion, Bloom, 
Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt (2005) and Aghion, Reenen, and Zingales (2013). 
 
2.2.2 Innovation Measures 
To form our sample of innovation measures, we collect annual information on 
innovation activity from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
Patent Citation Data File. This data set contains detailed information on more than 
three million patents granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) from 1976 to 2006. It provides information such as patent assignee 
names, numbers of patents, and numbers of citations received by each patent, 
patent application year as well as grant year, and patent technology class. One 
advantage of the NBER database is that it is likely unaffected by survivorship bias. 
As long as a patent application is eventually granted by the USPTO, it is attributed 
to the applying firm at the time of application even if the firm later is acquired or 
goes bankrupt. Moreover, because patent citations are attributed to a patent and 
not the applying firm, the patent granted to a firm that is later acquired or goes 
bankrupt can still receive citations long after the firm disappears. 
Following the recent innovation literature, such as Seru (2014) for publicly 
traded firms and Lerner, Sorensen, and Stromberg (2011) for privately held firms, 
we measure a firm’s innovation productivity using its patent activity, which 
indicates how effectively the firm transforms innovation inputs into outputs. With 
the information available in the NBER database, we use five measures of patent 
activity. 
45 
 
One measure of patent activity is the number of patent applications filed in a 
given year that are eventually granted. This captures the quantity of innovation 
output. We use the patent’s application year instead of its grant year because, as 
Griliches, Pakes, and Hall (1988) argue, a patent’s application year better matches 
the time of innovation than the patent’s grant year. Patents, however, appear in the 
NBER database only after they are granted and it takes about two years on 
average for a successful patent application to be granted by the USPTO.  Hence, 
many patent applications filed toward the end of our sample period (i.e., during 
2005 and 2006) were still under review and had not been granted by 2006. We 
therefore also perform robustness tests that limit patent application data to the 
period from 1970 to 2004 to account for the truncation bias in patent application 
counts arising from the application-grant lag.
8
 
Patent counts do not distinguish ground-breaking inventions from incremental 
technological discoveries. Hence, to further assess a firm’s innovation 
productivity, we examine the number of patent citations received (cf. Hall, Jaffe, 
and Trajtenberg, 2001, 2005), thereby capturing the quality of innovation output. 
We exclude self-citations from the citation count, although our results hold when 
these are included. Although a patent can receive citations over a long period of 
time (up to about 50 years), in our NBER sample, citations received are at most 
through 2006. In the NBER patent database, the citation variable is adjusted for 
truncation bias (Hall et al., (2001, 2005)).
9
 
Although more patent citations typically mean greater impact, the distribution 
of citations is also important. Therefore, we also use two more measures of patent 
                                                          
8
Information on all these tests is available from the authors upon request. 
 
9
Hall et al., (2001, 2005) use an adjustment factor to address citation lag (both backward and 
forward lag).They correct for this additional source of truncation bias by dividing the observed 
citation counts by the fraction of predicted lifetime citations observed over the lag interval. 
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activity: patent originality and patent generality. Following existing literature, 
patents that cite other patents in a wider array of technology classes are viewed as 
having greater originality. A patent’s originality score is defined by Hall et al. 
(2001) as one minus the Herfindahl index of the three-digit technology class 
distribution of all the patents that it cites. Patents with higher originality scores 
draw upon more diverse arrays of existing knowledge.
10
 Similarly, patents that are 
cited by other patents in a wider array of technology classes are viewed as having 
greater generality. A patent’s generality score is defined by Hall et al. (2001) as 
one minus the Herfindahl index of the three-digit technology class distribution of 
all the patents that cite it. Patents with higher generality scores are being cited by a 
more diverse array of subsequent patents. In the NBER patent data, each firm’s 
annual patent originality and generality scores are calculated by adding up the 
individual scores across patents for the given year. For firms that file no patents in 
a given year the NBER database treats patent generality and originality scores as 
missing.  
Besides the quantity, quality and the technology distribution of the innovation 
outputs, it is also important to know how firms’ share class structures affect their  
innovation research and development efficiency. Following Hirshleifer, Hsu and 
Li (2013), we construct a measure of innovation efficiency equal to the number of 
patents divided by R&D investment (XRD). Specifically, for each firm-year we 
calculate innovation efficiency by taking the number of ultimately successful 
                                                          
10
Hall et al. (2001) states, “Thinking of forward citations as indicative of the impact of a patent, a 
high generality score suggests that the patent presumably had a widespread impact, in that it 
influenced subsequent innovations in a variety of fields (hence the “generality” label). “Originality” 
is defined the same way, except that it refers to citations made. Thus, if a patent cites previous 
patents that belong to a narrow set of technologies the originality score will be low, whereas citing 
patents in a wide range of fields would render a high score”. 
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patent applications filed by firm i in year t (NumPati,t) divided by firm i’s 
weighted cumulative R&D investment during yearst-4 through year t: 
NumPati,t/ (XRDi,t+ 0.8*XRDi,t-1 + 0.6*XRDi,t-2 + 0.4*XRDi,t-3 + 0.2*XRDi,t-4), 
where XRDi,t indicates firm i’s R&D investment in year t. We adopt this five-year 
cumulative R&D investment based on the assumption of an annual depreciation 
rate of 20% on R&D investment (cf. Chan, Laknoishok, and Sougiannis, 2001; 
Lev, Sarath, and Sougiannis, 2005). We consider also an alternative innovation 
efficiency measure that includes only contemporaneous R&D investment, XRDi,t 
in the denominator.  The results are similar.  
 
2.2.3 Identifying Dual-Class Firms  
 To develop our sample of dual-class companies, we begin with the sample 
in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick’s (2010) (hereafter, the GIM sample). The GIM 
sample was constructed from the universe of U.S. public firms from 1994 to 2002. 
It is the most comprehensive of all readily available data sets on dual-class firms. 
We expand the GIM sample period from 1994–2002 to 1970–2006 by drawing 
relevant dual-class data from the same primary sources that they used: Securities 
Data Company (SDC), S&P’s COMPUSTAT, and the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP). The SDC’s Global New Issues Database not only tracks 
corporate new issue activity from 1970 but flags those that have a separate class of 
common stock. In the CRSP database, we identify dual-class firms by their 
Committee on Uniform Security Identification Procedures (CUSIP) numbers. 
Following GIM (2010), those having the same 6-digit CUSIP number with 
different 2-digit extensions are considered to have dual-class share structures (cf. 
Gompers et al., 2010).Firms having a letter (A, B, C…) as part of their “share 
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class” in the CRSP monthly database in any month of a year are also defined as 
dual-class firms in that year. Finally, because the CRSP data reports one specific 
stock issue of a firm while COMPUSTAT contains all shares of all classes of a 
firm’s stock, we compare “shares outstanding” in CRSP with “common shares 
outstanding” in COMPUSTAT (see Zhang, 2003). When the difference is more 
than 1%, we identify that firm as dual-class. Merging all of the above data 
together produces our final 1970–2006 list of dual-class firms. 
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Chapter 3 Results 
2.3.1 Summary Statistics 
 Table 1A summarizes the innovation variables and firm characteristics for 
firms with single-class shares and those with dual-class shares. On average, 
single-class firms have an average of 7.32 patents per year. Firms with dual-class 
shares have an average of 6.63 patents per year. The other innovation measures 
such as patent citations, patent generality and originality, and innovation 
efficiency show a similar pattern. That is, on average, firms with dual-class shares 
are less innovative than single-class firms. Firms with dual-class shares also tend 
to be larger and older than single-class firms, and they operate in less competitive 
industries, those with a higher Herfindahl index.
11
 
[INSERT TABLE 1A ABOUT HERE] 
Table 1B reports the means and medians of innovation variables for firms with 
single-class and those with dual-class shares according to firm age, Tobin’s Q, 
financial constraints, and hard-versus easy-to-innovate industries as well as high-
versus low-tech industries. The univariate tests in Panel A indicate that older firms 
with dual-class shares have significantly fewer patents and citations than older 
firms without dual-class shares, while young firms do not differ significantly in 
innovation regardless of share class structure. According to Panel B, no matter 
whether firms have low or high Tobin’s Q ratios, the means of the innovation 
variables for firms with dual-class shares are smaller than those for firms with 
single-class shares. Similarly, Panel C shows that firms with lesser degrees of 
financial constraints (low KZ indices) but with dual-class shares have significantly 
fewer patents and citations than those with single-class shares. Among financially 
                                                          
11
 The difference in the average Herfindahl indices is statistically significant, but small. 
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constrained firms, however, those with dual-class shares have higher mean 
numbers of patents and citations than those with single-class shares. This 
univariate test thus does not support the notion that dual-class firms are less 
innovative when firms are financially constrained. The univariate tests also 
indicate that in hard-to-innovate industries or high-tech sectors, firms with dual-
class share structures do not have significantly lower innovation means than those 
without (see panels D and E).  
[INSERT TABLE 1B ABOUT HERE] 
 
2.3.2 Baseline Regression Results 
 Table 2 reports the baseline multivariate regression results of the 
association between dual-class share structures and innovation activities. These 
pooled ordinary least squares regressions control for both year and industry fixed 
effects. The main independent variable is a dual-class dummy, which equals one if 
the firm has dual-class shares in each year and zero otherwise. All regressions are 
controlled for the logarithm of total assets, firm age, return on assets (ROA), 
Tobin’s Q, cash flow, leverage, R&D expense, capital expenditure (CAPX), 
property, plant and equipment (PPE) and the Herfindahl index based on the three-
digit SIC code. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
As Table 2 shows, the estimated coefficients of the dual-class shares dummy 
variable are negative and significant in all four regressions using the four different 
measures of innovation. For example, having dual-class shares reduces the patent 
number counts of public firms by 5.28 per firm-year.  Given the single-class 
sample mean of 7.32, this represents a 70% drop in patent counts per firm-year. 
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The coefficients of the other independent variables are consistent with prior 
literature (Tian and He, 2013).  For example, innovation is positively related to 
firm size (assets), Tobin’s Q, and R&D expenses.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
2.3.3 Impact of Dual-Class Shares and Firm Characteristics on Innovation 
Table 3 presents regression results similar to thoseinTable2. The focus in 
Table 3 is on the interaction term Dual-Class * Firm Age, which captures the 
impact of dual-class share structures on innovation for firms of different ages. The 
regression results show that the coefficients of Dual-Class * Firm Age are 
negative and marginally significant for patent number counts. This outcome 
shows that the negative effect of dual-class share structures on innovation is 
slightly more pronounced for old and mature firms than for young ones.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 4 presents regression estimates of the impact of dual-class shares on 
innovation for firms with differing growth opportunities. In this table we focus on 
the interaction term Dual-Class * Tobin’s Q. The results show that the coefficients 
of Dual-Class * Tobin’s Q are both statistically and economically significant. For 
example, in the regression of patent number counts reported in Column (1), the 
estimated coefficient of Dual-Class * Tobin’s Q is 2.99 and for Tobin’s Q is 0.407. 
The standard deviation of Tobin’s Q for single-class firms is 3.3 and for dual-class 
firms it is 2.24 (see Table 1A), respectively. Hence, an increase of one standard 
deviation in Tobin’s Q will result in an increase in patent counts of 2.24 * (0.407 
+ 2.992) = 7.61 per year for dual-class firms and of 3.3 * 0.407 = 1.34 for single-
class firms.  
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[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 5 presents regression estimates of how the impact of dual-class 
shares on innovation varies with the KZ Index, our measure of financial 
constraints. The coefficient of the interaction term Dual-Class*KZ Index is of 
principle interest here.  This coefficient shows how the impact of dual-class shares 
on innovation varies for firms with differing degrees of financial constraints. The 
estimated coefficients of Dual-Class * KZ Index are all positive and for two of the 
regressions they are marginally significant. This is consistent with the intuition 
that agency problems are exacerbated by dual-class share structures when insiders 
are not financially constrained, i.e., for firms with low KZ indices. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
In Table 6we present regression estimates of how firm cash flow affects 
the impact of dual-class shares on firm innovation productivity. As in Tables 3, 4, 
and 5, we focus on the interaction term between the dual-class dummy variable 
and the moderating variable of interest, in this case, Cash Flow-to-Assets. The 
regression results show that the estimated coefficients of Dual-Class * Cash 
Flow/Assets are all negative but the estimate is statistically significant only for the 
Patent Number regression. These results, therefore, are consistent with the notion 
that dual-class shares depress innovation activity to a greater extent for firms with 
high internally generated cash flow, but the evidence is weak. 
 
2.3.4 Impact of Dual-Class Shares and Industry Characteristics on 
Innovation 
 The recent proliferation of firms with dual-class share structures in the 
high-tech industries motivates the analysis presented in this section. We 
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investigate whether dual-class share structures encourage or depress innovation in 
high-tech industries. We adopt Hall and Lerner’s (2009) taxonomy where the 
high-technology sector comprises pharmaceuticals, office and computing 
equipment, communications equipment and electronic components. 
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
The relevant regression results are presented in Table 7. Note that the 
estimated coefficients of the high-tech industry dummy variable are all positive 
and highly significant. This is unsurprising. It is more interesting that the 
depressing effect of dual-class shares on innovation is greatly moderated for high-
tech firms. The estimated coefficients of the interaction term Dual-Class * High-
Tech are all positive. In three of the four regressions they are statistically 
significant. Moreover, the magnitudes of the coefficient estimates indicate that the 
impacts of dual-class shares on Patent Number, Citation Number, and Originality 
are substantially offset for high-tech firms. We perform a t-test of the hypothesis 
that the sum of the coefficient on the dual-class shares variable and on its 
interaction with the high-tech firms variable is zero. We cannot reject this 
hypothesis at conventional significance levels for patent counts or patent 
originality. The t-statistics are -1.57 and -1.54, respectively. We do reject the 
hypothesis for patent citations and patent generality with t-statistics of -2.37 and -
3.42, respectively. These results, though somewhat mixed, indicate that dual-class 
share structures affect innovation for high-tech firms to a lesser degree than for 
single-class firms. This may help to explain why high-tech companies seem 
increasingly willing to adopt dual-class share structures. 
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
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 Table 8 presents regression results similar to those in Table 7. The focus in 
this table is on the interaction term Dual-Class * Hard-to-Innovate. According to 
Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005), the Hard-to-Innovate industries are 
pharmaceuticals, medical instrumentation, chemicals, computers, communications, 
and the electrical industries. The estimated coefficients of the Dual-Class * Hard-
to-Innovate interaction terms are positive and statistically significant for three of 
the four regressions. Moreover, the magnitudes of the coefficient estimates 
indicate that the impacts of dual-class shares on Patent Number, Citation Number, 
and Originality are substantially offset for firms in hard-to-innovate industries. 
We perform a t-test of the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficient on the dual-
class shares variable and on its interaction with the hard-to-innovate variable is 
zero. We fail to reject this hypothesis for patent counts, patent citations, or patent 
originality though we do, again, reject the hypothesis for patent generality.
12
These 
results suggest that the negative effects of dual-class share structures for firms in 
hard-to-innovate industries are relatively small.  
[INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
 
2.3.5 Impact of Dual-Class Shares and Market Characteristics on Innovation 
Prior research indicates that insiders or executives adopt dual-class share 
structures to secure their own jobs and benefits when facing external takeover 
threats (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2003). For this reason, we examine how the effects 
of dual-class shares on innovation vary for firms with different exposures to 
takeover risk. We rely on takeover measures that are unrelated to firms’ own 
characteristics. One useful proxy for takeover risk is Bebchuk and Cohen’s (2003) 
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 The t-statistics are -0.59, -0.95, and -1.19 for patent counts, patent citations, and patent 
originality, respectively, and -3.05 for patent generality. 
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state-level index of anti-takeover laws. This index takes integer values from zero 
to five, with higher values corresponding to more restrictive takeover laws and, 
hence, lower implied external takeover risk. In the regression analysis we focus on 
the interaction term, Dual-Class * Anti-Takeover Index. 
We report the regression results in Table 9. The estimated coefficients of 
the interaction term are negative in three of the four regressions and statistically 
significant for Patent Number and Citation Number. These results show that dual-
class firms facing low takeover threats have fewer patents and patent citations 
than those operating in environments subject to high takeover threats. The 
evidence suggests that takeover threat mitigates the negative effects of dual-class 
shares on innovation. Note also that the estimated coefficients of the Anti-
Takeover Index variable itself are all negative and significant. This indicates that 
barriers to external takeovers are negatively associated with innovation 
productivity for firms in general. 
[INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE] 
In addition to takeover threats, product market competition provides 
another monitoring mechanism that serves to constrain self-serving managerial 
behavior. We propose that firms operating in relatively uncompetitive markets 
may be susceptible to managerial abuse and that this may lead to fewer resources 
being allocated for innovative activities. We use the Herfindahl Index as a proxy 
for the level of product market competition. In the regression analysis the 
coefficient of the interaction term, Dual-Class * Herfindahl Index, is of principle 
interest. The regression results are summarized in Table 10. The Dual-Class * 
Herfindahl Index coefficients are all negative. In three of the four regressions the 
estimates are statistically significant. These results imply that firms with dual-
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class shares that operate in relatively uncompetitive product markets are less 
innovative than dual-class firms facing stiffer product market competition. The 
estimated coefficients of the Herfindahl Index itself, however, are positive. This 
suggests that innovative output is greater in concentrated industries. Hence, the 
overall effect of product market competition on innovation is unclear. 
 
2.3.6 Robustness Check  
One concern about our evidence on the negative association between dual-
class shares and innovation is the possibility of reverse causality, in the sense that 
less innovative firms may choose to adopt dual-class share structures. To address 
this possibility, we conduct a test using a subsample of public firms that switched 
from single-class to dual-class share structures. This sample enables us to present 
evidence bearing on the possibility of reverse causality.  
The results, reported in Table 11, show that the estimated coefficients of the 
Dual-Class dummy variable are all negative and highly significant. Since the 
sample includes only firms that changed share class structures these results imply 
that innovation outputs declined after the switch to dual-class. The magnitude of 
these outcomes is also economically significant. The evidence suggests that a 
change from single- to dual-class share structures is associated with a decline in 
patent counts of 4.76 per firm-year. Given the single-class sample mean (patent 
counts) of 7.32, this represent a decline of 65%. We observe a similar decline for 
citation counts. These results help to mitigate concerns about reverse causality. 
We cannot, however, completely rule out an alternative explanation that firms 
anticipating declines in innovation voluntarily adopt dual-class shares as a defence 
mechanism. 
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[INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE] 
Taken together, the above results raise an important question. Through 
which channels do dual-class share structures affect innovation? We examine this 
issue using R&D expenses deflated by the book value of total assets as the 
dependent variable. These estimates, reported in Table 12 Column (1), indicate 
that dual-class shares have a negative effect on R&D expenses. This implies that 
firms with dual-class share structures spend relatively less on research and 
development.  
[INSERT TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE] 
Column (2) of Table 12shows the results using the subsample of public 
firms that switched from single-class shares to dual-class shares. This is to 
ascertain whether the results in Column (1) are due to reverse causality. The 
estimated coefficient of the dual-class dummy is negative but not statistically 
significant. 
[INSERT TABLE 13 ABOUT HERE] 
As a corollary, we next examine innovation efficiency. We measure 
innovation efficiency by the number of patents applied for and eventually granted 
each year divided by the R&D expense of previous years as in Hirshleifer et al., 
(2013). Table 13 summarizes the regression results using innovation efficiency as 
the measure of innovation. Results for the full sample are reported in column (1). 
The estimated coefficient of the dual-class shares dummy variable is negative and 
statistically significant. Column (2) of Table 13shows the results for the 
subsample of public firms that switched from single-class shares to dual-class 
shares. We perform this test to ascertain whether the results in Column (1) are due 
to reverse causality. For this alternative measure of innovation, the estimated 
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coefficient of the dual-class dummy is negative and statistically significant. 
Results from Table 13 are consistent with the hypothesis that dual-class share 
structures tend to decrease innovation. 
[INSERT TABLE 14 ABOUT HERE] 
In Table 14 we report regression results for dual-class on innovation efficiency 
for young versus old firms, hard- versus easy-to-innovate industries, high- versus 
low-tech industries and high versus low takeover threats. The results show that the 
negative effects of dual-class shares are associated with older firms, firms 
operating in easy-to-innovate industries, firms in low-tech sectors, and firms in 
states with low takeover pressure. We interpret these results to mean that dual-
class shares lead to low innovation efficiency in firms characterized by high levels 
of agency problems. For firms in the other subsamples, the estimated coefficients 
of the dual-class share dummy are statistically insignificant. 
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Chapter 4 Conclusion  
 In building competitive advantage, especially in high-tech firms, 
innovation is quintessential. Recently, there has been a proliferation of high-tech 
IPOs adopting dual-class share structures. Our research investigates the effects of 
dual-class share structures on corporate innovation. The empirical analysis 
provides strong evidence that dual-class shares are negatively associated with all 
four innovation measures (patent and citation counts, patent generality and patent 
originality). We also find similar results for the relationship between dual-class 
shares and innovation efficiency. These results support the hypothesis that dual-
class structures tend to stifle innovation. 
The negative effects of dual-class share shares on innovation are more 
pronounced for firms with looser financial constraints, those with low takeover 
pressure, and those operating in less competitive product markets. These findings 
imply that agency problems are likely to be exacerbated by the adoption of dual-
class shares because such share structures provide insiders or executives with a 
power of control that is greater than warranted by their ownership.  
Surprisingly, however, dual-class shares seem to have almost no negative 
effects for firms operating in high-tech and hard-to-innovate industries. Similarly, 
dual-class firms that operate in markets with high takeover threats and intense 
competition have innovation outputs that are significantly higher than those that 
are not subject to such market pressures or discipline. This implies that the nature 
of the product market and the cost of innovation play a complementary role to 
corporate governance in mitigating the agency problems arising from the use of 
dual-class shares. 
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 Overall, our research provides important insights on the increasing 
popularity of dual-class shares among high-tech companies. Our evidence 
highlights the role that market characteristics play in determining the effects of 
share class structures on corporate innovation.  
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Part III Sarbanes-Oxley and Corporate Innovation 
Chapter 1 Introduction: 
The history of regulation on markets and firms shows significant social 
and economic costs, including substantial and unintended effects on industrial 
competitiveness (Hahn, 1998). These effects on firm performance have been 
examined mostly through an economist’s lens, but have lacked development in 
research. In recent years, and especially with regards to the advent of regulations 
such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the effects on innovativeness have started to be 
more keenly felt (The Economist, 2007). This is particularly worrisome since 
economies and firms are becoming increasingly competitive with time, and 
technological change (i.e., innovation) is increasingly an integral aspect of that 
competitiveness. As such, regulations can now not only increase the costs of doing 
business, but can also affect firms’ global competitiveness (Hahn and Hird, 1991; 
Wall Street Journal, 2012).  
Despite this emerging concern, we still lack wider and more thoroughly 
explored understandings of the effects of economy-wide regulations on value 
creating activities such as innovation. Regulations simply have not been studied as 
much in the innovation and management literature, especially with regards to their 
effects on decision-making. This with the exception of studies on the stimulative 
effects of specific regulations on innovation, such as ones in the environmental 
arena, and with regards to university patenting via the Bayh-Dohl Act (Mowery et 
al, 2001). To address this gap, we will examine the question of one of these major 
hidden costs, which is the effect of certain generalized regulations -such as the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, addressed to corporate governance - on the innovativeness of 
business.  
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was one of the most far reaching 
regulations in recent decades. It was enacted to curb the worst of corporate 
excesses and to bring a denouement to the series of corporate governance scandals 
seen with the likes of the Enron and World.com cases of corporate misconduct. 
SOX legislation ushered in an era of increased power and accountability with 
external board members, audit controls, and overall responsibilities and greater 
liabilities for corporate leadership and auditors alike. However, the regulation’s 
“heavy-handed” influence also became the focus of corporate concern early on. 
The former chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), William 
Donaldson, wondered if “…by unleashing ‘batteries of lawyers across the country’ 
the legislation would lead to a ‘loss of risk-taking zeal’ due to a “huge 
preoccupation with the dangers and risks of making the slightest mistake”. It was 
observed that there was a decrease in IPOs, starting in 2008 and running through 
2011 (Wall Street Journal, 2012). Was corporate innovation, and innovative risk-
taking, put at risk by SOX? 
With this practical question in mind, we sought to understand the negative 
effects of SOX on firm-level innovation, as an unintended effect of the 
regulation.
13
 Early studies suggested that the effects of SOX have been benign, but 
as with studies of other regulations, these were often predicated on the direct costs 
of compliance and involved measuring these effects against the public benefits, or 
framing them in equity (across companies) terms(Coates and Srinivasan, 2014). 
Recent studies have been concerned with the regulation’s effect on corporate 
competitiveness, including by way of firms’ ability to innovate (Shadab, 2008, 
                                                          
13
There are different types of regulation, and while these having differing effects on corporate 
decisions, they also have the generally common effect of increasing the costs of doing business. 
This is particularly the case for environmental regulations (Coeurderoy and Murray, 2008; List et 
al., 2003). SOX legislation may fall in this category. 
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Bargeron et. al., 2010, Waters, 2013). In particular, SOX was shown to be 
affecting US corporations’ R&D investments by causing them to assume less risk 
and hoard more cash (as shown to happen after the legislation) (Bargeron et al., 
2010).We contribute to this line of research by examining the SOX legislation’s 
effect on innovation output, as seen in evidence on corporate patents. The problem 
is that firms respond to their institutional environment and in doing so may attend 
to other interests than to the firms’ and their managers’ interests (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). The question is, in the interests of guarding against corrupt 
practices, has the SOX’s enhancement of firm’s governance structure now 
lessened managers’ natural risk-taking tendencies? 
In section 2, we discuss the background behind our hypothesis - that the 
enactment of SOX stifles innovation. In section 3, we build on established 
methodology in the innovation literature, using patent filings and innovation 
efficiency as a measure of corporate innovations, directly testing the hypothesis 
(Hall, et al, 2001; Hall, et al., 2005). In section 4, we discuss our findings. In our 
baseline regression, we find that after controlling for a number of concomitant 
variables like firm size, firm age, return on assets (ROA), measure of firm value 
(Tobin’s Q), amount of cash holdings, leverage, capital and R&D expenditures, 
and measure of industry concentration (Herfindahl Index) with both industry and 
year specific fixed effects, the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley legislation has a 
significant negative impact on firm innovation.
14
 We find an unmistakable 
downward spiral of innovation measured in terms the number of patents, the 
number of citations of patents per year, and the generality and originality scores of 
the patents filed each year since the enactment of SOX. Controlling for firm size, 
                                                          
14
The result is robust to different quintiles of firm asset size (or log of firm size) and value 
(measured by Tobin’s Q) although it is much more pronounced for the biggest quintile of firms.  
64 
 
firm value, levels of governance, and high tech sectors, the number of patents 
dropped significantly between the pre- and post-SOX regimes.  Finally, in section 
5, we discuss the possible mechanisms underlying management decision-making 
and corporate behavior with the help of the corporate governance, innovation and 
management literature. 
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Chapter 2 the Nature of Regulatory Influences on the Firm 
To understand the theoretical means by which how SOX may impact 
negatively on innovation, we review some of the pertinent literature. One pertains 
to theories relating to the causes and effects of regulation. It is a fundamental tenet 
of modern economics that negative externalities or spillovers can be corrected by 
regulations, but at certain direct costs. Since the advent of neoclassical economics 
at the time of Adam Smith in the 1700suntil the current era, most regulation shave 
been of the form that “protect the public interest” by taking the public’s interest 
directly into account by making the competition fairer (Krugman, 2011). 
Regulations were generally designed to counter various negative aspects of 
behavior among economic agents causing negative spillovers or externalities to 
society at large.
15
Since the beginning of the last century, a number of cases of 
industry misconduct or behavior led to regulations that sought to rein in these 
business excesses, usually promulgated for one specific industry at a time. The 
earliest and more famous cases were more related to problems of industry 
structure and concentration, leading up to the various episodes of antitrust 
regulation, where “fair competition” was the desired regulatory outcome (Hart, 
2001).
16
 
                                                          
15
One major feature of regulation involves the internalization of pollution-type externalities caused 
by private sector activities, as was seen in the variety of environmental and health laws signed into 
effect over the past few decades, one of the earliest being the 1963 Clean Air Act. 
16
The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 was one of the first, to regulate railroads. While the theory 
of regulation was largely an issue in the public administrative and legal disciplines, and subjected 
to economics so far as cost-benefit analyses were warranted, during the 1970s, self-interest was 
incorporated into the economic theory of regulation, intertwining of the interests of the industry 
and the regulators themselves (Pelztman et al., 1989; Posner, 1974). In practice, this sort of 
individualistic bent was exacerbated in the socio-political sphere with the rightwing political lurch 
and deregulation impulses of the 1980s. To some degree, this has been associated with the 
unfettered (Laissez-faire)  nature of business practice that ensued in the 1990s and later, with 
“business deal making” (mergers and acquisitions in particular) becoming de rigueur. While few 
theories can explain these pendulum “lurches” in the political sphere, by coupling management 
theory with behavioral models, we can in limited fashion understand why firms’ leaders act the 
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Underlying all of these traditional notions of regulation are two 
conceptions of behavior. The first is that increasing industry power (such as that 
accrued from industry concentration measured by Herfindahl type indices) could 
lead to misconduct by economic agents. Misconductor inappropriate action can be 
brought on by a variety of factors, including cultural (e.g. “bad” corporate cultures 
and poor ethics), psychological (in way of increased expectations) (Akerlof, 1970; 
Aguilera, 2005; Greve et al., 2010; Mishina et al., 2010), and personality-based 
(Hayward and Hambrick, 1997) ones. The second idea inherent in notions of 
regulation pertains to the ability of regulations to “target” certain outcomes and to 
then compel firms to shift their strategy in the desired directions. In the 
environmental arena for instance, “command and control” environmental 
regulations enacted to create emissions standards were expected to lead not only 
to compliance, but in the extreme, to technological innovation.
17
 
That regulations could easily fall astray of their intended purposes is not 
new. While most of the costs expected of regulation are the direct costs of 
compliance (as is commonly seen in environmental regulations), other hidden (or 
implicit)costs are derived from the unintended consequences of the regulations 
and unanticipated behaviors instigated. Regulations have historically also been 
known to have unintended consequences, including the Prohibition Act of 1920 - 
enacted ostensibly to control alcohol, with the consequence being increased 
underground and criminal activity. The series of banking regulations enacted in 
the wake of the Great Depression, starting with the Banking Act of 1933 and the 
                                                                                                                                                               
way they do (e.g. Li and Tang, 2010; Mishina et al., 2010), and in the case of our study, 
understand how regulations may come to constrain their decision making on innovative actions. 
17
The “Porter hypothesis” (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995), described even earlier by Ashford and 
others (Ashford and Heaton, 1983; Ashford et al., 1985), suggested that firms would innovate to 
get out of regulatory mandates. 
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accompanying Glass-Steagall Act (1932), some of which were eventually partially 
repealed.
18
Thus, while regulations as these initially have a well-intended social 
purpose, their typically heavy hand and overall coarse manner by which they 
target perceived problems makes it difficult for them to achieve the desired 
behavior.  
The SOX follows in the long tradition of the governance of business 
behavior and regulation of misconduct. Although white collar in nature, the 
ostensibly criminal acts committed by Enron, World.com and other corporate 
leaders was determined to be the result of a lack of independent board oversight 
on activities, and the insufficient powers of auditors. Articles in the SOX 
legislation resolved to strengthen these poor governance controls, at the expense 
of CEOs’ independence. The most typical and direct of mechanisms cited is the 
increased cost of compliance - for publicly traded firms and smaller firms alike 
(Coates and Srinivasan, 2014). 
The enactment of the SOX legislation in July 2002 provides us with a 
natural experiment under two different regimes (pre and post SOX) to evaluate the 
impact of SOX on corporate innovation. As previously noted, SOX has been 
shown to have decreased R&D investments, and presumably, risk-taking 
(Bargeronet al., 2010; Dey, 2010). Our premise is that decisions on the input side 
such as these (R&D investments) will translate into specific effects on the output 
side: decreased patenting. Since innovation is costly, involving a process that is 
                                                          
18
Even while environmental regulations were in some ways found to be incentivizing of innovation, 
another dominant strand of the discourse in public policy shows perverse effects on business 
behavior. Environmental regulations that “target” behaviors with increased standards may lead to 
unintended consequences such as the shifting of “dirty plants” across borders (Coeurderoy and 
Murray, 2008). Thus, such regulations affect not only direct decision-making on investment in 
pollution control equipment, but a higher level strategic decision such as whether to “escape” such 
regulations, or to invest in such R&D (with one study finding the former effect, but not the latter 
[Jaffe and Palmer, 1997]). 
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long, idiosyncratic, uncertain, and often with a high probability of failure 
(Holmstrom, 1989), SOX’s effect on risk-taking can make such a process less 
attractive (Bargeron et al., 2010).Although the exact mechanisms have yet to be 
explored or discussed, it is presumed that the very same instruments that SOX 
uses to guard against misconduct -  increasing auditing, outside director oversight, 
and the specification of liabilities – can also be disruptive of corporate 
innovation.
19
 We thus hypothesize the following effect of SOX on innovation: 
 
Hypothesis 1. The enactment of SOX has a negative impact on corporate 
innovation.  
 
  
                                                          
19
For example, SOX does this through specific governance mechanisms such as shaping the 
corporate’s board of directors. Specifically, several sections of the legislation expand the role of 
and expanded liability of independent directors. SOX legislation mandates US listed firms to have 
significant (75%) external or independent board members. 
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Chapter 3 Data and sample summary 
3.3.1 Data 
The voluminous literature on the economics of innovation and the strategic 
management of innovation both widely accept patents as a primary measure of 
innovative output.
20
Notwithstanding the limitations, patents remain the most 
direct measure of the extent and quality of firms’ innovation (Griliches, 1990), 
and the use of patenting activity to measure of innovation productivity is widely 
accepted in the extant literature (Lerner et al., 2011). We use patent innovation 
data on publicly listed US corporations from Harvard University’s patent database. 
This database includes all patents filed and granted by the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO) from 1990 to 2009. The database provides 
detailed information on patent assignee (owner) names, the patent number, and a 
patent’s 3-digit technology class. For specifying the year of the patent, we use the 
patent’s application year instead of grant year, following Griliches et al (1988). 
If patents are measures of innovative output, R&D expenditures remain the 
main input to innovation, in effect, measuring the initial commitment to innovate. 
Our second measure of innovation, proposed by Hershleiferet al. (2013), relates 
this to patents: innovation efficiency (IE). We construct this measure by taking the 
number of patents scaled by the previous year’s R&D expenditure. Specifically, 
IE is calculated by taking the number of patents of firm i applied in year t which 
were eventually granted (NoPati,t) scaled by firm i’s cumulative R&D investment 
in fiscal year ending from year t-4 through year t: 
NoPati,t/ (XRDi,t + 0.8*XRDi,t-1 + 0.6*XRDi,t-2 + 0.4*XRDi,t-3 + 0.2*XRDi,t-4), 
                                                          
20
Nevertheless, the number of patents is but only one measure of innovative productivity. For 
example, some inventions are protected as trade secrets, such as the formula for Coca-Cola, and 
others like software are protected in other ways. Besides different industries have different 
innovation cycles and patenting propensities. 
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where XRDi,t indicates firm i’s R&D investment in fiscal year ending in year t, and 
so on. We adopt this 5-year cumulative R&D investment based on the assumption 
of an annual depreciation rate of 20% on R&D investment, following from Chanet 
al. (2001) and Levet al. (2005). Innovative efficiency highlights the effectiveness 
of R&D expenditures in terms of the number of patents that are applied for 
(successfully) for every unit of an exponentially smoothed average R&D dollar, 
i.e. “…innovative bang for the R&D buck…” 
Any corporate decision in a firm is affected by various external and internal 
factors, and innovation is no different. Identification of factors that are 
instrumental in innovative efficiency requires controlling for concomitant 
variables that might affect innovative activity in a firm. The control variables are 
collected from the COMPUSTAT database. These control variables include size 
(Total Assets), firm age, book to market, R&D expenses scaled by lagged PPE,  
return on assets (ROA); growth opportunities (Tobin’s Q), cash, leverage, capital 
expenditures scaled by lagged PPE (CAPX); and product market competition, 
given by the Herfindahl index of the 3-digit SIC industry of the firm based on 
sales (Herfindahl Index). These control variables are used in the extant literature 
(e.g., Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Aghion, et al. 2005; Chemmanur and Tian, 2011; 
Atanassov, 2012; Chang et al., 2015; He and Tian, 2013; Tian and Wang, 2013; 
Van Reenen and Zingales, 2013).
21
 
                                                          
21
The most relevant control to the innovation literature is firm size. Ever since Schumpeter, 
differential firm size has always been known to have an effect on the ability to innovate (Cohen 
and Levin, 1989). SOX has already been shown to have differential impact on firms at least in 
terms of costs of compliance and the likelihood of firms listing in the U.S. (Coates and Srinivasan, 
2014; Piotroski and Srinivasan, 2008).Along with firm size, firm age is also a historically relevant 
measure, given that age has implications for firms’ ability to innovate, particularly with regards to 
their explorative innovative ability (Sorensen and Stuart, 2000). Our approach also examines the 
possibility not covered in Bargeron et al., (2010) that under SOX, R&D might have become more 
efficient which is beneficial to firms without impacting innovation significantly (Hirshleifer et al., 
2013). 
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3.3.2 Summary 
Figure 1 depicts the general patterns of innovation 3 years before and 3 years 
after the 2002enactment of the SOX legislation. We calculate the sample mean of 
patents and innovation efficiency of all firms each year. Figure 1 shows a 
noticeable pattern with both measures of innovation decreasing after the SOX 
event. In particular, the number of patents shows an increasing trend before 2002 
and a decreasing pattern after the enactment of SOX. The caveat is that not all 
parts of the SOX legislation came into immediate effect. However, it can be 
conjectured that firms started taking decisions in advance of the legislation and 
that were in anticipation of the impending but phased rollout of SOX and its 
provisions. 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the innovation variables and control 
variables 3 years before and 3 years after the year of the initial SOX legislation. 
The sample mean of patents before SOX was0.41; after SOX the mean dropped to 
0.40but this was not a statistically significant drop. The innovation efficiency 
measure drops in the post SOX period by 0.03, a near 50% drop from pre-SOX 
value that was statistically significant. We further note that the sample means of 
controls such as firm size, ROA, Tobin’s Q do not exhibit difference before and 
after SOX legislation. Interestingly, without conditioning on other control 
variables, neither R&D expenses nor CAPEX show significant drops after the 
advent of SOX legislation. 
Table 2 reports the correlation matrix of all variables. Both the measures of 
innovation,, patent count and innovation efficiency, are not highly correlated with 
each other at 0.063. Firm size has non-zero correlations with the measures of 
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innovation; R&D expenses have correlations of 0.37 with innovation measures 
such as patents. 
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Chapter 4 Empirical Results 
3.4.1 Baseline Analysis 
We first examine what factors drive firm innovation in a multiple regression 
framework for panel data. Specifically, we estimate the following model: 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = α+ β SOX signal +δ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡+θFE+𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,     (1) 
where i indexes firms and t indexes years. The dependent variable 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡  
is one of our innov ation measures (i.e., the patents’ innovative efficiency). SOX 
signal is a dummy or binary variable that equals one if year is 2003, 2004, and 
2005, and zero otherwise. 
Table 3 reports the baseline OLS regression results as specified in model 
(1). The regression of coefficient estimate for SOX signal is -0.115 when the 
dependent variable is the logarithm of patents, and -0.055 when the dependent 
variable is innovation efficiency. Holding all other control variables constant, the 
number of patents drops by approximately 11.5% after the enactment of SOX. In 
similar vein, ceteris paribus, innovative efficiency drops by 0.055 patents for 
every average dollar of R&D expenses spend on an average. The coefficients are 
both statistically and economically significant after controlling for the different 
external factors (such as the H-Index) and internal factors (such as total assets, 
firm age, ROA, Tobin’s Q, Cash, Leverage ratio, CAPEX, R&D Expenses etc.). 
The results in Table 3 show that firms experience a substantial drop in innovation 
after the enactment of SOX in the baseline model.  
Although the baseline model on the impact of SOX enactment on 
innovation effectiveness does highlight the significant negative relationship, we 
still have to establish the plausible channels for such a decline. Tobin’s Q 
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measures the firm’s market values with respect to its asset value, and a high 
Tobin’s Q signifies a growth firm rather than a value firm. Table 4 reports the 
regression results of the impact of SOX on innovation when firms are divided into 
2 subsamples according to the median value of the firms’ Tobin’s Q. The 
regressions results show that the SOX’s impact on patents and innovation 
efficiency becomes more pronounced in firms with higher Q. This result suggests 
that SOX stifles innovation in general but the effect is greater for growth firms. 
For firms that are of higher value, the impact of SOX on innovation  is 
substantially dampened. The result indicates that for growth firms SOX legislation 
precipitated a nearly 20% drop in patents, while the drop was only 1.5% 
(statistically insignificant) among the firms with low Tobin’s Q (i.e., firms with 
high growth potential), ceteris paribus. For the innovative efficiency of high Q 
firms, the SOX legislation caused a statistically significant drop of 6.4 patents per 
R&D dollar spent. The corresponding drop for low Q firms of 4.7 patents per 
R&D dollar is statistically insignificant, which we surmise as possibly being due 
to sampling variation. 
Table 5 reports the regression results of the impact of SOX on innovation 
by dividing firms according to corporate governance quality. We follow 
Gomperset al.(2003) in dividing firms into 2 subsamples according to the mean 
value of the G-index. The regressions results show that SOX’s impact on patents 
remains pronounced only for firms with poor corporate governance. According to 
the G-index which captures shareholder protection, poorer rights protection leads 
to a bigger drop in patents and innovative efficiency. All else being equal, a 
poorly governed firm saw a drop in 15.5% patents compared to only 6.9% for a 
better governed firm. In terms of innovative efficiency, a poorly governed firm 
75 
 
had 0.33 fewer patents per dollar of R&D expenses comparing to a 0.03 drop for 
better governed firms. As expected, SOX did not have a big enough impact 
statistically for companies with better governance. 
 We further investigate the impact of SOX on firms operating in the high-
tech industries as opposed to the non-high-tech industries. This helps us to 
understand the impact of the SOX legislation by controlling for the innovativeness 
of the industry. There are two main issues. First, the aftermath of the tech sector 
bubble’s bursting, which occurred in 2000-2001. Second, the ease of innovating or 
patenting in these two types of sector are inherently different and might have had 
a differential impact of SOX. We split the sample into two subsamples and report 
the regression results in Table 6. The coefficient of SOX dummy on log of patents 
is significant and negative in both subsamples but is significantly greater in 
magnitude for high-tech industries. On the other hand, the impact of SOX on 
innovation efficiency only remains statistically significant and negative for firms 
in high-tech sectors but becomes insignificant in the low-tech industries. A high-
tech firm had a drop in productivity in patents of 15% compared to the non-tech 
firms registering a drop in 3.5% controlling for other factors. We further report a  
0.055 drop in the number of patents filed per R&D dollars spent after 
accommodating for depreciation and controlling for other factors. In sum, we can 
say that firms in the high-tech industry did indeed play a role in the reduction in 
innovation and innovative effectiveness as an aftermath of SOX, but only part of it 
can be explained by the funding crunch in the aftershock of the tech-sector bubble. 
 The nature of the decline in innovation and its causes could potentially 
also result from the actions of those companies which actively delisted during and 
after the SOX legislation. The main thrust of the argument is that companies 
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which found it difficult to be sustainable in a post-SOX regime actively sourced 
for funds to go private to avoid the cost of compliance and additional supervision 
enactment of SOX entails. However, such an analysis of private firms is not 
without its own shortcomings. One potential concern about our results are the 
omitted variables in the regressions, since the SOX will affect many corporate 
behaviors that may not be captured in the regressions. We therefore utilize a set of 
firms that delisted at the time of the SOX legislation, and compare the impact of 
SOX on delisted firms as opposed to those that remained listed. The results are 
reported in Table 7.  
 The regression in Table 7 includes the post-SOX dummy, the delisting 
dummy, their interaction term and the control variables used in other tables. The 
coefficient on the delisting dummy is negative and significant, hence controlling 
the impact of delisting directly. The post-SOX dummy is significant and negative, 
suggesting that the SOX legislation causes firms to innovate less. The interaction 
term between SOX dummy and delisting dummy is positive and significant, 
suggesting that firms which delisted are less adversely affected by the SOX 
legislation than firms that remained public. The results also stay the same even 
when we do not control for any of the standard covariates (Table 7 Panel (1)). Our 
findings in Table 7 confirm the negative impact of SOX on innovation, and our 
findings are not caused by endogeneity (or selection) concerns such as an omitted 
variable bias. Summing up, SOX had a significant negative impact on innovation, 
but this result is not driven by firms delisting alone. In fact, the firms that stay 
public seems to be less innovative after implementation of SOX. 
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Chapter 5 Possible Managerial Mechanisms Underlying SOX’s Effects on 
Innovative Performance 
The public need for SOX notwithstanding, our findings offer evidence that such 
regulations are having perverse effects on firms’ innovative behavior, and 
presumably, on their eventual competitiveness. We have yet to suggest a 
reasonable managerial model or process by which these impacts may happen. That 
SOX simply clamped down on managerial indiscretion by itself may not directly 
translate to a lower propensity to innovate, though by requiring independent 
oversight and its other provisions, SOX has been said to constrain managers’ risk-
taking (Bargeron et al., 2010). To further understand the effect of SOX on 
innovation, we examine how regulatory mechanisms may yield unintended 
consequences by their influence on managerial decision-making.
22
 To reiterate 
observations from the earlier literature, while regulations have historically already 
been seen to have had negative side effects through direct costs of compliance 
(Hahn 1998; Hahn and Hird, 1991), they have also had unintended consequences. 
While there is evidence on SOX’s effect on certain other decisions such as public 
listings, this is also the result of direct impacts (on costs). 
It is worth nothing that the corporate governance literature itself is strongly 
defined by the notion of “misconduct” and its “appropriate” governance. 
Governance is complicated by multidisciplinary facets (Aguilera and Jackson, 
2010), and misconduct itself has been attributed to a plethora of possible 
                                                          
22
While anecdotal evidence surfaced on concerns that SOX was having unnecessarily negative 
effects, understanding of its potential effects on innovation took longer to gestate. On top of this, 
academia was generally recognized to be lagging behind practice in understanding the negative 
effects, including at the time of SOX (Aguilera and Cuervo‐Cazurra, 2009). 
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underlying reasons (Greve et al., 2010).
23
 It is also known that individual traits 
and behaviors can interact with organizational incentives and expectations in more 
complex ways than straightforward economic self-interest would presume 
(Mishina et al., 2005). However, there is also an expanse of corporate behavior 
that is not purely in the realm of misconduct, but that is instead ‘rational conduct’. 
In some of these cases, with SOX, a ‘well-intentioned regulation, bad side effect’ 
mechanism may be at work.  
Since regulations, and SOX in particular, can affect the propensity to take 
risks, (Bargeron et al., 2010; Fama, 1980), our findings on higher growth firms 
and high tech firms (which are the typically ones taking on more risks), suggests a 
possible regulatory-induced bias against risk-taking – both proper (risks) and 
otherwise. It is known for instance that the more “sustaining” innovations are by 
definition not “disruptive”, and hence, associated with less risky investments 
(Christensen and Bower, 1996), and presumably, faster growing and innovative 
firms such as start-ups. SOX also enhances the pathways for exercising 
responsible behavior creates as well as increases the penalties on managers. This 
intended effect appears to be working, given our results showing that the well-
governed firms suffer less adverse effects on their patenting. Those with weaker 
governance processes or regimes may have higher than acceptable risk profiles 
(i.e. may be undertaking “risky” innovations), and so (appropriately) have their 
propensity to innovate decreased by SOX. 
                                                          
23
Reasons traditionally cited as underlying CEO misconduct include organizational culture, 
cognitive biases, ethical decision-making processes, hubris (which has an aspect of behavioral bias 
but also personality traits), willful blindness (partly based on cognitive inabilities of seeing one’s 
acts from other perspectives) (Greve et al., 2010; Hefferman, 2011), as well as rationally-governed 
misconduct (i.e., the self-interested nature of the economic paradigm) as taught in theories of 
business (Pfeffer, 2005). 
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We next examine the interaction of regulations with appropriate but risky 
corporate behavior by way of simple cognitive models of decision-making. 
Instead of simply restricting firms’ behavior as command and control regulations 
did, SOX provided for greater accountability and independent oversight by 
treating the corporation as a system of activities and stakeholders, and seeking to 
enhance accountability through increased transparency (via audit trails) and 
shifting the balance of power (by way of independent directors). In this way, SOX 
can be seen to be following well-established findings showing that independent 
boards act as controls on corporate excesses (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Pozner, 2007). Since managerial discretion enhances the positive relationship 
between traits as CEO hubris and firm risk-taking (Li and Tang, 2010),by 
increasing external monitoring and clamping down on such managerial 
indiscretion, SOX can be said to be seeking to control such behavior and 
conditions by promoting “low-discretion” environments (Hambrick and 
Finkelstein, 1987; Peteraf and Reed, 2007). In general, hubristic CEOs (which are 
not a small proportion of the population) will exercise strong control over 
innovation, but this effect is weakened when task complexity increases (Tang et 
al., 2012). Regulations may very well add to that task complexity, weakening that 
strong control (Hahn, 1998),this being quite in-line with bounded rationality 
assumptions on decision-making.  
With regards to the classical innovation activities of R&D and new 
product development, the manager’s decision problem consists of creating and 
deciding from amongst a feasible set of strategic choices within the firm. This is 
often typically described as creating a “funnel” of project ideas which are 
winnowed out over time. The question is: how are regulations acting on managers’ 
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mindsets and shaping (or restricting) such actions? The decision to pursue a 
particular innovative product (or service) or the project leading up to it (including 
the scientific or technical research) is often made using rational calculi, weighing 
the benefits and likelihoods of technical and market success.
24
 Much of what firms 
already do in the way of making technology decisions involves mitigating the 
risks of product and investment decisions, and thereby reducing the uncertainty in 
facing them.
25
 The resulting set of “investment options” would largely consist of 
what remains feasible technologically, financially and strategically. Regulations 
that increase the risks of taking certain technological choices (say by suggesting 
new levels of risks that could be penalized), can act as further constraints on the 
set of viable choices or range of permissible actions. In addition to this, 
technological choices nowadays (but especially just before 2000) are associated 
with (that is, enacted by) new business models, some of which incorporate 
different economic arrangements with external parties (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 
2010; Teece, 2010; Zott and Amit, 2008), but which may also entail different 
types of risks (risks of diversifying or moving beyond stakeholders’ 
understandings and expectations being a simple example). Thus, what on the 
surface appears to be a technological investment decision may actually be 
associated with a particular business model predicated on extracting value from 
                                                          
24
The stage gate process exemplifies this, using certain stages of the product development process 
as cut off points at which projects are allowed to proceed or to be halted (Krishnan and Ulrich, 
2001; Ulrich and Eppinger, 1995). 
25
Firms employ means such as cross-functional and cross-level teams to increase the different 
views on a problem or solution, technology scanning and other predictive methods (Brown and 
Eisenhardt, 1997; Calantone et al., 2003), and shortening the product cycle in order to increase 
information (Krishnan and Bhattacharya, 2002). 
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external partnerships – one that may be deemed riskier (at risk of being penalized) 
under the new regulatory regime.
26
 
As regulations shape choices within an industry, through firms’ mimetic 
behavior or other “coerced” means (e.g. consultants indicating the new risks and 
penalties across their clients), they can become embedded as new “industry 
recipes” that further act to sanction or otherwise limit the set of actions deemed 
permissible to the entire industry (Peteraf and Reed, 2007; Spender, 1989). These 
are just some of the pathways by which regulations may impact on the innovative 
behaviors and underlying decision-making of firms. More detailed research could 
be warranted to test whether some of these pathways have clearer or stronger 
effects than others. 
 
  
                                                          
26
Presumably then, some risky technologies require more creative engagements with external 
parties and parts of the value chain. Tesla’s branching into charging stations (creating its own 
value chain) is an example integrating new technology with a new business model. In general, the 
concept of innovation is itself considered by some to be expanding to recognize its effects and 
desired properties of helping firms bridge and capture value across established industry boundaries 
(Hacklin, 2007), and when modern entrepreneurial thought promotes firms having an even freer 
hand to innovate, to experiment and even to fail(Blank, 2013).  
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Chapter 6 Conclusion     
 The question more informed regulators would like to ask is, how can 
regulations such as SOX isolate problems and implement appropriate mechanisms 
and incentives in order to correct for these individual and systemic failures 
without jeopardizing corporate performance? While this cannot be easily 
answered, we can shed light on the conditions and means by which such failures 
can occur. In the research, we directly examine the hypothesis that SOX stifles 
corporate innovation. We provide direct evidence for the first time in the literature 
that such impacts exist. For example, for US listed firms in 4 years after the 
enactment of the SOX, they experience a significant drop in innovation.  
We show that the impact of SOX on innovation have an interesting cross-
sectional pattern. Growth firms especially those with above average growth 
opportunities experience greater drop in innovation. Similarly, SOX’s impact on 
innovation is more pronounced in firms operating in high-tech industries or firms 
with poor corporate governance, consistent with the regulatory purpose of raising 
compliance costs particularly for these “riskier” firms. Finally, we show that the 
impact of SOX on innovation is not solely driven by its status of being publicly 
listed since no such effect is found in firms gone private before SOX.  
Our research shows that policies that aim to impact on corporations 
universally may still have unintended consequences. This has important 
implications for policy makers, particularly ones interested in the competitiveness 
implications of any regulations.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A Tables for Part I 
Appendix Table I.A  
Variable Definitions  
 
Variable Definition 
Innovation measures  
Ln(1+Patent) Natural logarithm of one plus the patent number. Patent number is 
defined as number of patent applications filed in year t of each firm. 
Only patents that are later granted are included.  The patent number is 
set to zero for companies that have no patent information available from 
the NBER database. 
Ln(1+Citation) Natural logarithm of one plus the citation number. Citation number is 
defined as number of citations received by patent applications filed in 
year t of each firm. The citation number is corrected for the truncation 
bias in citation counts using the Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) 
adjustment factor. Only patents that are later granted are included. The 
citation number is set to zero for companies that have no citation 
information available from the NBER database. 
Ln(1+Generality) Natural logarithm of one plus the generality scores. Generality score is 
defined as one minus the Herfindahl index of the three-digit technology 
class distribution of all the patents that cite a given patent. We then take 
the sum for all patent applications filed in year t of each firm. Only 
patents that are later granted are included.  For firms that generate no 
patents in a year, their patents generality scores are undefined and 
therefore treated as missing.  
Ln(1+Originality) Natural logarithm of one plus the originality scores. Originality score is 
defined as one minus the Herfindahl index of the three-digit technology 
class distribution of all the patens that a given patent cites. We then take 
the sum for all patent applications filed in year t of each firm. Only 
patents that are later granted are included.  For firms that generate no 
patents in a year, their patents orginality scores are undefined and 
therefore treated as missing. 
Real estate value and price index 
Ln(1+RE Value) (MSA) Logarithm of one plus the market value of real estate assets using the 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)-level real estate price index 
divided by the lagged PPE (PPENT from COMUSTAT) in year t of 
each firm. Detailed description on the calculation of the market value of 
real estate assets is provided in the Internet Appendix. 
Ln(1+RE Value) (State) Logarithm of one plus the market value of real estate assets using the 
state-level real estate price index divided by lagged PPE in year t of 
each firm. 
Real Estate Price Index 
(MSA) 
Home Price Index (HPI) at the MSA level in year t of each firm, a broad 
measure of the movement of single family home prices in the United 
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States, provided by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight 
(OFHEO).  
Real Estate Price Index 
(State) 
Home Price Index (HPI) at the state level in year t of each firm, a broad 
measure of the movement of single family home prices in the United 
States, provided by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight 
(OFHEO).  
Control variables  
Ln(Asset) Firm's total asset. It is defined as logarithm of the book value of total 
assets (AT from COMPUSTAT) measured at the end of fiscal year t. 
Ln(1+Age) Firm's age. It is defined as logarithm of one plus the number of years of 
the corporation has existed from the IPO year to year t. 
ROA Firm's return-on-asset ratio. It is defined as operating income before 
depreciation (OIBDP from COMUSTAT) divided by book value of 
total asset (AT), measured at the end of fiscal year t.  
Tobin's Q Firm's market-to-book ratio. It is defined as [the market value of equity 
(PRCC_F×CSHO from COMUSTAT) plus book value of assets (AT) 
minus book value of equity (CEQ from COMUSTAT) minus balance 
sheet deferred taxes (TXDB from COMUSTAT)] divided by book value 
of asset (AT), measured at the end of fiscal year t. 
Cash  Firm's cash flows. It is defined as income before extraordinary items (IB 
from COMUSTAT) plus depreciation and amortization (DP from 
COMUSTAT) divided by lagged PPE (PPENT from COMUSTAT), 
measured at the end of fiscal year t.  
Leverage  Firm's leverage ratio. It is defined as book value of debt (DLTT+DLC 
from COMUSTAT) divided by book value of total assets (AT) 
measured at the end of fiscal year t.  
R&D Expense  Firm's research and development expenditure. It is defined as research 
and develop expenditure (XRD from COMUSTAT) divided by book 
value of lagged PPE (PPENT), measured at the end of fiscal year t.  
CAPX  Firm's capital expenditure. It is defined as capital expenditure (CAPX 
from COMUSTAT) divided by book value of lagged PPE (PPENT), 
measured at the end of fiscal year t.  
Herfindahl Index Herfindahl index of 3-digit SIC industry of each firm measured at the 
end of fiscal year t based on sales.   
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Appendix Table I.B 
Sample Calculations for General Motors (GM) (In millions of dollars) 
Step 1: Obtain Age and Purchase Year of Real Estate 
Fiscal Year 1993 data: 
Property, Plant, and Equipment for Buildings at Cost = $13,577 
Accumulated Depreciation for Buildings = $6,889.7 
Proportion of Buildings Used = 0.5075 
Age = 20 
Purchase Year = 1973 
Step 2: Estimate Book Value of Real Estate 
Book Value of Real Estate in Fiscal Year 1993 
= Buildings at Cost + Construction in Progress at Cost + Land and Improvements 
at Cost  
= $18,278 
Step 3: Estimate Market Value of Real Estate as of 1993  
Market Value of Real Estate as of 1993 
= RE Book Value * (HPI_1993/HPI_1975)*(CPI_1975/HPI_1973) 
=$58,943 
Step 4: Estimate Impact of Real Estate Shocks on Market Value of Real Estate from 1993 
to  
Step 5: Calculate the RE Value Ratio 
RE Value in Year t = (Market Value of Real Estate in Year t)/(PPE in Year t-1) 
 
Year 
RE Market  
Value in 1993 
MSA-level 
Price Index 
RE Market  
Value 
Lagged PPE RE Value 
1993 58,943  0.511 58,943  46,777  1.26  
1994 58,943  0.536 61,827  47,320  1.31  
1995 58,943  0.573 66,094  54,842  1.21  
1996 58,943  0.619 71,400  65,442  1.09  
1997 58,943  0.666 76,822  67,616  1.14  
1998 58,943  0.708 81,666  67,869  1.20  
1999 58,943  0.755 87,088  71,514  1.22  
2000 58,943  0.809 93,317  76,116  1.23  
2001 58,943  0.858 98,969  77,843  1.27  
2002 58,943  0.896 103,352  73,738  1.40  
2003 58,943  0.926 106,812  72,784  1.47  
2004 58,943  0.946 109,119  72,594  1.50  
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Table I.1 
Summary Statistics  
This table reports descriptive statistics for the sample of firms with real estate data from 
1993 to 2004. Columns (1) to (6) report the mean, standard deviation (S.D.), 25th 
percentile (P25), median, 75th percentile (P75), and the number of observations of each 
variable (N), respectively, for the full sample of 26,083 firm-year observations. Columns 
(7) and (8) report the mean of each variable for the subsamples of firms with high and low 
real estate collateral value (RE value), respectively. In each year, a high RE value firm is 
one whose RE value is above the median of RE value based on the Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA)-level real estate prices, while a low RE value firm is one with 
below-median RE value. Detailed definitions of each variable are provided in the 
Appendix. 
 
  
Full Sample 
(N=26,083) 
  
  
High RE 
Value 
(N=13,081) 
  
Low RE 
Value 
(N=13,002) 
 
Mean S.D. P25 Median P75 N 
 
Mean 
 
Mean 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   (7)   (8) 
Panel A: Innovation productivity measures 
 Patent Number 4.02 14.74 0.00 0.00 1.00 26,083 
 
6.66 
 
1.58 
Citation Number 36.17 112.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 26,083 
 
53.08 
 
20.6 
Generality 1.00 5.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 26,083 
 
1.71 
 
0.36 
Originality 2.00 10.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 26,083 
 
3.45 
 
0.67 
Panel B: Real estate value and price index 
 Real Estate Value 
(MSA) 
0.80 1.28 0.00 0.23 1.07 24,999 
 
1.58 
 
0.02 
Real Estate Price 
(MSA) 
0.54 0.17 0.39 0.52 0.66 25,022 
 
0.58 
 
0.51 
Real Estate Value 
(State) 
0.82 1.3 0.00 0.27 1.09 26,083 
 
1.58 
 
0.11 
Real Estate Price 
(State)  
0.55 0.16 0.42 0.53 0.66 26,083 
 
0.58 
 
0.52 
Panel C: Control variables 
 Total Assets 672.3 1,554 18.82 89.48 492.7 26,071 
 
1,113 
 
266.4 
Firm Age 17.68 11.67 9.00 14.00 26.00 26,083 
 
23.37 
 
12.45 
ROA 0.01 0.24 -0.05 0.06 0.12 25,937 
 
0.07 
 
-0.09 
Tobin's Q 2.12 1.59 1.08 1.51 2.47 23,288 
 
1.66 
 
2.54 
Cash   0.02 1.48 -0.13 0.24 0.57 25,957 
 
0.21 
 
-1.01 
Leverage  0.24 0.22 0.03 0.20 0.37 25,995 
 
0.28 
 
0.21 
R&D Expense  0.64 1.29 0.00 0.01 0.51 26,059 
 
0.13 
 
1.11 
CAPX  0.37 0.55 0.11 0.21 0.41 26,083 
 
0.22 
 
0.51 
Herfindahl Index 0.15 0.11 0.06 0.12 0.20 26,059 
 
0.17 
 
0.13 
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Table I.2 
Real Estate Collateral and Innovation: Patents and Patent Citations  
This table reports the OLS estimation results of the baseline panel regressions examining the 
effects of real estate collateral on innovation productivity from 1993 to 2004. The dependent  
variables in Columns (1) to (4) are Ln(1+Patent), the logarithm of one plus the number of 
successful patent applications filed in each year of each firm. The dependent variable in 
Columns (5) to (6) are Ln(1+Citation), the logarithm of one plus the number of citations 
received by patents filed in each year of each firm. The main independent variable is 
Ln(1+RE Value), the logarithm of one plus the market value of real estate collateral 
normalized by lagged PPE. RE Value in Columns (1) to (2) are measured using the state-level 
real estate prices (RE Price), while RE Value in Columns (3) to (6) are based on MSA-level 
RE Price. All regressions, except Columns (1), (3), and (5), control for the logarithm of total 
asset, logarithm of one plus firm age, return on asset (ROA), Tobin’s Q, leverage, R&D 
expense, capital expenditure (CAPX), Herfindahl Index based on the three-digit SIC code, as 
well as year, two-digit SIC industry, and the MSA of location fixed effects. Detailed 
definitions of each variable are provided in the Appendix. Robust t-statistics with standard 
errors clustered at the MSA and year level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
  Ln(1+Patent)   Ln(1+Citation) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
Ln(1+RE Value) (MSA)   
0.324
***
 
(20.03) 
0.091
***
 
(7.51) 
 
 
0.441
***
 
(16.54) 
0.121
***
 
(5.37) 
  
RE Price (MSA)   
0.683
***
 
(3.68) 
0.207 
(1.64) 
 
 
0.976
***
 
(3.13) 
0.189 
(0.84) 
  
Ln(1+RE Value) (State) 
0.314
***
 
(19.90) 
0.085
***
 
(7.20)    
 
 
   
 
 
RE Price (State) 
-0.232 
(-0.81) 
0.009 
(0.04)    
 
 
   
 
 
Ln(Asset)  
0.277
***
 
(45.85)  
0.276
***
 
(44.93)  
 
0.441
***
 
(39.05) 
 
Ln(1+Age)  
0.146
***
 
(11.88)  
0.146
***
 
(11.54)  
 
0.197
***
 
(8.13) 
 
ROA  
-0.470
***
 
(-13.48)  
-0.476
***
 
(-13.54)  
 
-0.769
***
 
(-10.17) 
 
Tobin's Q  
0.061
***
 
(13.17)  
0.062
***
 
(13.22)  
 
0.109
***
 
(12.78) 
 
Cash  
0.011
***
 
(4.24)  
0.011
***
 
(4.26)  
 
0.023
***
 
(3.96) 
 
Leverage   
-0.267
***
 
(-10.96)  
-0.283
***
 
(-11.37)  
 
-0.631
***
 
(-13.21) 
 
R&D Expense  
0.020
***
 
(4.30)  
0.021
***
 
(4.30)  
 
0.082
***
 
(7.78) 
 
CAPX  
-0.026
***
 
(-2.61)  
-0.025
**
 
(-2.54)  
 
-0.029 
(-1.28) 
 
Herfindahl Index  
0.180
**
 
(2.41)  
0.206
***
 
(2.70)  
 
0.366
***
 
(2.93) 
 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Adj. R
2
 0.193 0.415 0.195 0.414 
 
0.194 0.366 
Observations 25,809 22,845 24,999 22,146 
 
24,999 22,146 
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Table I.3 
Alternative Measures of Innovation Productivity: Patent Generality and 
Originality  
This table reports the OLS estimation results of the baseline panel regressions examining 
the effects of real estate collateral on alternative measures for innovation productivity 
from 1993 to 2004. The dependent variables of Columns (1) to (2) are Ln(1+Generality), 
the logarithm of one plus the sum of generality scores of all successful patent applications 
filed in each year of each firm. The dependent variable of Columns (3) to (4) are 
Ln(1+Originality), the logarithm of one plus the sum of originality scores of all 
successful patent applications filed in each year of each firm. The main independent 
variable is Ln(1+RE Value), the logarithm of one plus the market value of real estate 
assets based on the MSA-level real estate price index normalized by lagged PPE. The 
regressions control for firm characteristics as well as the year, two-digit SIC industry, and 
the MSA of location fixed effects. Detailed definitions of each variable are provided in 
the Appendix. Robust t-statistics with standard errors clustered at the MSA and year level 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively.    
 
  Ln(1+Generality)  Ln(1+Originality) 
  (1) (2)  
(3) (4) 
Ln(1+RE Value) 
0.166
***
 
(14.44) 
0.046
***
 
(6.06)  
0.252
***
 
(19.16) 
0.070
***
 
(7.49) 
RE Price 
0.251
**
 
(2.49) 
0.037 
(0.49)  
0.527
***
 
(3.57) 
0.182
*
 
(1.84) 
Ln(Asset) 
 
0.127
***
 
(21.16)   
0.197
***
 
(36.31) 
Ln(1+Age) 
 
0.083
***
 
(10.62)   
0.110
***
 
(11.90) 
ROA 
 
-0.181
***
 
(-8.39)   
-0.324
***
 
(-12.89) 
Tobin's Q 
 
0.028
***
 
(9.25)   
0.045
***
 
(12.24) 
Cash 
 
0.002 
(1.39)   
0.008
***
 
(4.26) 
Leverage 
 
-0.131
***
 
(-8.95)   
-0.168
***
 
(-9.35) 
R&D Expense 
 
0.004 
(1.42)   
0.000 
(0.02) 
CAPX 
 
-0.002 
(-0.39)   
-0.016
**
 
(-2.27) 
Herfindahl Index 
 
0.078 
(1.39)   
0.183
***
 
(2.85) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
MSA FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Adj. R
2
 0.130 0.279 
 
0.156 0.359 
Observations 24,999 22,146 
 
24,999 22,146 
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Test I.4 
Instrumental Variable (IV) Approach 
This table reports the IV regression estimation results examining the causal effects of real 
estate collateral on innovation productivity from 1993 to 2004. Column (1) reports the 
first-stage regression with the real estate prices (RE Price) at the MSA level as the 
dependent variable and the interaction of local elasticity of land supply interacted with 
real mortgage rate as the instrumental variable. Columns (2) to (5) report the results of the 
second-stage regressions, where the dependent variables are different measures of 
innovation productivity including patents, patent citations, generality and originality. We 
calculate the market value of real estate collateral (RE value) using the predicted RE Price 
from the first stage. All the regressions control for firm characteristics as well as the year, 
two-digit SIC industry, and the MSA of location fixed effects. Detailed definitions of 
each variable are provided in the Appendix. Robust t-statistics with standard errors 
clustered at the MSA and year level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.    
 
 
First Stage  Second Stage 
 
RE Price  
Ln(1+Pate
nt) 
Ln(1+Citati
on) 
Ln(1+Generali
ty) 
Ln(1+Originali
ty) 
 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Elasticity 
Mortgage Rate 
0.028
***
 
(6.32) 
 
 
  
  
Ln(1+RE 
Value) 
(Instrumented) 
  0.068
***
 
(5.17) 
0.078
***
 
(3.21) 
0.038
***
 
(4.49) 
0.056
***
 
(5.56) 
RE Price   
0.158 
(0.88) 
0.302 
(0.86) 
0.061 
(0.48) 
0.194 
(1.40) 
Ln(Asset)   
0.277
***
 
(41.01) 
0.441
***
 
(35.38) 
0.129
***
 
(19.51) 
0.199
***
 
(33.54) 
Ln(1+Age)   
0.176
***
 
(13.25) 
0.237
***
 
(9.14) 
0.101
***
 
(12.78) 
0.138
***
 
(14.46) 
ROA   
-0.471
***
 
(-12.69) 
-0.784
***
 
(-9.85) 
-0.186
***
 
(-8.05) 
-0.328
***
 
(-12.31) 
Tobin's Q   
0.068
***
 
(13.77) 
0.119
***
 
(13.24) 
0.031
***
 
(9.59) 
0.050
***
 
(12.76) 
Cash   
0.009
***
 
(3.49) 
0.022
***
 
(3.55) 
0.001 
(0.78) 
0.007
***
 
(3.52) 
Leverage   
-0.323
***
 
(-12.07) 
-0.704
***
 
(-13.65) 
-0.162
***
 
(-10.23) 
-0.203
***
 
(-10.65) 
R&D Expense   
0.021
***
 
(3.99) 
0.082
***
 
(7.33) 
0.004 
(1.34) 
0.000 
(0.12) 
CAPX   
-0.034
***
 
(-3.26) 
-0.047
**
 
(-1.97) 
-0.008 
(-1.24) 
-0.023
***
 
(-3.05) 
Herfindahl 
Index 
  
0.212
***
 
(2.54) 
0.403
***
 
(3.03) 
0.073 
(1.18) 
0.193
***
 
(2.71) 
Year FE Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA FE Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R
2
 0.942  0.416 0.366 0.274 0.354 
Observations 1,358  19,460 19,460 19,460 19,460 
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Test I.5  
Determinants of Real Estate Ownership and Innovation  
This table reports the estimation results of the two-stage panel regressions controlling for 
the observable determinants of real estate ownership to investigate the causal effects of 
real estate collateral on innovation. Column (1) reports the results of first-stage regression 
analyzing the determination of RE Ownership, a dummy indicating whether the firm owns 
any real estate assets or not, with total asset, age, and ROA, as well as the year, industry, 
and MSA of location as predictors. Columns (2) to (5) report the results of second-stage 
regressions. The dependent variables are different measures of innovation productivity 
including patents, patent citations, generality and originality, and the main explanatory 
variable is Ln(1+RE Value). The second-state regressions control for the predicted RE 
Ownership from the first stage interacted with RE Price, firm characteristics as well as the 
year, two-digit SIC industry, and the MSA of location fixed effects. Detailed definitions 
of each variable are provided in the Appendix. Robust t-statistics with standard errors 
clustered at the MSA and year level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.    
 
First Stage  Second Stage 
 
RE 
Ownership 
 Ln(1+Patent
) 
Ln(1+Citati
on) 
Ln(1+Generalit
y) 
Ln(1+Originali
ty) 
 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln(1+RE 
Value)  
 0.090
***
 
(7.41) 
0.118
***
 
(5.26) 
0.045
***
 
(6.17) 
0.069
***
 
(7.44)  
RE Price 
 
 0.694
***
 
(5.04) 
1.089
***
 
(4.18) 
0.781
***
 
(8.37) 
0.586
***
 
(5.55)  
RE Ownership 
(Predicted)   
 -1.317
***
 
(-5.41) 
-2.438
***
 
(-5.93) 
-2.006
***
 
(-10.37) 
-1.088
***
 
(-5.43)  
Ln(Asset) 
0.072
***
 
(53.76) 
 0.317
***
 
(30.06) 
0.516
***
 
(30.77) 
0.189
***
 
(19.43) 
0.231
***
 
(25.24)  
Ln(1+Age) 
0.179
***
 
(51.88) 
 0.23
***
 
(10.27) 
0.351
***
 
(9.01) 
0.213
***
 
(13.49) 
0.179
***
 
(10.18)  
ROA 
0.195
***
 
(17.60) 
 -0.336
***
 
(-7.60) 
-0.47
***
 
(-5.56) 
-0.041 
(-1.53) 
-0.242
***
 
(-7.27)  
Tobin's Q 
 
 0.061
***
 
(12.92) 
0.107
***
 
(12.47) 
0.027
***
 
(9.11) 
0.044
***
 
(11.97)  
Cash 
 
 0.011
**
 
(2.34) 
0.017 
(1.72) 
0.009
***
 
(3.38) 
0.014
***
 
(3.94)  
Leverage Ratio 
 
 -0.293
***
 
(-11.73) 
-0.652
***
 
(-13.6) 
-0.139
***
 
(-9.53) 
-0.173
***
 
(-9.61)  
R&D Expense 
 
 0.014
***
 
(2.99) 
0.068
***
 
(6.60) 
-0.001 
(-0.23) 
-0.005 
(-1.37)  
CAPX 
 
 -0.026
***
 
(-2.60) 
-0.031 
(-1.36) 
-0.001 
(-0.06) 
-0.017
**
 
(-2.41)  
Herfindahl 
Index  
 0.229
***
 
(3.04) 
0.409
***
 
(3.28) 
0.115
**
 
(2.15) 
0.202
***
 
(3.21)  
Year FE Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA FE Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R
2
 0.530  0.415 0.367 0.288 0.360 
Observations 25,937  22,146 22,146 22,146 22,146 
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Test I.6 
Real Estate Purchasers and Innovation   
This table reports the estimation results of the subsample regressions examining how the 
effects of real estate prices on innovation productivity differ across the non-land-
purchasers, future purchasers before their real estate acquisition, and purchasers after the 
acquisition. The innovation measures in dependent variables are the number of successful 
patent applications and patent citations in each year of each firm. The main independent 
variable is RE Price, the real estate price at the MSA-level. All the regressions control for 
firm characteristics as well as the year, two-digit SIC industry, and the MSA of location 
fixed effects. Detailed definitions of each variable are provided in the Appendix. Robust 
t-statistics with standard errors clustered at the MSA and year level are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.    
 
 
Ln(1+Patent) 
 
Ln(1+Citation) 
 
Non- 
purchaser 
Purchaser 
before the 
purchase 
Purchaser 
after the 
purchase 
 
Non- 
purchaser 
Purchaser 
before the 
purchase 
Purchaser 
after the 
purchase 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
RE Price 
0.018 
(1.18) 
0.150 
(1.59) 
0.658
***
 
(3.73)  
-0.09 
(-1.10) 
0.344 
(1.11) 
1.012
***
 
(2.81) 
Ln(Asset) 
0.042
***
 
(31.83) 
0.147
***
 
(14.16) 
0.236
***
 
(15.15)  
0.21
***
 
(30.15) 
0.446
***
 
(12.94) 
0.375
***
 
(11.79) 
Ln(1+Age) 
-0.011
***
 
(-3.48) 
-0.017 
(-0.82) 
0.072 
(1.55)  
-0.069
***
 
(-4.37) 
-0.126
*
 
(-1.85) 
0.179
*
 
(1.89) 
ROA 
-0.072
***
 
(-7.82) 
-0.102 
(-1.46) 
-0.206 
(-1.62)  
-0.314
***
 
(-6.51) 
-0.273 
(-1.18) 
-0.258 
(-0.99) 
Tobin's Q 
0.013
***
 
(13.98) 
0.029
***
 
(4.58) 
0.073
***
 
(6.78)  
0.071
***
 
(14.79) 
0.084
***
 
(4.01) 
0.158
***
 
(7.16) 
Cash 
0.001 
(0.46) 
-0.019
**
 
(-2.15) 
0.013 
(0.83)  
0.007 
(1.08) 
-0.055
*
 
(-1.92) 
0.015 
(0.46) 
Leverage 
Ratio 
-0.075
***
 
(-11.14) 
-0.042 
(-0.73) 
-0.196
**
 
(-2.29)  
-0.308
***
 
(-8.73) 
-0.297 
(-1.54) 
-0.336
**
 
(-1.92) 
R&D Expense 
0.001
**
 
(-2.05) 
-0.001 
(-1.34) 
0.004 
(0.87)  
0.001 
(-1.65) 
-0.002 
(-1.05) 
0.006 
(0.63) 
CAPX 
-0.003 
(-1.43) 
-0.026
*
 
(-1.69) 
-0.016 
(-0.87)  
-0.005 
(-0.43) 
-0.082
*
 
(-1.66) 
-0.006 
(-0.15) 
Herfindahl 
Index 
-0.052
**
 
(-2.39) 
-0.845
***
 
(-4.98) 
-0.514
*
 
(-1.84)  
-0.269
**
 
(-2.38) 
-2.838
***
 
(-5.04) 
-0.572 
(-1.00) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2
 0.227 0.369 0.395 
 
0.204 0.311 0.344 
Observations 17,378 2,020 1,863 
 
17,378 2,020 1,863 
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Table I.7 
Innovation over Subsequent Years 
Panels A to E report the intertemporal effects of real estate collateral at year t on 
innovation productivity over subsequent years from t+1 to t+5, respectively. The 
dependent variables are measures of innovation productivity including the number of 
successful patent applications, patent citations, generality and originality scores in each 
year of each firm. The main independent variables is Ln(1+RE Value), the logarithm of 
one plus the market value of real estate assets based on MSA-level real estate price index 
normalized by lagged PPE. All the regressions control for firm characteristics as well as 
the year, two-digit SIC industry, and the MSA of location fixed effects as used in Tables 
2 and 3, but their coefficients are not reported for brevity. Detailed definitions of each 
variable are provided in the Appendix. Robust t-statistics with standard errors clustered at 
the MSA and year level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.    
 
 
Ln(1+Patent) Ln(1+Citation) Ln(1+Generality) Ln(1+Originality) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Panel A: Innovation over year t+1 (N=21,454)     
Ln(1+RE Value) 
0.111*** 
(8.89) 
0.138*** 
(5.84) 
0.049*** 
(5.73) 
0.081*** 
(8.45) 
Panel B: Innovation over year t+2 (N=20,727)  
Ln(1+RE Value) 
0.109*** 
(8.16) 
0.139*** 
(5.66) 
0.045*** 
(4.98) 
0.077*** 
(7.57) 
Panel C: Innovation over year t+3 (N=19,956)  
Ln(1+RE Value) 
0.099*** 
(7.15) 
0.124*** 
(4.93) 
0.036*** 
(4.05) 
0.069*** 
(6.44) 
Panel D: Innovation over year t+4 (N=19,119)  
Ln(1+RE Value) 
0.087*** 
(6.22) 
0.099*** 
(4.37) 
0.029*** 
(3.36) 
0.060*** 
(5.57) 
Panel E: Innovation over year t+5 (N=18,215)  
Ln(1+RE Value) 
0.069*** 
(4.98) 
0.074*** 
(3.42) 
0.021*** 
(2.96) 
0.043*** 
(4.58) 
 
    Control 
Variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table I.8 
Financial Constraint and Innovation  
This table reports the estimation results of subsample regressions examining how the 
effects of real estate collateral on innovation productivity vary with the level of financial 
constraint. We use the KZ index of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) as a proxy for the extent 
of financial constraint. In each year, firms with a KZ index above the sample median are 
considered as financially constrained (Yes); otherwise, they are regarded as unconstrained 
(No). The dependent variables are measures of innovation productivity including patents, 
patent citations, generality and originality; the main explanatory variable is Ln(1+RE 
Value). The regressions also control for firm characteristics as well as the year, two-digit 
SIC industry, and the MSA of location fixed effects. Detailed definitions of each variable 
are provided in the Appendix. Robust t-statistics with standard errors clustered at the 
MSA and year level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.    
 
 
Ln(1+Patent) 
 
Ln(1+Citation) 
 
Ln(1+Generality) 
 
Ln(1+Originality) 
 
Con. Unc. 
 
Con. Unc. 
 
Con. Unc. 
 
Con. Unc. 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) 
Ln(1+RE Value) 0.134
***
 
(8.05) 
0.027 
(1.40)  
0.191
***
 
(6.52) 
0.025 
(0.70)  
0.069
***
 
(6.92) 
0.009 
(0.70)  
0.107
***
 
(8.42) 
0.017 
(1.12) 
RE Price 
0.207 
(1.62) 
0.131 
(0.78)  
0.240 
(1.04) 
0.028 
(0.09)  
-0.022 
(-0.26) 
0.030 
(0.31)  
0.192 
(1.65) 
0.098 
(0.82) 
Ln(Asset) 
0.224
***
 
(35.50) 
0.336
***
 
(39.34)  
0.356
***
 
(33.80) 
0.537
***
 
(34.93)  
0.092
***
 
(19.50) 
0.166
***
 
(19.40)  
0.156
***
 
(28.20) 
0.243
***
 
(31.77) 
Ln(1+Age) 
0.093
***
 
(6.07) 
0.171
***
 
(9.87)  
0.139
***
 
(4.74) 
0.208
***
 
(6.22)  
0.049
***
 
(6.19) 
0.099
***
 
(8.38)  
0.065
***
 
(5.97) 
0.135
***
 
(10.53) 
ROA 
-0.473
***
 
(-10.26) 
-0.454
***
 
(-8.43)  
-0.793
***
 
(-7.68) 
-0.694
***
 
(-6.61)  
-0.162
***
 
(-6.36) 
-0.193
***
 
(-5.86)  
-0.313
***
 
(-9.40) 
-0.324
***
 
(-8.12) 
Tobin's Q 
0.043
***
 
(7.56) 
0.079
***
 
(10.59)  
0.092
***
 
(8.11) 
0.127
***
 
(9.06)  
0.020
***
 
(6.25) 
0.034
***
 
(6.17)  
0.030
***
 
(6.74) 
0.059
***
 
(9.44) 
Cash 
0.017
***
 
(5.26) 
0.004 
(1.02)  
0.034
***
 
(4.33) 
0.008 
(0.99)  
0.006
***
 
(3.23) 
-0.002 
(-0.69)  
0.011
***
 
(4.97) 
0.004 
(1.58) 
Leverage Ratio 
-0.183
***
 
(-5.20) 
-0.041 
(-0.75)  
-0.392
***
 
(-5.86) 
-0.252
**
 
(-2.38)  
-0.066
***
 
(-3.73) 
0.023 
(0.65)  
-0.104
***
 
(-4.23) 
0.012 
(0.35) 
R&D Expense 
0.031
***
 
(4.42) 
0.020
***
 
(2.66)  
0.091
***
 
(5.45) 
0.081
***
 
(5.45)  
0.010
***
 
(2.95) 
0.001 
(0.11)  
0.008 
(1.61) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
CAPX 
-0.008 
(-0.63) 
-0.028
*
 
(-1.69)  
-0.005 
(-0.17) 
-0.028 
(-0.75)  
0.005 
(0.72) 
0.001 
(0.12)  
-0.001 
(-0.11) 
-0.020
*
 
(-1.67) 
Herfindahl Index 
0.438
***
 
(4.56) 
-0.002 
(-0.02)  
0.636
***
 
(3.82) 
0.084 
(0.46)  
0.135
**
 
(2.19) 
0.036 
(0.44)  
0.317
***
 
(4.06) 
0.081 
(0.89) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
MSA FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Adj. R
2
 0.377 0.469 
 
0.329 0.412 
 
0.238 0.330 
 
0.326 0.410 
Observations 11,028 11,118 
 
11,028 11,118 
 
11,028 11,118 
 
11,028 11,118 
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Table I.9 
Debt Financing Dependence and Innovation 
This table reports the estimation results of the subsample regressions examining how the 
effects of real estate collateral on innovation productivity vary with the dependence of 
debt financing. In each year, firms with debt outstanding are considered as debt financing 
dependent (with) and vice versa. The dependent variables are measures of innovation 
productivity including patents, patent citations, generality and originality; the main 
explanatory variable is Ln(1+RE Value). The regressions also control for firm 
characteristics as well as the year, two-digit SIC industry, and the MSA of location fixed 
effects. Detailed definitions of each variable are provided in the Appendix. Robust t-
statistics with standard errors clustered at the MSA and year level are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.    
  
 
Ln(1+Patent) 
 
Ln(1+Citation) 
 
Ln(1+Generality) 
 
Ln(1+Originality) 
 
With Without 
 
With Without 
 
With Without 
 
With Without 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) 
Ln(1+RE Value) 
0.093
***
 
(7.04) 
0.003 
(0.08)  
0.116
***
 
(4.76) 
0.044 
(0.66)  
0.051
***
 
(6.16) 
-0.011 
(-0.68)  
0.076
***
 
(7.33) 
-0.024 
(-1.1) 
RE Price 
0.207
*
 
(1.69) 
0.308 
(0.97)  
0.214 
(0.94) 
0.222 
(0.36)  
0.023 
(0.28) 
0.234 
(1.55)  
0.182
*
 
(1.81) 
0.268 
(1.21) 
Ln(Asset) 
0.284
***
 
(47.31) 
0.247
***
 
(13.02)  
0.447
***
 
(42.21) 
0.449
***
 
(13.7)  
0.132
***
 
(22.04) 
0.100
***
 
(7.76)  
0.203
***
 
(37.7) 
0.171
***
 
(10.58) 
Ln(1+Age) 
0.147
***
 
(11.16) 
0.069
***
 
(2.70)  
0.215
***
 
(8.65) 
-0.028 
(-0.47)  
0.087
***
 
(10.74) 
0.000 
(0.01)  
0.111
***
 
(11.58) 
0.048 
(2.75) 
ROA 
-0.511
***
 
(-12.44) 
-0.178
***
 
(-2.61)  
-0.794
***
 
(-9.37) 
-0.230 
(-1.35)  
-0.247
***
 
(-10.57) 
-0.013 
(-0.38)  
-0.377
***
 
(-12.3) 
-0.142
***
 
(-2.99) 
Tobin's Q 
0.067
***
 
(11.63) 
0.043
***
 
(5.14)  
0.115
***
 
(11.32) 
0.077
***
 
(4.48)  
0.032
***
 
(8.76) 
0.017
***
 
(3.33)  
0.050
***
 
(11.71) 
0.030
***
 
(4.33) 
Cash 
0.016
***
 
(2.80) 
-0.004 
(-0.47)  
0.028
**
 
(2.35) 
-0.024 
(-1.07)  
0.014
***
 
(4.25) 
-0.007 
(-1.57)  
0.019
***
 
(4.44) 
-0.002 
(-0.32) 
Leverage Ratio 
-0.283
***
 
(-10.86) 
- 
 
-0.621
***
 
(-12.53) 
- 
 
-0.128
***
 
(-7.94) 
- 
 
-0.157
***
 
(-8.16) 
- 
R&D Expense 
0.012
**
 
(1.99) 
0.041
***
 
(4.84)  
0.065
***
 
(5.04) 
0.091
***
 
(4.54)  
0.001 
(0.39) 
0.015
***
 
(3.36)  
-0.009
**
 
(-2.21) 
0.023
***
 
(3.76) 
CAPX 
-0.030
***
 
(-2.69) 
-0.032 
(-1.62)  
-0.069
***
 
(-3.07) 
0.038 
(0.76)  
-0.005 
(-0.74) 
-0.002 
(-0.21)  
-0.015
*
 
(-1.82) 
-0.035
***
 
(-2.71) 
Herfindahl Index 
0.298
***
 
(3.64) 
-0.685
***
 
(-4.61)  
0.551
***
 
(4.06) 
-1.382
***
 
(-4.08)  
0.109
*
 
(1.73) 
-0.335
***
 
(-4.55)  
0.250
***
 
(3.59) 
-0.532
***
 
(-5.06) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
MSA FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Adj. R
2
 0.4304 0.3363 
 
0.3872 0.2969 
 
0.294 0.2276 
 
0.3751 0.2917 
Observations 18,898 3,248 
 
18,898 3,248 
 
18,898 3,248 
 
18,898 3,248 
 
  
104 
 
Table I.10 
Industries with Different Levels of Innovation Difficulties 
This table reports the estimation results of the subsample regressions examining how the 
effects of real estate collateral on innovation productivity vary with the degree of 
difficulty in innovation. As in Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) and Tian and Wang 
(2011) the hard to innovation industries include pharmaceutical, medical instrumentation, 
chemicals, computers, communications, and electrical industries, and the rest are 
classified as easy to innovation industries, which include software programming, internet 
applications, and other low-tech industries. The dependent variables are measures of 
innovation productivity including patents, patent citations, generality and originality; the 
main explanatory variable is Ln(1+RE Value). The regressions also control for firm 
characteristics as well as the year, two-digit SIC industry, and the MSA of location fixed 
effects. Detailed definitions of each variable are provided in the Appendix. Robust t-
statistics with standard errors clustered at the MSA and year level are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.    
 
 
Ln(1+Patent) 
 
Ln(1+Citation) 
 
Ln(1+Generality) 
 
Ln(1+Originality) 
 
Hard Easy 
 
Hard Easy 
 
Hard Easy 
 
Hard Easy 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) 
Ln(1+RE Value) 0.152
*** 
(4.18) 
0.075*** 
(5.34)  
0.222*** 
(3.36) 
0.096*** 
(3.76)  
0.132*** 
(4.27) 
0.028*** 
(3.4)  
0.139*** 
(4.64) 
0.054*** 
(5) 
RE Price 
0.603*** 
(2.91) 
0.097 
(0.78)  
1.449*** 
(3.69) 
-0.062 
(-0.27)  
0.544*** 
(3.42) 
-0.028 
(-0.4)  
0.621*** 
(3.7) 
0.084 
(0.92) 
Ln (Asset) 
0.423*** 
(29.4) 
0.241*** 
(47.14)  
0.643*** 
(28.95) 
0.388*** 
(38.17)  
0.216*** 
(12.91) 
0.106*** 
(24.75)  
0.316*** 
(21.2) 
0.169*** 
(41.61) 
Ln (1+Age) 
0.255*** 
(7.67) 
0.143*** 
(12.27)  
0.230*** 
(3.87) 
0.214*** 
(8.84)  
0.198*** 
(8.49) 
0.075*** 
(11.46)  
0.235*** 
(9.04) 
0.099*** 
(12.46) 
ROA 
-0.687*** 
(-8.34) 
-0.412*** 
(-10.46)  
-1.112*** 
(-5.91) 
-0.569*** 
(-7.13)  
-0.387*** 
(-6.73) 
-0.174*** 
(-8.51)  
-0.537*** 
(-7.98) 
-0.308*** 
(-11.09) 
Tobin's Q 
0.074*** 
(7.17) 
0.056*** 
(11.43)  
0.127*** 
(6.63) 
0.102*** 
(10.93)  
0.040*** 
(5.88) 
0.024*** 
(7.97)  
0.060*** 
(7.81) 
0.039*** 
(10.12) 
Cash 
0.021* 
(1.76) 
0.006 
(1.25)  
0.054** 
(2.02) 
0.002 
(0.18)  
0.018** 
(2.46) 
0.002 
(0.87)  
0.023*** 
(2.58) 
0.008** 
(2.12) 
Leverage Ratio 
-0.349*** 
(-4.43) 
-0.268*** 
(-11.53)  
-0.762*** 
(-5.11) 
-0.601*** 
(-12.43)  
-0.146*** 
(-2.92) 
-0.121*** 
(-8.93)  
-0.217*** 
(-3.73) 
-0.158*** 
(-9.54) 
R&D Expense 
0.031*** 
(2.82) 
0.028*** 
(4.86)  
0.061*** 
(2.67) 
0.113*** 
(8.25)  
0.014** 
(2.02) 
0.014*** 
(4.23)  
0.008 
(1.06) 
0.012*** 
(2.98) 
CAPX 
-0.086*** 
(-3.02) 
-0.031*** 
(-2.79)  
-0.060 
(-0.97) 
-0.061** 
(-2.41)  
-0.013 
(-0.69) 
-0.012** 
(-2.06)  
-0.059*** 
(-2.93) 
-0.023*** 
(-3.1) 
Herfindahl Index 
-2.995*** 
(-6.76) 
0.435*** 
(5.39)  
-4.517*** 
(-5.95) 
0.726*** 
(5.34)  
-1.674*** 
(-5.03) 
0.248*** 
(4.58)  
-2.308*** 
(-6.21) 
0.387*** 
(5.94) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
MSA FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.523 0.408 
 
0.429 0.365 
 
0.420 0.271 
 
0.502 0.353 
Observations 3,963 17,776 
 
3,963 17,776 
 
3,963 17,776 
 
3,963 17,776 
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Table IA I.1 
Additional Robustness Tests 
This table reports the robustness test. Panel A reports the regressions using alternative 
definition of innovation measurements as dependent variables. Panel B reports the 
regressions using alternative measurements of real estate values as main independent 
variables. Panel C reports subsample analysis by excluding firms with zero patents and 
citations from 1993 to 2004 or located in Silicon Valley area, and Panel D reports sub-
period analysis from 1993 to 1997, 1998 to 2000, and 2001 to 2004. Each regression 
controls for the logarithm of total asset, logarithm of one plus firm age, return on asset 
(ROA), Tobin’s Q, leverage, R&D expense, capital expenditure (CAPX), Herfindahl 
Index based on the three-digit SIC code, as well as year, two-digit SIC industry, and the 
MSA of location fixed effects as used in Tables 2 and 3, but their coefficients are not 
reported for brevity. Detailed definitions of each variable are provided in the Appendix. 
Standard errors are clustered at the MSA-year level, and heteroskedasticity-robust t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively.    
 
Panel A: Alternative definitions of innovation measurements as dependent variables 
A.1: Innovation measures without log-transformation  (N=22,146) 
 
Patent Citation Generality Originality 
Ln(1+RE Value) 
1.187*** 
(6.68) 
8.030*** 
(5.83) 
0.468*** 
(5.36) 
0.914*** 
(7.23) 
A.2: Natural logarithm of one plus average citations, generality, and originality of each patent of each 
firm (N=22,146) 
  
Ln(1+
Citation
Patent
) Ln(1+
Generality
Patent
) Ln(1+
Originality
Patent
) 
Ln(1+RE Value)  
0.043*** 
(2.98) 
0.005*** 
(3.70) 
0.012*** 
(5.73) 
A.3: Innovation dummy (Dummy=1 if innovation measure>0, otherwise 0) (N=22,146) 
 
Patent Dummy Citation Dummy 
  
Ln(1+RE Value) 
0.031*** 
(5.34) 
0.025*** 
(4.51)   
Panel B: Alternative measurements of real estate value as main independent variables  
B.1:  Real estate value without log-transformation (N=22,146) 
 
Ln(1+Patent) Ln(1+Citation) Ln(1+Generality) Ln(1+Originality) 
RE Value 
0.029*** 
(6.33) 
0.038*** 
(4.55) 
0.016*** 
(5.49) 
0.024*** 
(6.52) 
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B.2: Raw market value of real estate assets using MSA-level real estate price without normalization by 
lagged PPE (Billions of $) (N=22,146) 
Raw RE Value 
0.050*** 
(11.10) 
0.070*** 
(10.62) 
0.040*** 
(7.27) 
0.060*** 
(12.20) 
B.3: Logarithm of one plus raw market value of real estate assets using MSA-level real estate price 
without normalization by lagged PPE  (N=22,146) 
Ln(1+Raw RE Value) 
0.095*** 
(14.96) 
0.111*** 
(10.59) 
0.063*** 
(13.61) 
0.087*** 
(16.84) 
B.4: Logarithm of one plus the market value of real estate assets based on MSA-level real estate price 
normalized by lagged total asset  (N=22,146) 
Ln(1+
Raw RE Value
Total Asset
) 
0.110*** 
(3.81) 
0.149*** 
(3.32) 
0.099*** 
(5.53) 
0.103*** 
(4.53) 
B.5: Real estate ownership interacted with MSA-level real estate price, where RE ownership=1 if a 
firm owns non-zero real estate assets, otherwise equal to 0  (N=22,168) 
RE Ownership×RE 
Price 
0.223*** 
(8.56) 
0.454*** 
(8.71) 
0.046*** 
(3.31) 
0.103*** 
(5.65) 
Panel C: Sub-sample Analysis 
C.1: Excluding firms with zero patents and citations from 1993 to 2004   (N=11,972) 
 
Ln(1+Patent) Ln(1+Citation) Ln(1+Generality) Ln(1+Originality) 
Ln(1+RE Value) 
0.101*** 
(4.96) 
0.142*** 
(3.76) 
0.101*** 
(3.21) 
0.124*** 
(4.28) 
C.2: Excluding firms located in Silicon Valley area (N=21,247) 
Ln(1+RE Value) 
 
0.090*** 
(7.72) 
0.123*** 
(5.52) 
0.041*** 
(6.21) 
0.066*** 
(7.50) 
Panel D: Sub-period Analysis 
D.1: From year 1993 to 1997  (N=11,413) 
 Ln(1+Patent) Ln(1+Citation) Ln(1+Generality) Ln(1+Originality) 
Ln(1+RE Value) 
0.084*** 
(4.39) 
0.141*** 
(3.76) 
0.056*** 
(4.14) 
0.058*** 
(3.95) 
D.2: From 1998 to 2000  (N=3,828) 
Ln(1+RE Value) 
0.123*** 
(3.90) 
0.153** 
(2.52) 
0.057*** 
(3.42) 
0.088*** 
(3.70) 
D.3: From 2001 to 2004  (N=6,905) 
Ln(1+RE Value) 
0.064*** 
(3.34) 
0.053* 
(1.83) 
0.023*** 
(2.87) 
0.060*** 
(4.19) 
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Table IA I.2 
Cross-sectional Relationship between Real Estate Collateral and Innovation 
This table reports the cross-sectional link between the value of real estate collateral and 
innovation productivity. The observation unit in this analysis is firm.  The dependent 
variables are firm-level innovation productivity measures such as the annual average 
number of patents successfully filed from 1993 to 2004 of each firm, and the annual 
average citations, generality, and originality of all successful patent applications filed 
from 1993 to 2004 of each firm. The main independent variable is Ln(1+RE Value), the 
firm-level average of logarithm of one plus the market value of real estate assets based on 
MSA-level real estate price index normalized by lagged PPE. All regressions control for 
various average firm characteristics as well as two-digit SIC industry and the MSA of 
location fixed effects. Detailed definitions of each variable are provided in the Appendix. 
Robust t-statistics with standard errors clustered at the MSA and year level are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.    
 
 
Ln(1+Patent) Ln(1+Citation) Ln(1+Generality) Ln(1+Originality) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(1+RE Value) 0.100
***
 
(2.88) 
0.175
***
 
(2.87) 
0.056
***
 
(2.70) 
0.073
***
 
(2.68) 
RE Price 
-0.310 
(-1.63) 
-1.318
***
 
(-3.94) 
-0.301
***
 
(-2.64) 
-0.033 
(-0.22) 
Ln(Asset) 
0.269
***
 
(28.58) 
0.446
***
 
(26.95) 
0.133
***
 
(23.60) 
0.189
***
 
(25.57) 
Ln(1+Age) 
0.112
***
 
(4.75) 
0.133
***
 
(3.22) 
0.042
***
 
(2.98) 
0.079
***
 
(4.29) 
ROA 
-0.653
***
 
(-4.17) 
-1.008
***
 
(-3.66) 
-0.403
***
 
(-4.29) 
-0.531
***
 
(-4.31) 
Tobin's Q 
0.079
***
 
(5.95) 
0.147
***
 
(6.30) 
0.039
***
 
(4.86) 
0.055
***
 
(5.22) 
Cash 
0.022 
(1.02) 
0.053 
(1.40) 
0.025
*
 
(1.91) 
0.026 
(1.57) 
Leverage 
-0.400
***
 
(-5.00) 
-0.804
***
 
(-5.71) 
-0.182
***
 
(-3.79) 
-0.248
***
 
(-3.95) 
R&D Expense 
-0.018 
(-1.07) 
0.033 
(1.14) 
-0.016 
(-1.62) 
-0.031
**
 
(-2.40) 
CAPX 
0.055 
(1.13) 
0.175
**
 
(2.05) 
0.037 
(1.26) 
0.029 
(0.75) 
Herfindahl Index 
0.260 
(1.57) 
0.343 
(1.18) 
0.108 
(1.08) 
0.232
*
 
(1.78) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R
2
 0.459 0.456 0.338 0.385 
Observations 2,884 2,884 2,884 2,884 
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Table IA I.3 
Alternative Measures of Financial Constraint: Debt Rating and Paper Rating  
This table reports the estimation results of subsample regressions examining how the 
effects of real estate collateral on innovation productivity vary with the level of financial 
constraint using alternative proxies of financial constraint.  Panel A classifies Firms as 
financially constrained if they have debt outstanding that year but their long-term credit 
ratings are not available or below the investment grade. Panel B classifies firms as 
financially unconstrained if they have debt outstanding that year but their short-term 
credit ratings are not available or below the investment grade. The dependent variables 
are measures of innovation productivity including patents, patent citations, generality and 
originality; the main explanatory variable is Ln(1+RE Value). The regressions also 
control for firm characteristics as well as the year, two-digit SIC industry, and the MSA 
of location fixed effects. Detailed definitions of each variable are provided in the 
Appendix. Robust t-statistics with standard errors clustered at the MSA and year level are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.    
  
 
Ln(1+Patent) 
 
Ln(1+Citation) 
 
Ln(1+Generality) 
 
Ln(1+Originality) 
 
Con. Unc. 
 
Con. Unc. 
 
Con. Unc. 
 
Con. Unc. 
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) 
Panel A: Debt Rating  
Ln(1+RE Value) 
0.095*** 
(6.50) 
-0.004 
(-0.13)  
0.126*** 
(4.80) 
-0.015 
(-0.23)  
0.040*** 
(4.71) 
0.056** 
(2.01)  
0.069*** 
(6.05) 
0.027 
(0.85) 
RE Price 
0.283** 
(2.46) 
0.082 
(0.28)  
0.238 
(1.07) 
0.662 
(1.27)  
-0.043 
(-0.62) 
0.594*** 
(3.21)  
0.205** 
(2.22) 
0.157 
(0.71) 
Ln(Asset) 
0.236*** 
(31.32) 
0.344*** 
(24.34)  
0.391*** 
(31.55) 
0.537*** 
(22.61)  
0.101*** 
(16.09) 
0.174*** 
(14.09)  
0.159*** 
(23.92) 
0.268*** 
(20.72) 
Ln(1+Age) 
0.074*** 
(6.77) 
0.305*** 
(9.90)  
0.119*** 
(5.21) 
0.306*** 
(5.12)  
0.034*** 
(5.83) 
0.223*** 
(9.66)  
0.048*** 
(6.36) 
0.263*** 
(10.96) 
ROA 
-0.476*** 
(-12.16) 
-0.289*** 
(-3.44)  
-0.752*** 
(-8.68) 
-0.262 
(-1.55)  
-0.201*** 
(-9.57) 
-0.136** 
(-2.51)  
-0.325*** 
(-11.45) 
-0.294*** 
(-4.35) 
Tobin's Q 
0.039*** 
(8.29) 
0.055*** 
(6.03)  
0.084*** 
(8.36) 
0.090*** 
(5.42)  
0.021*** 
(7.36) 
0.011* 
(1.77)  
0.026*** 
(7.74) 
0.039*** 
(5.03) 
Cash 
0.018*** 
(3.39) 
0.000 
(-0.04)  
0.032*** 
(2.66) 
-0.024 
(-1.04)  
0.015*** 
(5.02) 
-0.008 
(-1.37)  
0.019*** 
(5.01) 
0.003 
(0.35) 
Leverage Ratio 
-0.234*** 
(-9.71) 
-0.081 
(-0.33)  
-0.576*** 
(-11.78) 
-0.606 
(-1.59)  
-0.086*** 
(-6.55) 
-0.152 
(-0.88)  
-0.106*** 
(-6.31) 
-0.087 
(-0.42) 
R&D Expense 
0.023*** 
(3.95) 
0.007 
(0.78)  
0.077*** 
(5.98) 
0.066*** 
(3.37)  
0.006* 
(1.86) 
0.007 
(1.16)  
0.002 
(0.48) 
-0.005 
(-0.66) 
CAPX 
-0.024** 
(-2.34) 
-0.006 
(-0.25)  
-0.067*** 
(-3.01) 
0.075 
(1.35)  
-0.002 
(-0.37) 
0.001 
(0.06)  
-0.009 
(-1.27) 
-0.018 
(-1.01) 
Herfindahl Index 
0.230*** 
(2.85) 
0.323 
(1.64)  
0.391*** 
(2.75) 
0.396 
(1.23)  
0.016 
(0.28) 
0.378** 
(2.53)  
0.195*** 
(2.94) 
0.319* 
(1.89) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
MSA FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.373 0.584 
 
0.338 0.485 
 
0.256 0.457 
 
0.322 0.542 
109 
 
Observations 17352 4387 
 
17352 4387 
 
17352 4387 
 
17352 4387 
Panel B: Paper Rating  
Ln(1+RE Value) 
0.094*** 
(6.20) 
-0.001 
(-0.01)  
0.121*** 
(4.47) 
0.020 
(0.37)  
0.038*** 
(4.43) 
0.038* 
(1.82)  
0.068*** 
(5.87) 
0.014 
(0.61) 
RE Price 
0.345*** 
(2.63) 
-0.235 
(-1.02)  
0.269 
(1.11) 
0.131 
(0.28)  
0.019 
(0.24) 
0.268* 
(1.84)  
0.276*** 
(2.59) 
-0.121 
(-0.71) 
Ln(Asset) 
0.247*** 
(32.52) 
0.344*** 
(33.39)  
0.403*** 
(32.46) 
0.530*** 
(29.58)  
0.107*** 
(16.95) 
0.174*** 
(17.28)  
0.168*** 
(24.58) 
0.265*** 
(29.83) 
Ln(1+Age) 
0.094*** 
(8.28) 
0.311*** 
(10.05)  
0.143*** 
(6.11) 
0.336*** 
(6.12)  
0.051*** 
(8.32) 
0.197*** 
(7.72)  
0.066*** 
(8.43) 
0.257*** 
(10.29) 
ROA 
-0.498*** 
(-11.62) 
-0.340*** 
(-4.88)  
-0.742*** 
(-7.85) 
-0.456*** 
(-3.16)  
-0.219*** 
(-9.32) 
-0.156*** 
(-3.46)  
-0.353*** 
(-11.17) 
-0.297*** 
(-5.38) 
Tobin's Q 
0.043*** 
(8.59) 
0.055*** 
(7.20)  
0.086*** 
(8.32) 
0.098*** 
(6.48)  
0.022*** 
(7.05) 
0.013*** 
(2.69)  
0.029*** 
(7.84) 
0.037*** 
(5.89) 
Cash 
0.019*** 
(3.09) 
-0.003 
(-0.36)  
0.031** 
(2.36) 
-0.017 
(-0.85)  
0.016*** 
(4.51) 
-0.007 
(-1.36)  
0.020*** 
(4.53) 
0.001 
(0.19) 
Leverage Ratio 
-0.243*** 
(-9.19) 
-0.211*** 
(-2.98)  
-0.588*** 
(-11.25) 
-0.514*** 
(-3.36)  
-0.190*** 
(-5.99) 
-0.159*** 
(-3.00)  
-0.210*** 
(-5.86) 
-0.122*** 
(-3.38) 
R&D Expense 
0.022*** 
(3.73) 
0.014 
(1.64)  
0.083*** 
(6.09) 
0.066*** 
(3.75)  
0.009*** 
(2.88) 
0.003 
(0.54)  
0.001 
(0.26) 
-0.001 
(-0.08) 
CAPX 
-0.013 
(-1.23) 
-0.044** 
(-2.05)  
-0.043* 
(-1.87) 
-0.017 
(-0.34)  
0.001 
(0.21) 
-0.010 
(-0.78)  
-0.002 
(-0.3) 
-0.040** 
(-2.56) 
Herfindahl Index 
0.259*** 
(3.24) 
0.419** 
(2.55)  
0.420*** 
(2.94) 
0.688** 
(2.38)  
0.036 
(0.61) 
0.375*** 
(3.32)  
0.209*** 
(3.22) 
0.389*** 
(2.86) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
MSA FE Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.392 0.531 
 
0.353 0.443 
 
0.274 0.399 
 
0.343 0.488 
Observations 16,428 5,311 
 
16,428 5,311 
 
16,428 5,311 
 
16,428 5,311 
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Appendix B Tables for Part II 
Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Innovation measures  
Patent Number Patent number is defined as number of patent 
applications filed in year t of each firm. Only patents that 
are later granted are included.  The patent number is set 
to zero for companies that have no patent information 
available from the NBER database. 
Citation Number Citation number is defined as number of citations 
received by patent applications filed in year t of each 
firm. The citation number is corrected for the truncation 
bias in citation counts using the Hall, Jaffe, and 
Trajtenberg (2001) adjustment factor. Only patents that 
are later granted are included. The citation number is set 
to zero for companies that have no citation information 
available from the NBER database. 
Generality Generality score is defined as one minus the Herfindahl 
index of the three-digit technology class distribution of 
all the patents that cite a given patent. We then take the 
sum for all patent applications filed in year t of each 
firm. Only patents that are later granted are included.  
For firms that generate no patents in a year, their patents 
generality scores are undefined and therefore treated as 
missing.  
Originality Originality score is defined as one minus the Herfindahl 
index of the three-digit technology class distribution of 
all the patens that a given patent cites. We then take the 
sum for all patent applications filed in year t of each 
firm. Only patents that are later granted are included.  
For firms that generate no patents in a year, their patents 
originality scores are undefined and therefore treated as 
missing. 
Innovation Efficiency Innovative Efficiency (Hirshleifer, Hsu and Li, 2013) is 
calculated by taking the number of patents of firm i 
applied in year t which eventually got granted divided by 
firm i’s cumulative R&D investment in fiscal year 
ending from year t-4 through year t: 
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Control variables  
Ln(Asset) 
The logarithm of the book value of total assets (AT from 
COMPUSTAT) measured at the end of fiscal year t. 
Firm Age The number of years  from the firm’s IPO year to year t. 
ROA Firm operating income before depreciation (OIBDP from 
COMPUSTAT) divided by the book value of total assets (AT), 
measured at the end of fiscal year t.  
Tobin's Q The market value of equity (PRCC_F×CSHO from 
COMPUSTAT) plus the book value of assets (AT) minus the 
book value of equity (CEQ from COMPUSTAT) minus balance 
sheet deferred taxes (TXDB from COMPUSTAT)] divided by 
the book value of assets (AT), measured at the end of fiscal year 
t. 
Cash Flow-to-Assets Income before extraordinary items (IB from COMPUSTAT) 
plus depreciation and amortization (DP from COMPUSTAT) 
divided by the book value of assets (AT), measured at the end 
of fiscal year t.  
Leverage  The book value of debt (DLTT+DLC from COMPUSTAT) 
divided by the book value of total assets (AT) measured at the 
end of fiscal year t.  
PPE-to-Assets The book value of property, plant and equipment (PPENT from 
COMPUSTAT) divided by the book value of total assets (AT) 
measured at the end of fiscal year t. 
R&D Expense-to-Assets Research and develop expenditure (XRD from COMPUSTAT) 
divided by the book value of assets (AT), measured at the end 
of fiscal year t.  
CAPX-to-Assets 
Capital expenditure (CAPX from COMPUSTAT) divided by 
book value of assets (AT), measured at the end of fiscal year t.  
Herfindahl Index Herfindahl index of the 3-digit SIC industry of each firm 
measured at the end of fiscal year t based on sales.   
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Table II.1ASummary Statistics  
This table presents descriptive statistics for the samples of firms with single-class and dual-
class shares during the period 1970-2006.Panel A reports summary statistics for the main four 
measures of firm innovation output. These are Patent Number(the number of patent 
applications filed in a given year that are eventually granted), Citation Number(the number of 
citations received for patent applications filed in a given year that are eventually granted), 
Generality(one minus the Herfindahl index of the three-digit technology class distribution of 
all the patents that cite the instant patent summed over all patent applications filed during the 
year by each firm), Originality(one minus the Herfindahl index of the three-digit technology 
class distribution of all the earlier patents the patent cites summed over all patent applications 
filed during the year by each firm) and Innovation Efficiency (defined as the number of patent 
applications filed in a given year that are eventually granted divided by the R&D Expense of 
previous years). Panel B reports summary statistics for the control variables used in this study:  
Total Assets, the logarithm of Total Assets, Firm Age, Return on Assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q, 
Cash Flow-to-Assets, Leverage, CAPX-to-Assets, PPE-to-Assets, R&D Expense-to-Assets, 
and the Herfindahl Index, at the firm-year level. Detailed definitions of each variable are 
provided in the Appendix. Columns (1) to (4) and (5) to (8) report the number of firm-year 
observations (Obs), mean, median and standard deviation (S.D.) of the subsample that covers 
firms with single-class and dual-class shares, respectively. Column (9) reports the difference 
in means between the two groups. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively using robust t-statistics for two-tailed tests. 
  Single-Class Firms Dual-Class Firms 
Dual-Class 
minus Single-Class 
 
Obs Mean Median S.D. 
 
Obs Mean Median S.D. 
 
Mean-Difference 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8)   (9) 
Panel A: Innovation Productivity Measurement 
       
Patent Number 103476 7.32 0.00 33.60 
 
3423 6.63 0.00 32.87 
 
-0.69*** 
Citation Number 103476 97.35 0.00 464.41 
 
3423 93.02 0.00 479.75 
 
-4.34** 
Generality 32691 6.13 0.73 22.13 
 
1106 3.47 0.57 12.95 
 
-2.66*** 
Originality 33213 6.96 0.73 26.75 
 
1299 5.61 0.76 21.71 
 
-1.35** 
Innovation Efficiency 58401 0.57 0.00 2.47  2011 0.32 0.02 1.05  -0.25*** 
            
Panel B: Control Variables 
       
            
Ln (Total Assets in $ millions) 98881 4.69 4.49 2.51 
 
3421 5.64 5.67 2.03 
 
0.96*** 
Firm Age (years) 103476 15.05 11.00 12.50 
 
3423 18.89 16.00 13.41 
 
3.84*** 
ROA 98881 0.02 0.12 0.43 
 
3421 0.08 0.13 0.30 
 
0.06*** 
Tobin's Q 98881 2.12 1.25 3.30 
 
3421 1.97 1.34 2.24 
 
-0.15*** 
Cash Flow/Assets 98881 -0.04 0.08 0.50 
 
3421 0.02 0.08 0.34 
 
0.06*** 
Leverage 98881 0.25 0.21 0.29 
 
3421 0.24 0.21 0.22 
 
-0.01*** 
CAPX/Assets 98881 0.06 0.05 0.06 
 
3421 0.06 0.04 0.05 
 
0.00*** 
PPE/Assets 98881 0.27 0.22 0.21  3423 0.27 0.24 0.18  0.00 
R&D Expense/Assets 98881 0.07 0.02 0.16 
 
3421 0.05 0.01 0.12 
 
-0.03*** 
Herfindahl Index 103473 0.17 0.13 0.14   3423 0.19 0.16 0.16   0.02*** 
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Table II.1B Summary Statistics  
This table presents summary statistics of differences in innovation production between firms 
with single-class shares and those with dual-class shares. Columns (1) to (4) and (5) to (8) 
report the numbers of firm-year observations (Obs) and means of the innovation production 
for the firm-year observations of single-class firms and dual-class firms, respectively. Panel A 
reports the mean differences in innovation output between firms that are Old (Age above 
median) and those that are Young (Age below median).Panel B reports the mean differences 
in innovation output between firms with above median and below median Tobin’s Q. Panel C 
reports the mean differences in innovation output between firms with above median and 
below median financial constraints as measured by the KZ index. Panel D reports the mean 
differences in innovation output between firms within Hard-to-Innovate industries and other 
industries (Easy-to-Innovate). Panel E reports the mean differences in innovation output 
between firms within High-Technology industries and other industries.***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively using t-statistics for two-tailed tests. 
  Single-Class Firms   Dual-Class Firms   
Dual-Class minus 
Single-Class 
 
Obs Mean 
 
Obs Mean 
 
Obs Mean 
 
Obs Mean 
 
Mean-Difference 
 
(1) (2)   (5) (6)   (5) (6)   (7) (8)   (9) (10) 
Panel A: Age 
         
 
Young   Old 
 
Young   Old 
 
Young Old 
Patent Number 48582 3.09   54894 11.05 
 
1366 4.29   2057 8.18 
 
1.19** -2.88*** 
Citation Number 48582 44.17 
 
54894 144.43 
 
1366 54.61 
 
2057 118.53 
 
10.44 -25.90** 
Generality 12361 2.48 
 
20330 8.35 
 
373 1.91 
 
733 4.27 
 
-0.57 -4.08*** 
Originality 13108 3.34 
 
20105 9.32 
 
442 4.49 
 
857 6.19 
 
1.15 -3.13*** 
Innovation Eff. 22077 0.76   36324 0.45 
 
664 0.53 0 1347 0.21   -0.24* -0.24*** 
Panel B: Tobin's Q 
         
 
Low   High 
 
Low   High 
 
Low High 
Patent Number 53465 6.84   50011 7.83 
 
1650 5.69   1773 7.50 
 
-1.15 -0.33 
Citation Number 53465 86.18 
 
50011 109.30 
 
1650 75.15 
 
1773 109.65 
 
-11.03 0.35 
Generality 15701 6.30 
 
16990 5.98 
 
538 2.76 
 
568 4.15 
 
-3.53*** -1.83** 
Originality 16038 7.26 
 
17175 6.68 
 
623 4.54 
 
676 6.59 
 
-2.71** -0.09 
Innovation Eff. 27359 0.53   31042 0.60 
 
1012 0.26   999 0.37   -0.27*** -0.23*** 
Panel C: Financial Constraint 
         
 
Low   High 
 
Low   High 
 
Low High 
Patent Number 53996 8.43   49480 6.10 
 
1668 7.10   1755 6.18 
 
-1.34 0.08 
Citation Number 53996 114.31 
 
49480 78.86 
 
1668 101.03 
 
1755 85.41 
 
-13.28 6.55 
Generality 18640 6.58 
 
14051 5.54 
 
579 3.80 
 
527 3.12 
 
-2.78*** -2.42** 
Originality 18740 6.95 
 
14473 6.97 
 
679 5.66 
 
620 5.55 
 
-1.29 -1.42 
Innovation Eff. 30397 0.56   28004 0.58 
 
1020 0.35   991 0.29   -0.22*** -0.29*** 
Panel D: Innovation Difficulty 
         
 
Easy   Hard 
 
Easy   Hard 
 
Easy Hard 
Patent Number 80942 6.26   22534 11.10 
 
2674 4.18   749 15.36 
 
-2.08*** 4.26*** 
Citation Number 80942 80.12 
 
22534 159.27 
 
2674 59.59 
 
749 212.36 
 
-20.53*** 53.10** 
Generality 24177 5.55 
 
8514 7.79 
 
793 2.34 
 
313 6.34 
 
-3.21*** -1.45 
Originality 23854 6.14 
 
9359 9.03 
 
936 3.57 
 
363 10.87 
 
-2.58*** 1.85 
Innovation Eff. 42111 0.63   16290 0.42 
 
1424 0.30   587 0.35   -0.32*** -0.07 
Panel E: High-Tech Industries 
         
 
Non   High 
 
Non   High 
 
Non High 
Patent Number 68463 6.39   35013 9.13 
 
2467 3.79   956 13.94 
 
-2.60*** 4.81*** 
Citation Number 68463 77.89 
 
35013 135.41 
 
2467 56.14 
 
956 188.19 
 
-21.75*** 52.77*** 
Generality 19413 6.03 
 
13278 6.28 
 
704 2.33 
 
402 5.48 
 
-3.70*** -0.80 
Originality 18870 6.68 
 
14343 7.32 
 
844 3.31 
 
455 9.87 
 
-3.36*** 2.54* 
Innovation Eff. 32810 0.63   25591 0.49   1237 0.28   774 0.37   -0.35*** -0.12 
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Table II.2 
Innovation Productivity and Share Class Structure 
This table reports the estimation results of panel regressions examining the effects of dual-
class shares on innovation productivity for the period from 1970 through 2006. The 
dependent variables in Columns (1) to (4) are the Patent Number(the number of patent 
applications filed in a given year that are eventually granted), Citation Number(the number of 
citations received for patent applications filed in a given year that are eventually granted), 
Generality(the sum of generality scores of all successful patent applications filed by a firm in 
each year), and Originality(the sum of originality scores of all successful patent applications 
filed by a firm in each year). The main independent variable is Dual-Class, which equals one 
if the firm has dual-class shares in year t and zero otherwise. All regressions control for the 
logarithm of total assets, firm age, return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q, Cash Flow-to-Assets, 
Leverage, R&D Expense-to-Assets, CAPX-to-Assets, PPE-to-Assets, and the Herfindahl 
Index based on the three-digit SIC code, as well as year and two-digit SIC industry fixed 
effects. Detailed definitions of each variable are provided in the Appendix. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively using t-statistics for two-tailed 
tests.  The p-values are reported in parentheses. 
  Patent Number Citation Number Generality Originality 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dual-Class -5.279*** -62.090*** -3.667*** -3.615*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln(Total Assets) 6.495*** 83.174*** 5.210*** 5.796*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age 0.151*** 1.800*** 0.004 0.054*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.731) (0.000) 
ROA -6.984*** -76.258*** -9.211*** -10.249*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin's Q 0.423*** 7.138*** 0.069 0.230*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.128) (0.000) 
Cash Flow/Assets 2.004*** 20.699** 3.845*** 4.740*** 
 
(0.001) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.467 -13.921*** -0.620 -0.263 
 
(0.220) (0.009) (0.274) (0.671) 
CAPX/Assets 28.153*** 469.436*** 30.354*** 29.980*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D Exp./Assets 8.798*** 146.241*** 11.678*** 10.156*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PPE/Assets -7.464*** -125.983*** -7.902*** -7.185*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Herfindahl Index 6.769*** 35.207*** 2.215** 0.934 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.020) (0.416) 
Constant -30.907*** -422.962*** -36.289*** -50.688*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 102302 102302 32708 33444 
Adj. R2 0.193 0.169 0.230 0.214 
Year F. E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry F. E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table II.3 
Dual-Class Shares, Firm Age, and Innovation 
This table reports the estimation results of regressions designed to measure the effect of dual-
class shares on innovation productivity for firms of different ages. We regress firm innovation 
output in year t on a Dual-Class dummy variable that equals one if a firm has dual-class 
shares in year t and zero otherwise, and the product of the Dual-Class dummy variable with 
Firm Age for each firm in each year. The dependent variables are the measures of innovation 
productivity: Patent Number, Citation Number, Generality, and Originality. All regressions 
control for the logarithm of total assets, firm age, return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q, Cash 
Flow-to-Assets, Leverage, R&D Expense-to-Assets, CAPX-to-Assets, PPE-to-Assets, and the 
Herfindahl Index based on the three-digit SIC code, as well as year and two-digit SIC 
industry fixed effects. Detailed definitions of each variable are provided in the Appendix. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively using t-statistics for 
two-tailed tests. The p-values are reported in parentheses. 
 
  Patent Number Citation Number Generality Originality 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dual-Class -3.377*** -54.844*** -3.936*** -3.199** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) 
Dual-Class*Firm Age -0.082* -0.108 0.026 -0.019 
 
(0.089) (0.875) (0.630) (0.758) 
Ln(Total Assets) 6.604*** 85.615*** 5.078*** 5.684*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age 0.197*** 2.466*** 0.041*** 0.095*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA -7.743*** -89.461*** -9.931*** -11.279*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin's Q 0.419*** 6.926*** 0.068 0.228*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.123) (0.000) 
Cash Flow/Assets 2.152*** 22.501*** 3.976*** 5.234*** 
 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.281 -9.639* -0.574 -0.149 
 
(0.455) (0.068) (0.303) (0.808) 
CAPX/Assets 18.021*** 314.647*** 19.549*** 17.564*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D Exp./Assets 6.863*** 111.110*** 9.562*** 8.408*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PPE/Assets -2.561*** -53.348*** -2.520** -1.017 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.014) (0.406) 
Herfindahl Index 3.755*** 27.178 2.370 -1.311 
 
(0.002) (0.117) (0.144) (0.526) 
Constant -28.157*** -354.437*** -33.805*** -47.791*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 102302 102302 32708 33444 
Adj. R2 0.228 0.201 0.279 0.254 
Year F. E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry F. E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table II.4 
Dual-Class Shares, Firm Growth Opportunities, and Innovation 
This table reports the estimation results of regressions designed to measure the effect of dual-
class shares on innovation productivity for firms with different growth opportunities. We 
regress firm innovation output in year t on a Dual-Class dummy variable that equals one if a 
firm has dual-class shares in year t and zero otherwise, and the product of the Dual-Class 
dummy variable with firm Tobin’s Q for each firm in each year. The dependent variables are 
the measures of innovation productivity: Patent Number, Citation Number, Generality, and 
Originality. All regressions control for the logarithm of total assets, firm age, return on assets 
(ROA), Tobin’s Q, Cash Flow-to-Assets, Leverage, R&D Expense-to-Assets, CAPX-to-
Assets, PPE-to-Assets, and the Herfindahl Index based on the three-digit SIC code, as well as 
year and two-digit SIC industry fixed effects. Detailed definitions of each variable are 
provided in the Appendix. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively using t-statistics for two-tailed tests. The p-values are reported in parentheses. 
 
  Patent Number Citation Number Generality Originality 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dual-Class -9.002*** -113.090*** -4.804*** -6.426*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dual-Class*Tobin’s Q  2.992*** 40.051*** 1.334* 2.479*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.080) (0.006) 
Ln(Total Assets) 6.449*** 83.037*** 4.833*** 5.466*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age 0.201*** 2.638*** 0.038*** 0.094*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA -7.519*** -85.436*** -8.337*** -9.891*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin's Q 0.407*** 6.679*** 0.115*** 0.260*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) 
Cash Flow/Assets 2.090*** 20.443*** 3.337*** 4.378*** 
 
(0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.335 -9.353* -0.623 -0.107 
 
(0.370) (0.075) (0.256) (0.860) 
CAPX/Assets 15.503*** 273.999*** 16.987*** 15.459*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D Exp./Assets 6.771*** 101.517*** 9.985*** 8.306*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PPE/Assets -2.152*** -49.643*** -1.784* -0.126 
 
(0.006) (0.000) (0.085) (0.919) 
Herfindahl Index 2.397* 10.260 -1.212 -6.479*** 
 
(0.050) (0.551) (0.446) (0.001) 
Constant -27.100*** -337.820*** -33.080*** -56.736*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 102302 102302 32708 33444 
Adj. R2 0.250 0.223 0.319 0.288 
Year F. E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry F. E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table II.5 
Dual-Class Shares, Firm Financial Constraints, and Innovation 
This table reports the estimation results of regressions designed to measure the effect of dual-
class shares on innovation productivity for firms with different degrees of financial 
constraints. We use the KZ Index of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) to measure financial 
constraints and regress firm innovation output in year t on a Dual-Class dummy variable that 
equals one if a firm has dual-class shares in year t and zero otherwise, and the product of the 
Dual-Class dummy variable with Firm KZ Index for each firm in each year. The dependent 
variables are the measures of innovation productivity: Patent Number, Citation Number, 
Generality, and Originality. All regressions control for the logarithm of total assets, firm age, 
return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q, Cash Flow-to-Assets. Leverage, R&D Expense-to-Assets, 
CAPX-to-Assets, PPE-to-Assets, and the Herfindahl Index based on the three-digit SIC code, 
as well as year and two-digit SIC industry fixed effects. Detailed definitions of each variable 
are provided in the Appendix. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively using t-statistics for two-tailed tests. The p-values are reported in parentheses. 
 
  Patent Number Citation Number Generality Originality 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dual-Class -6.352*** -74.906*** -3.844*** -4.982*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dual-Class* KZ Index 1.318* 15.731 0.214 1.598* 
 
(0.062) (0.112) (0.787) (0.075) 
KZ Index 0.000 0.005 0.004 0.007 
 
(0.632) (0.734) (0.476) (0.349) 
Ln(Total Assets) 6.497*** 83.199*** 5.215*** 5.798*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age 0.151*** 1.804*** 0.003 0.055*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.741) (0.000) 
ROA -7.020*** -76.568*** -9.321*** -10.404*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin's Q 0.424*** 7.149*** 0.067 0.226*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.140) (0.000) 
Cash Flow/Assets 2.021*** 20.794** 3.909*** 4.843*** 
 
(0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.522 -14.575*** -0.649 -0.438 
 
(0.173) (0.007) (0.258) (0.484) 
CAPX/Assets 28.195*** 470.014*** 30.565*** 30.047*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D Exp./Assets 8.753*** 145.771*** 11.595*** 10.066*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PPE/Assets -7.467*** -126.117*** -8.008*** -7.201*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Herfindahl Index 6.821*** 35.812*** 2.217** 1.004 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.020) (0.382) 
Constant -27.850*** -342.692*** -31.780*** -48.411*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 102260 102260 32699 33438 
Adj. R2 0.193 0.169 0.230 0.214 
Year F. E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry F. E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table II.6 
Dual-Class Shares, Firm Cash Flow, and Innovation  
This table reports the estimation results of regressions designed to measure the effect of dual-
class shares on innovation productivity for firms with different levels of cash flow. We 
regress firm innovation output in year t on a Dual-Class dummy variable that equals one if a 
firm has dual-class shares in year t and zero otherwise, and the product of the Dual-Class 
dummy variable with firm Cash Flow-to-Assets for each firm in each year. The dependent 
variables are the measures of innovation productivity: Patent Number, Citation Number, 
Generality and Originality. All regressions control for the logarithm of total assets, firm age, 
return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q, Cash Flow-to-Assets, Leverage, R&D Expense-to-Assets, 
CAPX-to-Assets, PPE-to-Assets, and the Herfindahl Index based on the three-digit SIC code, 
as well as year and two-digit SIC industry fixed effects. Detailed definitions of each variable 
are provided in the Appendix. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively using t-statistics for two-tailed tests. The p-values are reported in parentheses. 
  
Patent 
Number 
Citation Number Generality Originality 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dual-Class -3.838*** -52.407*** -3.575*** -2.338** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.037) 
Dual-Class*Cash Flow/Assets -21.111** -141.849 -1.273 -17.736 
 
(0.039) (0.322) (0.910) (0.149) 
Ln(Total Assets) 6.496*** 83.180*** 5.210*** 5.797*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age 0.151*** 1.802*** 0.004 0.054*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.730) (0.000) 
ROA -6.948*** -76.014*** -9.210*** -10.241*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin's Q 0.426*** 7.157*** 0.069 0.232*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.128) (0.000) 
Cash Flow/Assets 2.004*** 20.700** 3.847*** 4.780*** 
 
(0.001) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.482 -14.022*** -0.622 -0.283 
 
(0.205) (0.009) (0.272) (0.648) 
CAPX/Assets 28.185*** 469.655*** 30.357*** 30.031*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D Expense/Assets 8.805*** 146.287*** 11.681*** 10.197*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PPE/Assets -7.447*** -125.870*** -7.899*** -7.147*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Herfindahl Index 6.819*** 35.543*** 2.220** 1.005 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.019) (0.382) 
Constant -27.881*** -342.835*** -31.796*** -48.465*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 102302 102302 32708 33444 
Adj. R2 0.193 0.169 0.230 0.214 
Year F. E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry F. E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table II.7 
Dual-Class Shares, High-Tech Industries, and Innovation 
This table reports the estimation results of regressions designed to measure how the effects of 
dual-class shares on innovation productivity vary between High-Tech industries and other 
industries. Following Hall and Lerner (2009), we define the high-technology industries as 
drugs, office and computing equipment, communications equipment and electronic 
components. We regress firm innovation output in year t on a Dual-Class dummy variable 
that equals one if a firm has dual-class shares in year t and zero otherwise, a High-Tech 
dummy variable that equals one if a firm is within the high-tech industries in year t and zero 
otherwise, and the product of these two dummy variables. The dependent variables are the 
measures of innovation productivity; Patent Number, Citation Number, Generality and 
Originality. All regressions control for the logarithm of total assets, firm age, return on assets 
(ROA), Tobin’s Q, Cash Flow-to-Assets, Leverage, R&D Expense-to-Assets, CAPX-to-
Assets, PPE-to-Assets, and the Herfindahl Index based on the three-digit SIC code, as well as 
year and two-digit SIC industry fixed effects. Detailed definitions of each variable are 
provided in the Appendix. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively using t-statistics for two-tailed tests. The p-values are reported in parentheses. 
  Patent Number Citation Number Generality Originality 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dual-Class -6.716*** -72.965*** -3.834*** -4.654*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dual-Class* High-Tech 5.128*** 39.289** 0.435 2.887** 
 
(0.000) (0.019) (0.728) (0.043) 
High-Tech 3.070*** 67.064*** 1.552*** 2.141*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln(Total Assets) 6.499*** 83.309*** 5.198*** 5.780*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age 0.159*** 1.970*** 0.008 0.061*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.419) (0.000) 
ROA -7.007*** -77.131*** -9.238*** -10.300*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin's Q 0.416*** 6.985*** 0.060 0.220*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.183) (0.000) 
Cash Flow/Assets 1.862*** 17.797** 3.699*** 4.611*** 
 
(0.001) (0.028) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.406 -12.402** -0.599 -0.233 
 
(0.287) (0.020) (0.290) (0.707) 
CAPX/Assets 26.831*** 441.047*** 29.185*** 28.330*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D Expense/Assets 7.533*** 118.828*** 10.816*** 9.161*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PPE/Assets -6.811*** -112.156*** -7.306*** -6.271*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Herfindahl Index 8.550*** 72.318*** 3.383*** 2.869** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.018) 
Constant -31.337*** -433.053*** -36.464*** -50.854*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 102302 102302 32708 33444 
Adj. R2 0.194 0.170 0.230 0.214 
Year F. E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry F. E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table II.8 
Dual-Class Shares, Hard-to-Innovate Industries, and Innovation 
This table reports the estimation results of regressions designed to measure how the effects of 
dual-class shares on innovation productivity vary between Hard-to-Innovate industries and 
other industries. As in Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) and Tian and Wang (2014) we 
define the Hard-to-Innovate industries as the pharmaceutical, medical instrumentation, 
chemicals, computers, communications, and electrical industries. We regress firm innovation 
output in year t on a Dual-Class dummy variable that equals one if a firm has dual-class 
shares in year t and zero otherwise, a Hard-to-Innovate dummy variable that equals one if a 
firm is within the hard-to-innovate industries in year t and zero otherwise, and the product of 
these two dummy variables. The dependent variables are the measures of innovation 
productivity: Patent Number, Citation Number, Generality and Originality. All regressions 
control for the logarithm of total assets, firm age, return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q, Cash 
Flow-to-Assets, Leverage, R&D Expense-to-Assets, CAPX-to-Assets, PPE-to-Assets, and the 
Herfindahl Index based on the three-digit SIC code, as well as year and two-digit SIC 
industry fixed effects. Detailed definitions of each variable are provided in the Appendix. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively using t-statistics for 
two-tailed tests. The p-values are reported in parentheses. 
  Patent Number Citation Generality Originality 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dual-Class -6.600*** -75.833*** -3.791*** -4.501*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dual-Class * Hard-to-Innovate 5.920*** 60.477*** 0.346 2.964* 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.796) (0.051) 
Hard-to-Innovate 3.180*** 69.030*** 1.987*** 2.494*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln (Total Assets) 6.492*** 83.131*** 5.191*** 5.770*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age 0.159*** 1.983*** 0.010 0.062*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.342) (0.000) 
ROA -7.035*** -77.629*** -9.270*** -10.359*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin's Q 0.414*** 6.968*** 0.057 0.217*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.207) (0.000) 
Cash Flow/Assets 1.869*** 17.951** 3.653*** 4.596*** 
 
(0.001) (0.026) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.377 -11.949** -0.594 -0.206 
 
(0.322) (0.025) (0.294) (0.739) 
CAPX/Assets 26.852*** 441.145*** 28.876*** 28.134*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D Expense/Assets 7.500*** 118.262*** 10.544*** 8.957*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PPE/Assets -6.781*** -111.552*** -7.133*** -6.143*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Herfindahl Index 8.647*** 74.526*** 3.770*** 3.203*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) 
Constant -28.809*** -363.278*** -32.479*** -49.408*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 102302 102302 32708 33444 
Adj. R2 0.194 0.170 0.231 0.215 
Year F. E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry F. E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table II.9 
Dual-Class Shares, Takeover Threats, and Innovation 
This table reports the estimation results of regressions designed to measure the effect of dual-
class shares on innovation productivity for firms with different exposures to external takeover 
threats. We use the state-level index (from 0 to 5) of anti-takeover laws compiled by Bebchuk 
and Cohen (2003) as a proxy for external takeover pressure and regress firm’ innovation 
output in year t on a Dual-Class dummy variable that equals one if a firm has dual-class 
shares in year t and zero otherwise, and the product of the Dual-Class dummy variable with 
the firm Anti-Takeover Index for each firm in each year. The dependent variables are the 
measures of innovation productivity: Patent Number, Citation Number, Generality and 
Originality. All regressions control for the logarithm of total assets, firm age, return on assets 
(ROA), Tobin’s Q, Cash Flow-to-Assets, Leverage, R&D Expense-to-Assets, CAPX-to-
Assets, PPE-to-Assets, and the Herfindahl Index based on the three-digit SIC code, as well as 
year and two-digit SIC industry fixed effects. Detailed definitions of each variable are 
provided in the Appendix. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively using t-statistics for two-tailed tests. The p-values are reported in parentheses. 
  Patent Number Citation Number Generality Originality 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dual-Class -1.971 -34.506 -3.644** -1.603 
 
(0.138) (0.116) (0.014) (0.327) 
Dual-Class* Anti-Takeover Index -1.140*** -15.518** 0.046 -0.633 
 
(0.004) (0.019) (0.916) (0.190) 
Anti-Takeover Index -0.208** -8.151*** -0.250*** -0.245** 
 
(0.012) (0.000) (0.005) (0.013) 
Ln(Total Assets) 6.484*** 107.264*** 5.034*** 5.630*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age 0.363*** 4.600*** 0.138*** 0.187*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA -7.277*** -120.505*** -9.938*** -10.238*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin's Q 0.433*** 8.404*** 0.137*** 0.255*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) 
Cash Flow/Assets 1.978** 33.362** 3.677*** 3.939*** 
 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.001) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.233 -11.725 -1.366** -1.204* 
 
(0.659) (0.179) (0.047) (0.100) 
CAPX/Assets 21.734*** 445.535*** 22.488*** 20.655*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D Expense/Assets 7.674*** 128.573*** 7.923*** 7.670*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PPE/Assets -3.249*** -78.387*** -3.335** -3.119** 
 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.014) (0.036) 
Herfindahl Index 3.659 57.633 8.896*** 3.534 
 
(0.162) (0.181) (0.005) (0.316) 
Constant -29.554*** -447.845*** -34.210*** -29.541*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 47047 47047 17744 19385 
Adj. R2 0.224 0.209 0.239 0.235 
Year F. E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry F. E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table II.10 
Dual-Class Shares, Product Market Competition, and Innovation 
This table reports estimation results of regressions designed to measure the effect of dual-
class shares on innovation productivity for firms facing different levels of product market 
competition. We use the Herfindahl Index of Herfindahl (1950) as a proxy for the level of 
product market competition and regress firm innovation output in year t on a Dual-Class 
dummy variable that equals one if a firm has dual-class shares in year t and zero otherwise, 
and the product of the Dual-Class dummy variable with the firm Herfindahl Index for each 
firm in each year. The dependent variables are the measures of innovation productivity: 
Patent Number, Citation Number, Generality and Originality. All regressions control for the 
logarithm of total assets, firm age, return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q, Cash Flow-to-Assets, 
Leverage, R&D Expense-to-Assets, CAPX-to-Assets, PPE-to-Assets, and the Herfindahl 
Index based on the three-digit SIC code, as well as year and two-digit SIC industry fixed 
effects. Detailed definitions of each variable are provided in the Appendix. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively using t-statistics for two-tailed 
tests. The p-values are reported in parentheses. 
  
Patent 
Number 
Citation Number Generality Originality 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dual-Class 0.106 -6.732 -2.370* -0.875 
 
(0.931) (0.694) (0.064) (0.548) 
Dual-Class*Herfindahl Index -34.022*** -352.646*** -8.400 -19.611** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.317) (0.038) 
Ln(Total Assets) 6.607*** 85.616*** 5.076*** 5.684*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age 0.195*** 2.470*** 0.042*** 0.095*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA -7.740*** -89.486*** -9.942*** -11.283*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin's Q 0.419*** 6.925*** 0.068 0.228*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.127) (0.000) 
Cash Flow/Assets 2.152*** 22.581*** 3.996*** 5.253*** 
 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.295 -9.733* -0.579 -0.165 
 
(0.432) (0.066) (0.298) (0.787) 
CAPX/Assets 17.974*** 314.330*** 19.573*** 17.588*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D Expense/Assets 6.908*** 111.578*** 9.585*** 8.466*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PPE/Assets -2.539*** -53.159*** -2.524** -1.016 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.014) (0.406) 
Herfindahl Index 4.113*** 31.325* 2.536 -0.964 
 
(0.001) (0.071) (0.120) (0.642) 
Constant -28.271*** -355.947*** -33.862*** -47.927*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 102302 102302 32708 33444 
Adj. R2 0.228 0.201 0.279 0.254 
Year F. E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry F. E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table II.11 
Firms Switching from Single-Class to Dual-Class Share Structures 
This table reports the estimation results of panel regressions examining the effects of dual-
class shares on innovation productivity the period from 1970 through 2006. Only firms that 
changed from single-class to dual-class share structures are included in the sample. The 
dependent variables in Columns (1) to (4) are the Patent Number (the number of patent 
applications filed in a given year that are eventually granted), Citation Number(the number of 
citations received for patent applications filed in a given year that are eventually granted), 
Generality (the sum of generality scores of all successful patent applications filed by a firm in 
each year), and Originality (the sum of originality scores of all successful patent applications 
filed by a firm in each year). The main independent variable is Dual-Class, which equals one 
if a firm has dual-class shares in year t and zero otherwise. All regressions control for the 
logarithm of total assets, firm age, return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q, Cash Flow-to-Assets, 
Leverage, R&D Expense-to-Assets, CAPX-to-Assets, PPE-to-Assets, and the Herfindahl 
Index based on the three-digit SIC code, as well as year and two-digit SIC industry fixed 
effects. Detailed definitions of each variable are provided in the Appendix. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively using t-statistics for two-tailed 
tests. The p-values are reported in parentheses. 
  Patent Number Citation Number Generality Originality 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dual-Class -4.764*** -65.544*** -3.081*** -2.785*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) 
Ln(Total Assets) 7.161*** 89.882*** 3.516*** 5.128*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age 0.044 1.128** 0.024 -0.029 
 
(0.211) (0.028) (0.404) (0.471) 
ROA -5.203 -64.215 -5.018 -1.042 
 
(0.140) (0.210) (0.161) (0.802) 
Tobin's Q 1.169*** 21.147*** 0.488*** 0.657*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Cash Flow/Assets 2.864 70.886 4.231 0.323 
 
(0.339) (0.103) (0.167) (0.911) 
Leverage -2.388 -8.992 0.341 -0.997 
 
(0.156) (0.713) (0.832) (0.648) 
CAPX/Assets 42.612*** 772.518*** 37.143*** 32.700*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) 
R&D Expense/Assets 31.353*** 433.537*** 12.513*** 26.681*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) 
PPE/Assets 0.744 -28.887 0.211 8.240* 
 
(0.817) (0.536) (0.944) (0.053) 
Herfindahl Index -1.720 -55.635 -8.170*** -16.401*** 
 
(0.575) (0.212) (0.008) (0.000) 
Constant -34.280*** -499.380*** -27.566*** -29.408 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.212) 
Observations 6893 6893 2310 2452 
Adj. R2 0.197 0.176 0.204 0.190 
Year F. E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry F. E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table II.12 
Research and Development Expense and Share Class Structure 
This table reports the estimation results of panel regressions examining the effects of dual-
class shares on firm Research and Development Expenditures. The results reported in Column 
(1) are based on our full sample from 1970 through 2006. Column (2) includes only firms that 
switched from single to dual-class share structures. The dependent variable in Columns (1) 
and (2) is the R&D Expense-to-Assets for each firm in each year. The main independent 
variable in Columns (1) and (2) is Dual-Class, which equals one if the firm has dual-class 
shares and zero for firms with single-class shares. All regressions control for the logarithm of 
total assets, firm age, return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q, Cash Flow-to-Assets, Leverage, 
CAPX-to-Assets, PPE-to-Assets, and the Herfindahl Index based on the three-digit SIC code, 
as well as year and two-digit SIC industry fixed effects. Detailed definitions of each variable 
are provided in the Appendix. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively using t-statistics for two-tailed tests. The p-values are reported in parentheses. 
                                     R&D Expense-to-Assets 
  (1) (2) 
Dual-Class -0.011*** -0.002 
 
(0.000) (0.244) 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.001*** -0.003*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Firm Age -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
ROA -0.202*** -0.185*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Tobin's Q -0.000* 0.003*** 
 
(0.052) (0.000) 
Cash Flow/Assets -0.024*** -0.035*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.046*** -0.053*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
CAPX/Assets 0.226*** 0.197*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
PPE/Assets -0.045*** -0.039*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Herfindahl Index -0.054*** -0.004 
 
(0.000) (0.563) 
Constant 0.096*** 0.126*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 102302 6893 
Adj. R2 0.520 0.555 
Year F. E. Yes Yes 
Industry F. E. Yes Yes 
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Table II.13 
Innovation Efficiency and Share Class Structure 
This table reports the estimation results of panel regressions examining the effects of dual-
class shares on firm Innovation Efficiency (Hirshleifer, Hsu and Li, 2013), which is defined 
as number of patent applications filed in a given year that are eventually granted divided by 
the R&D Expense of previous years. The results reported in Column (1) are based on our full 
sample from 1970 through 2006. Column (2) includes only firms that switched from single to 
dual-class share structures. The dependent variable in Columns (1) and (2) is the Innovation 
Efficiency measure for each firm in each year.  The main independent variable in Columns (1) 
and (2) is Dual-Class, which equals one if the firm has dual-class shares and zero for firms 
with single-class shares. All regressions control for the logarithm of total assets, firm age, 
return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q, Cash Flow-to-Assets, Leverage, R&D Expense-to-Assets, 
CAPX-to-Assets, PPE-to-Assets, and the Herfindahl Index based on the three-digit SIC code, 
as well as year, two-digit SIC industry fixed effects. Detailed definitions of each variable are 
provided in the Appendix. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively using t-statistics for two-tailed tests. The p-values are reported in parentheses. 
  Innovation Efficiency 
  (1) (2) 
Dual-Class -0.097* -0.064** 
 
(0.069) (0.038) 
Ln(Total Assets) -0.074*** -0.051* 
 
(0.000) (0.063) 
Firm Age -0.008*** -0.009*** 
 
(0.000) (0.003) 
ROA -0.099** 0.049 
 
(0.046) (0.843) 
Tobin's Q 0.013** 0.012 
 
(0.016) (0.590) 
Cash Flow/Assets 0.070** -0.158 
 
(0.046) (0.286) 
Leverage -0.144*** -0.342*** 
 
(0.010) (0.004) 
CAPX/Assets  1.343*** 2.385* 
 
(0.001) (0.055) 
R&D Expense/Assets -0.789*** -0.795** 
 
(0.001) (0.041) 
PPE/Assets 0.023 0.628 
 
(0.825) (0.104) 
Herfindahl Index 0.027 -0.088 
 
(0.859) (0.781) 
Constant 0.160 -0.222 
 
(0.299) (0.453) 
Observations 60096 3900 
Adj. R2 0.062 0.064 
Year F. E. Yes Yes 
Industry F. E. Yes Yes 
 
126 
 
Table II.14 
Innovation Efficiency– Subsample Tests 
This table reports the estimation results of panel regressions examining the effects of dual-class shares on 
firm Innovation Efficiency (Hirshleiferet al., 2013), which is defined as the number of patent applications 
filed in a given year that are eventually granted divided by the R&D Expense of previous years. The 
results are based on our full sample from 1970 through 2006. The dependent variable in each regression is 
the innovation efficiency for each firm in each year. The dichotomous subsamples are as follows: old vs. 
young firms, columns (1) and (2);hard- vs. easy-to-innovate industries, columns (3) and (4);high- vs. low-
tech industries, columns (5) and (6); and high vs. low takeover threats, columns (7) and (8). Subsample 
sorting is based on the full sample medians of the conditioning variables. The main independent variable 
is Dual-Class, which equals one if the firm has dual-class shares and zero for firms with Single-class 
shares. All regressions control for the logarithm of total assets, firm age, return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s 
Q, Cash Flow-to-Assets, Leverage, R&D Expense-to-Assets, CAPX-to-Assets, PPE-to-Assets, and the 
Herfindahl index based on the three-digit SIC code, as well as year and two-digit SIC industry fixed 
effects. Detailed definitions of each variable are provided in the Appendix. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively using t-statistics for two-tailed tests. The p-
values are reported in parentheses. 
  Age   Innovation Difficulty   High-Tech Industries   Takeover Threat 
 
Old Young 
 
Hard Easy 
 
High Low 
 
High Low 
  (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) 
Dual-Class -0.108*** -0.003   0.008 -0.141**   0.018 -0.168**   -0.030 -0.124** 
 
(0.004) (0.977) 
 
(0.897) (0.036) 
 
(0.664) (0.021) 
 
(0.688) (0.047) 
Ln (Total Assets) -0.061*** -0.092*** 
 
-0.047*** -0.087*** 
 
-0.056*** -0.090*** 
 
-0.015** -0.087*** 
 
(0.001) (0.000) 
 
(0.004) (0.000) 
 
(0.005) (0.000) 
 
(0.031) (0.000) 
Firm Age -0.004*** -0.041*** 
 
-0.010*** -0.008*** 
 
-0.012*** -0.007*** 
 
-0.012*** -0.008*** 
 
(0.001) (0.010) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
ROA -0.040 -0.077 
 
-0.065 -0.107 
 
-0.070 -0.098 
 
-0.244*** -0.070 
 
(0.573) (0.385) 
 
(0.253) (0.177) 
 
(0.104) (0.294) 
 
(0.000) (0.230) 
Tobin's Q 0.011* 0.017** 
 
0.019** 0.011** 
 
0.016*** 0.013** 
 
0.027*** 0.007 
 
(0.054) (0.029) 
 
(0.031) (0.021) 
 
(0.010) (0.031) 
 
(0.002) (0.178) 
Cash Flow/Assets 0.027 0.087 
 
0.037*** 0.086 
 
0.035*** 0.097 
 
0.093** 0.057 
 
(0.599) (0.112) 
 
(0.000) (0.120) 
 
(0.000) (0.149) 
 
(0.026) (0.154) 
Leverage -0.174** -0.105 
 
-0.100 -0.172** 
 
-0.155*** -0.144 
 
-0.270*** -0.099 
 
(0.033) (0.334) 
 
-0.265 (0.032) 
 
(0.000) (0.162) 
 
(0.000) (0.112) 
R&D Expense/Assets 1.292*** 0.930 
 
1.246** 1.533*** 
 
1.659*** 1.247*** 
 
1.519*** 1.321*** 
 
(0.000) (0.210) 
 
(0.046) (0.000) 
 
(0.003) (0.007) 
 
(0.000) (0.004) 
CAPX/Assets -0.710*** -0.776*** 
 
-0.619** -0.894*** 
 
-0.621** -1.025*** 
 
-0.835*** -0.804*** 
 
(0.008) (0.001) 
 
(0.049) (0.000) 
 
(0.020) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.008) 
PPE/Assets 0.059 0.061 
 
0.159 -0.080 
 
0.022 -0.044 
 
-0.122 0.067 
 
(0.430) (0.755) 
 
(0.206) (0.563) 
 
(0.865) (0.787) 
 
(0.232) (0.562) 
Herfindahl Index 0.263 -0.437 
 
0.391 -0.083 
 
-0.178 -0.079 
 
-0.031 0.045 
 
(0.174) (0.121) 
 
(0.427) (0.603) 
 
(0.487) (0.651) 
 
(0.842) (0.798) 
Constant 0.146*** 0.401 
 
-0.022 0.267 
 
0.277* 0.421 
 
0.573*** 0.494 
 
(0.005) (0.026) 
 
(0.905) (0.253) 
 
(0.067) (0.977) 
 
(0.000) (0.333) 
Observations 37484 22612 
 
16788 43308 
 
26219 33877 
 
12519 47577 
Adj. R2 0.063 0.070   0.058 0.062   0.065 0.061   0.050 0.063 
Year F. E. Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Industry F.E. Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
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Appendix C Tables for Part III 
Variable Definitions  
 
Variable Definition 
Innovation measures  
Patent Number Patent number is defined as number of patent applications filed in year t 
of each firm. Only patents that are later granted are included.  The 
patent number is set to zero for companies that have no patent 
information available from the NBER database. 
Innovation efficiency 
number of patent scaled by the previous four years’ R&D investment 
(Hershleifer, Hsu and Li, 2013). 
  
Control variables  
Ln(Asset) The logarithm of the book value of total assets (AT from 
COMPUSTAT) measured at the end of fiscal year t. 
Age The logarithm of the book value of total assets (AT from 
COMPUSTAT) measured at the end of fiscal year t. 
ROA Firm operating income before depreciation (OIBDP from 
COMPUSTAT) divided by the book value of total assets (AT), 
measured at the end of fiscal year t. 
Tobin's Q The market value of equity (PRCC_F×CSHO from COMPUSTAT) plus 
the book value of assets (AT) minus the book value of equity (CEQ 
from COMPUSTAT) minus balance sheet deferred taxes (TXDB from 
COMPUSTAT)] divided by the book value of assets (AT), measured at 
the end of fiscal year t. 
Cash Flow-to-Assets Income before extraordinary items (IB from COMPUSTAT) plus 
depreciation and amortization (DP from COMPUSTAT) divided by the 
book value of assets (AT), measured at the end of fiscal year t. 
Leverage  The book value of debt (DLTT+DLC from COMPUSTAT) divided by 
the book value of total assets (AT) measured at the end of fiscal year t. 
R&D Expense-to-Assets Research and develop expenditure (XRD from COMPUSTAT) divided 
by the book value of assets (AT), measured at the end of fiscal year t. 
CAPX-to-Assets Capital expenditure (CAPX from COMPUSTAT) divided by book 
value of assets (AT), measured at the end of fiscal year t. 
Herfindahl Index Herfindahl index of 3-digit SIC industry of each firm measured at the 
end of fiscal year t based on sales.   
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Figure III.1: Innovation Productivity over Time, 1999 – 2005 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This figure plots trends in total Patent Number and sample mean of innovation efficiency 
(Hirshleifer, Hsu and Li, 2013) over the sample period 1999 – 2005. 
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Table III.1: Summary and Univariate Test 
  3 years pre- SOX   3 years post- SOX   
Comparison 
between two 
samples 
 
Obs Mean Median S.D. 
 
Obs Mean Median S.D. 
 
Mean-
Difference 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
(9) 
Panel A: Innovation Productivity Measurement 
       
Log(1+Patent) 20153 0.41 0.00 1.00 
 
20143 0.40 0.00 1.01 
 
-0.01 
           
(1.29) 
Innovation 
Effeciency 
20153 0.07 0.00 1.13 
 
20143 0.04 0.00 0.63 
 
-0.03*** 
           
(3.11) 
            
Panel B: Control Variables 
       
Log (Total Asset) 18594 5.37 5.54 2.71 
 
18745 5.60 5.84 2.82 
 
0.23 
Firm Age 20153 14.18 9.00 12.90 
 
20143 18.17 13.00 12.88 
 
3.98 
ROA 18594 -0.11 0.07 0.88 
 
18745 -0.14 0.07 1.22 
 
-0.04 
Tobin's Q 18594 3.21 1.24 7.76 
 
18745 3.74 1.46 12.00 
 
0.52 
Cash 18594 -0.19 0.04 1.14 
 
18745 -0.23 0.05 1.63 
 
-0.04 
Leverage Ratio 18594 0.29 0.20 0.42 
 
18745 0.33 0.18 0.72 
 
0.04 
CAPX  18594 0.05 0.03 0.07 
 
18745 0.04 0.02 0.05 
 
-0.01 
R&D Expense  18594 0.06 0.00 0.15 
 
18745 0.05 0.00 0.14 
 
0.00 
Herfindahl Index 20153 0.18 0.10 0.23   20143 0.19 0.11 0.24   0.02 
 
Notes:  
This table reports descriptive statistics for the sample of firms with innovation data in both pre-SOX 
(1999-2001) and post-SOX (2003-2005) periods. Columns (1) to (4) and (5) to (8) report the number of 
observations (N), mean median and standard deviation (S.D.) of the subsample that cover three years 
before and after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), respectively. Column (9) report the difference of mean of 
each variable for the two subsamples. In Panel A, two innovation measures are listed: the logarithm of 
one plus the number of successfully granted patent applications filed in each year of each firm, and the 
firms’ Innovative Efficiency (Hirshleifer, Hsu and Li, 2013), which is defined by using number of patent 
application that is eventually granted divided by the R&D Expense of previous years. And Panel B 
includes all of the control variables: logarithm of total asset, firm age, return on asset (ROA), Tobin’s Q, 
leverage, R&D expense, capital expenditure (CAPX) and Herfindahl Index based on the three-digit SIC 
code. Column (9) reports the difference in means between the two groups. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively using t-statistics for two-tailed tests. 
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Table III. 2: Correlation Matrix 
  Patent 
Innov. 
Eff. 
Log(Asse
t) 
Firm 
Age 
ROA 
Tobin's 
Q 
Cash 
Flow 
/Assets 
Leverage 
CAPEX/ 
Assets 
R&D 
Expense/ 
Assets 
Hindex  
G 
Index 
KZ 
Index 
Patent 1.000 
            
Innovation Efficiency 0.063 1.000 
           
Log(Asset in $ millions) 0.151 0.004 1.000 
          
Firm Age (years) 0.149 0.020 0.376 1.000 
         
ROA 0.048 0.008 0.097 0.056 1.000 
        
Tobin's Q 0.218 0.002 -0.192 -0.176 -0.008 1.000 
       
Cash Flow/Assets 0.024 0.007 0.119 0.066 0.894 -0.043 1.000 
      
Leverage -0.066 0.002 0.156 0.116 -0.279 -0.121 -0.265 1.000 
     
CAPEX/Assets -0.030 0.005 -0.103 -0.007 0.209 0.100 0.170 0.006 1.000 
    
R&D Expense/Assets 0.372 0.005 -0.291 -0.200 -0.321 0.327 -0.306 -0.016 -0.066 1.000 
   
Hindex  -0.006 -0.004 -0.019 0.110 0.098 -0.044 0.069 -0.009 0.060 -0.171 1.000 
  
G Index 0.054 -0.003 0.147 0.320 0.044 -0.090 0.038 0.045 -0.018 -0.083 0.045 1.000 
 
KZ Index -0.030 -0.001 0.108 -0.035 -0.076 0.060 -0.115 0.370 -0.002 -0.032 -0.023 0.010 1.000 
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Table III.3: Baseline Regression of Impact of SOX on innovation 
  Log(1+Patent) Innovation Efficiency 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
SOX Signal 0.041*** -0.115*** -0.038*** -0.055*** 
 
(3.57) (-6.64) (-4.62) (-3.87) 
Log Total Asset 
 
0.171*** 
 
-0.002 
  
(5.14) 
 
(-0.90) 
Firm Age 
 
0.007*** 
 
0.001 
  
(3.17) 
 
(0.86) 
ROA 
 
0.011 
 
-0.005 
  
(0.65) 
 
(-1.25) 
Tobin's Q 
 
0.012*** 
 
0.000* 
  
(4.22) 
 
(1.84) 
Cash 
 
-0.019*** 
 
0.005 
  
(-2.81) 
 
(1.41) 
Leverage 
 
-0.096*** 
 
-0.017*** 
  
(-3.06) 
 
(-3.20) 
CAPEX 
 
0.248 
 
0.029 
  
(0.73) 
 
(0.53) 
R&D Expense 
 
0.537*** 
 
-0.112*** 
  
(4.34) 
 
(-2.75) 
Hindex 
 
0.161 
 
-0.025 
  
(0.80) 
 
(-0.68) 
Constant 0.357*** -0.807*** 0.029*** 0.043* 
 
(15.88) (-3.93) (3.50) (1.91) 
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 40296 37339 40296 37339 
adj. R-sq 0.188 0.344 0.004 0.004 
 
Notes: This table reports the OLS estimation results of the baseline panel regressions 
examining the effects of Sarbanes-Oxley Act on innovation productivity from year 1999 
to 2005 (without 2002). The dependent variables in Columns (1) to (2) are the logarithm 
of one plus the number of successfully granted patent applications filed in each year of 
each firm and the dependent variables in Columns (3) to (4) is firms’ Innovative 
Efficiency (Hirshleifer, Hsu and Li, 2013). The main independent variable is SOX Signal, 
which equals to one if observations are of years no less than 2002 and zero otherwise. All 
regressions control for the logarithm of total asset, firm age, return on asset (ROA), 
Tobin’s Q, leverage, R&D expense, capital expenditure (CAPX), Herfindahl Index based 
on the three-digit SIC code, as well as year, two-digit SIC industry. Detailed definitions 
of each variable are provided in the Appendix. Robust t-statistics with standard errors 
clustered at the industry (two-digit SIC code) and year level are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table III.4: Impact of SOX on high Q vs. low Q firms 
  Log(1+Patent) Innovation Efficiency 
 
High Q Low Q High Q Low Q 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
SOX Signal -0.202*** -0.015 -0.064*** -0.047 
 
(-5.59) (-0.72) (-4.24) (-1.04) 
Log Total Asset 0.212*** 0.117*** -0.003 -0.002 
 
(5.83) (4.34) (-0.78) (-0.54) 
Firm Age 0.011*** 0.003* 0.000 0.001 
 
(4.40) (1.93) (0.21) (0.86) 
ROA -0.030** -0.031 -0.008 -0.006 
 
(-2.03) (-0.43) (-1.03) (-0.27) 
Tobin's Q 0.010*** 0.330*** -0.000 0.053* 
 
(4.33) (4.29) (-0.75) (1.95) 
Cash -0.010* -0.007 0.005 0.005 
 
(-1.79) (-0.16) (1.51) (0.36) 
Leverage -0.051** -0.361*** -0.017** -0.002 
 
(-2.07) (-5.85) (-2.42) (-0.06) 
CAPEX 0.203 0.096 0.017 0.004 
 
(0.54) (0.40) (0.32) (0.04) 
R&D Expense 0.427*** 0.930** -0.126*** -0.184* 
 
(4.24) (2.05) (-3.06) (-1.94) 
Hindex -0.099 0.362** 0.038 -0.076 
 
(-0.41) (1.98) (0.67) (-1.46) 
Constant -0.880*** -0.725*** 0.056 -0.002 
 
(-3.62) (-3.54) (1.39) (-0.07) 
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 19501 17838 19501 17838 
adj. R-sq 0.389 0.277 0.005 -0.000 
 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results of subsample regressions examining how 
the effects of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act on innovation productivity vary between the 
high-growth firms and low-growth firm. In each year, firms with Tobin’s Q that higher 
than median are considered as high-growth firms and low-growth otherwise. The 
dependent variables in Columns (1) to (2) are the logarithm of one plus the number of 
successfully granted patent applications filed in each year of each firm, and the dependent 
variables in Columns (3) to (4) is firms’ Innovative Efficiency (Hirshleifer, Hsu and Li, 
2013); the main independent variable is SOX Signal, which equals to one if observations 
are of years no less than 2002 and zero otherwise. All regressions control for the 
logarithm of total asset, firm age, return on asset (ROA), Tobin’s Q, leverage, R&D 
expense, capital expenditure (CAPX), Herfindahl Index based on the three-digit SIC code, 
as well as year, two-digit SIC industry. Detailed definitions of each variable are provided 
in the Appendix. Robust t-statistics with standard errors clustered at the industry (two-
digit SIC code) and year level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table III.5: Impact of SOX on good governance vs. poor governance firms 
  Log(1+Patent) Innovation Efficiency 
 
Good G Poor G Good G Poor G 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
SOX Signal -0.069 -0.155** -0.030** -0.332** 
 
(-1.14) (-2.24) (-2.09) (-2.18) 
Log Total Asset 0.415*** 0.379*** 0.007 -0.002 
 
(6.27) (6.36) (1.51) (-0.17) 
Firm Age 0.010*** 0.004 -0.000 0.003 
 
(3.43) (0.93) (-0.20) (0.96) 
ROA 0.527 0.614*** 0.061 0.064 
 
(1.11) (3.13) (0.96) (0.70) 
Tobin's Q 0.085*** 0.097*** 0.005 -0.002 
 
(4.00) (4.69) (1.64) (-0.26) 
Cash -0.053 -0.398*** -0.024 -0.033 
 
(-0.13) (-3.00) (-0.64) (-0.57) 
Leverage -0.518** -0.407** -0.040 -0.063 
 
(-2.25) (-2.37) (-1.22) (-1.26) 
CAPEX 0.590 -0.308 0.007 -0.279 
 
(0.40) (-0.30) (0.03) (-0.58) 
R&D Expense 7.032*** 5.098** -0.367 0.228* 
 
(5.31) (2.54) (-1.30) (1.68) 
Hindex 0.524 -0.200 0.019 -0.067 
 
(1.53) (-0.48) (0.28) (-0.53) 
Constant 0.476 -2.690*** 0.088 0.215 
 
(0.80) (-8.42) (1.59) (1.41) 
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3903 2980 3903 2980 
adj. R-sq 0.587 0.539 0.042 -0.012 
 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results of subsample regressions examining how 
the effects of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act on innovation productivity vary with the firms’ 
level of corporate governance, which measured by G-Index. In each year, firms with G-
Index that higher than median are considered as Good governance firms and Poor 
governance otherwise. The dependent variables in Columns (1) to (2) are the logarithm of 
one plus the number of successfully granted patent applications filed in each year of each 
firm, and the dependent variables in Columns (3) to (4) is firms’ Innovative Efficiency 
(Hirshleifer, Hsu and Li, 2013); the main independent variable is SOX Signal, which 
equals to one if observations are of years no less than 2002 and zero otherwise. All 
regressions control for the logarithm of total asset, firm age, return on asset (ROA), 
Tobin’s Q, leverage, R&D expense, capital expenditure (CAPX), Herfindahl Index based 
on the three-digit SIC code, as well as year, two-digit SIC industry. Robust t-statistics 
with standard errors clustered at the industry (two-digit SIC code) and year level are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table III.6: Impact of SOX on high-tech vs. low-tech firms 
  Log(1+Patent) Innovation Efficiency 
 
High Tech Non-High High Tech Non-High 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
SOX Signal -0.151*** -0.035*** -0.055*** -0.023 
 
(-4.74) (-3.60) (-3.18) (-0.75) 
Log Total Asset 0.361*** 0.113*** -0.003 -0.002 
 
(25.90) (18.23) (-0.42) (-0.64) 
Firm Age 0.010*** 0.008*** -0.001 0.001 
 
(3.81) (6.93) (-0.65) (1.21) 
ROA -0.091** 0.015 -0.007 -0.005 
 
(-2.37) (1.18) (-0.85) (-0.53) 
Tobin's Q 0.015*** 0.008*** -0.000 0.000 
 
(6.82) (10.17) (-0.38) (0.74) 
Cash -0.004 -0.013* 0.012 0.004 
 
(-0.19) (-1.70) (1.18) (1.14) 
Leverage -0.089*** -0.078*** -0.003 -0.020** 
 
(-3.02) (-5.90) (-0.24) (-2.38) 
CAPEX 0.720** -0.175 0.237*** -0.068 
 
(2.44) (-1.52) (3.21) (-1.42) 
R&D Expense 0.720*** 0.642*** -0.169** -0.045 
 
(8.44) (7.51) (-2.15) (-1.32) 
Hindex -0.375 0.267** -0.401** 0.019 
 
(-0.87) (2.56) (-2.36) (0.46) 
Constant -2.351*** -0.461 0.080 0.035 
 
(-19.38) (-1.41) (1.09) (1.41) 
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 8790 28549 8790 28549 
adj. R-sq 0.444 0.280 0.005 0.002 
 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results of subsample regressions examining how 
the effects of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act on innovation productivity vary within high-
technology industries and non-high-technology industries. As in Hall and Lerner (2010) 
the high-technology sectors include drugs, office and computing equipment, 
communications equipment and electronic components, and the rest are classified as non-
high-technology sectors. The dependent variables in Columns (1) to (2) are the logarithm 
of one plus the patent number and the dependent variables in Columns (3) to (4) is firms’ 
Innovative Efficiency (Hirshleifer, Hsu and Li, 2013); the main independent variable is 
SOX Signal, which equals to one if observations are of years no less than 2002 and zero 
otherwise. All regressions control for the logarithm of total asset, firm age, return on asset 
(ROA), Tobin’s Q, leverage, R&D expense, capital expenditure (CAPX), Herfindahl 
Index based on the three-digit SIC code, as well as year, two-digit SIC industry. Detailed 
definitions of each variable are provided in the Appendix. Robust t-statistics with 
standard errors clustered at the industry (two-digit SIC code) and year level are reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table III.7: Impact of SOX on firms gone private vs. remaining listed 
  Log(1+Patent) Log(1+Patent) 
  (1) (2) 
SOX * Delisted Signal 0.188*** 0.150*** 
 
(5.72) (4.42) 
Delisted Signal -0.531*** -0.210*** 
 
(-11.25) (-5.16) 
SOX Signal -0.245*** -0.357*** 
 
(-13.68) (-16.17) 
Log (Total Asset) 
 
0.254*** 
  
(22.39) 
Firm Age 
 
0.003** 
  
(2.05) 
ROA 
 
-0.002 
  
(-1.64) 
Tobin's Q 
 
0.001*** 
  
(4.49) 
Cash Flow/Assets 
 
0.001 
  
(1.26) 
Leverage 
 
0.001* 
  
(1.86) 
CAPX/Assets 
 
1.152*** 
  
(5.11) 
R&D Expense/Assets 
 
0.009 
  
(0.99) 
Herfindahl Index 
 
0.291** 
  
(2.15) 
Constant 1.501** -0.422 
 
(2.00) (-0.64) 
Year F. E. Yes Yes 
Industry F. E. Yes Yes 
Observations 22013 21782 
Adj. R2 0.173 0.374 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results of subsample regressions examining how 
the effects of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act on innovation productivity vary between firms 
did not delist until 2006 and firms delisted during 2001 to 2003. It use the NBER dataset 
to include sample of patent number for both listed and delisted firms. The sample period 
is from 1998 to 2006. The Delisted Signal equals to one if the firm delisted during 2001 
to 2003 and zero otherwise. The dependent variables are measures of innovation 
productivity including patents; the main explanatory variable is the SOX Signal’s 
interaction term with Delisted Signal. Regressions control for the logarithm of total assets, 
firm age, return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q, Cash Flow-to-Assets, Leverage, R&D 
Expense-to-Assets, CAPX-to-Assets and Herfindahl Index based on the three-digit SIC 
code as well as year, two-digit SIC industry. Detailed definitions of each variable are 
provided in the Appendix. Robust t-statistics with standard errors clustered at the industry 
(two-digit SIC code) and year level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
